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Formal and Empirical Methods in Philosophy of Science

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The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science

Part of the book series: The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective ((PSEP,volume 1))

Abstract

This essay addresses the methodology of philosophy of science and illustrates how formal and empirical methods can be fruitfully combined. Special emphasis is given to the application of experimental methods to confirmation theory and to recent work on the conjunction fallacy, a key topic in the rationality debate arising from research in cognitive psychology. Several other issues can be studied in this way. In the concluding section, a brief outline is provided of three further examples.

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Acknowledgements

Work supported by a grant from the Spanish Department of Science and Innovation (FFI2008-01169/FISO).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Turin, via Sant’Ottavio 20, 10124, Turin, Italy

    Vincenzo Crupi

  2. Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University, 5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands

    Stephan Hartmann

Authors
  1. Vincenzo Crupi
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  2. Stephan Hartmann
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Correspondence to Vincenzo Crupi .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. , Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Vienna Circle, Universitätscampus, Hof 1, Vienna, A-1090, Austria

    Friedrich Stadler

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Crupi, V., Hartmann, S. (2010). Formal and Empirical Methods in Philosophy of Science. In: Stadler, F. (eds) The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9115-4_7

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