Abstract
In the version of the paper “Is Naturalism the Unsurpassable Philosophy for the Sciences of Man in the Twenty-first Century?” Daniel Andler sent me a few days ago, he puts forth a position in the sciences of Man he starts calling liberalized naturalism. In the course of the paper’s development, however, Andler’s own brand of liberalized naturalism is further clarified as minimal naturalism. Further on, he characterizes minimal naturalismas methodological naturalism with philosophically wide open eyes. This is the complex term he ends up selecting as the designator of the position he wants to mark out. What is then methodological naturalism with philosophically wide open eyes?
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AntÓNio, Z. (2010). What Does it Mean to Be a Naturalist in the Human and Social Sciences?. In: Stadler, F. (eds) The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9115-4_22
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