Abstract
Child labour is dead wrong. The coalition and Unilever agree on that. Yet, they disagree on the scope of chain responsibility, a closely related question of ethical principle. Both parties subscribe to this principle as an important part of corporate social responsibility. The coalition appeals to the principle of chain responsibility to justify its criticism of Unilever and to argue that the latter has a duty to prevent child labour. Unilever, in its turn, asserts that the principle does not apply in this particular case and that the company need not act upon it. It appears that the idea of chain responsibility is open to multiple interpretations. This contribution explores the principle of chain responsibility to explain the difference of opinion between Unilever and the coalition. The first step is to reflect on the meaning of “responsibility”. The following is to consider how “chain” denominates this responsibility. The last step offers thoughts on the differing scopes that the parties assign to chain responsibility. Needless to say, these considerations will not resolve the moral conflict. Yet, they may deepen business ethical reflection on the case.
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Notes
- 1.
The following does not pretend to be comprehensive. There is much discussion in practical philosophy (ethics, philosophy of mind and action) on the nature and capability of (moral) responsibility, especially in relation to the problem of free will (in the context of determinism) and what it means to be an actor. The following considerations intend only to explain chain responsibility and give an idea of its complexity.
- 2.
According to a famous and authoritative article that deeply influenced philosophical debate on responsibility (Strawson, 1992), someone is responsible if she is the proper object of reactive attitudes like praise and blame, resentment, indignation, hurt feelings, anger, gratitude, reciprocal love, and forgiveness etc. (See Eshleman, 2008). Such reactive attitudes are constitutive of social life.
- 3.
Compare this with the strong statement in SER, 2005:61–62: “Accepting chain responsibility should be sharply demarcated from accepting legal chain liability. There can usually be no question of the latter at all.” Note that this statement follows a quote from former Unilever CEO Brugmans about Unilever’s views on chain responsibility (see below in main text).
- 4.
One French and continental school of philosophy emphasises the importance of a 2nd-person perspective. The Other holds you responsible (Cf. Emmanuel Levinas’s ethical philosophy) in a close I – thou relation (Cf. M. Buber’s dialogical philosophy). More recently, moral philosopher Steven Darwall offered a 2nd-person view of responsibility. Yet, Darwall builds on an Anglo-Saxon neo-Kantian analytical philosophy (Darwall, 2006).
- 5.
In role responsibility, the actor takes responsibility (renders account) for activities and events not of her choosing or causation. One example: A state secretary must assume responsibility for the errors of officials in her department.
- 6.
Chain responsibility can also involve the client, to the extent that she is taken to be a link in the production and supply chain. Action groups appeal to the chain responsibility of clients when they, for example, call people to buy Fair Trade products like coffee.
- 7.
The quote continues as follows: “Due to increasing globalization of the economy, product chains get an increasing global character. It heavily depends on the complexity and diversity of the chain, how a company takes its corporate social responsibility. Meanwhile the factor of power plays an important role as well.” (Cramer and Klein, 2005:14, curs. and transl. jjk). Note that chain responsibility is taken here as a 1st-person obligation as in the SER, 2005 recommendation.
- 8.
Links in the chain are reasonably evident, but their degree of interdependence is subject to discussion.
- 9.
At least until Unilever formally ceased growing cottonseed.
- 10.
The case description shows that Unilever and the coalition also disagree about the facts of the matter. Facts are very important in ethical reflection, but they hardly if ever appear in moral deliberation in their pure form, i.e. without bias, without implicit evaluation or interpretation. The weight given to facts in a moral conflict often depends on the ethical views of the one doing the weighing. So the quarrel about facts is actually a mock battle in the moral conflict between Unilever and the coalition.
- 11.
Chain responsibility as chain liability may not be plausible from a legal perspective (see note 3). Yet it can be, to a certain extent, from a moral point of view.
- 12.
Burgmans was speaking about food supply chains and the risk of crises in such chains when consumers no longer trust food safety.
- 13.
People can feel compelled by the power of their own attraction to ideals, but this is less transferable to others than is the normative force of a minimal duty.
References
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Kole, J. (2011). Commentary: The Scope of Chain Responsibility. In: Dubbink, W., van Liedekerke, L., van Luijk, H. (eds) European Business Ethics Cases in Context. Issues in Business Ethics, vol 28. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9334-9_20
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