Abstract
Most contemporary theories of the justification of empirical belief have ruled out sensory perception as a source of justification. The arguments favoring this position, however, have not sufficiently addressed the central points that Husserl has made in support of his claim that sensory perception is a source of justification. Husserl’s discussion undermines one of the main arguments used to deny perception an originating role, namely the argument whose grounds are the epistemic regress problem. When the phenomenological analyses which Husserl uses to support his position are extended beyond the point to which he developed them in order to bring out the role of future time-consciousness in verification, as this article does, there results an approach to epistemic justification which has promise as a rival to the coherentist and naturalistic theories that have become prevalent in recent times.
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Notes
- 1.
Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985). This work will subsequently be referred to in the body of the text as “SK.”
- 2.
Edmund Husserl, Analysen zur passiven Synthesis, Husserliana XI (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), p. 96.
- 3.
Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, tr. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), pp.122–29. This work will subsequently be referred to in the body of the text as “FTL”.
- 4.
Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment, tr. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 198. This work will subsequently be referred to in the body of the text as “EJ.”
- 5.
Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, tr. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 61. This work will subsequently be referred to in the body of the text as “CM.”
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McKenna, W. (2010). Perception as a Source of Justification of Belief. In: Nenon, T., Blosser, P. (eds) Advancing Phenomenology. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 62. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9286-1_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9286-1_9
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