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Judicial Review of Legislation pp 135–179Cite as

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Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 5))

Abstract

The third element of judicial review discussed – in addition to its judicial fora and modalities, which were addressed in previous chapters – is that of its content. What is it that is actually scrutinised when a court tests the quality of legislation? Taken at its broadest, the content of review can pertain to the legality and legitimacy of a norm. Legality, simply put, involves the technical issue whether the norm in question is a legal one, while legitimacy concerns its material value as measured against fundamental rights. A court must always decide if what it is presented is actually a law, otherwise any norm can be pleaded before judges without them having the ability to establish if it really is a law. The greater the bench’s powers to analyse a norm’s legal pedigree, the more the judiciary ventures onto the middle ground between it and the legislature. This chapter explores the contours of judicial review in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and South Africa as far as its content is concerned.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Van der Schyff, supra note 18, at 132–167.

  2. 2.

    M.C.B. Burkens, Beperking van grondrechten (Deventer: Kluwer, 1971), at 93; Van der Schyff, supra note 18, at 136–137.

  3. 3.

    Namibian Constitution (1990), at secs. 44, 67, 77, 79(2), 80(2).

  4. 4.

    For delegated legislation the situation is different. Most jurisdictions, be they inspired by parliamentary sovereignty or judicially enforced constitutional supremacy, allow the courts to test whether such legislation is in accordance with the enabling act of parliament. One only has to recall the case already discussed of R. v. Lord Chancellor, Ex parte Witham, supra note 62, where a court in the United Kingdom reviewed delegated legislation to test if it met the requirements of its parent statute.

  5. 5.

    Cf. United States v. Lovett, 328 US 303 (1946), at 428; Rautenbach and Malherbe, supra note 22, at 345–346.

  6. 6.

    Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom of 26 April 1979, Publ. Eur. Court H.R., Series A, no. 30, at par. 271: “First, the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case.”

  7. 7.

    The standard formulation being that of the European Court of Human Rights in Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom, supra note 541, at par. 271: “Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as ‘law’ unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able – if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail.”

  8. 8.

    Theodor Maunz and Reinhold Zippelius, Deutsches Staatsrecht (München: Beck, 28th ed., 1991), at 158.

  9. 9.

    Tushnet, supra note 284, at 178–180; Daphne Barak-Erez and Aeyal M. Gross, “Introduction: Do We Need Social Rights?: Questions in the Era of Globalisation, Privatisation, and the Diminished Welfare State”, in Daphne Barak-Erez and Aeyal M. Gross (eds.), Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice 1 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) who speak of socio-economic rights as being relegated to a second-class status.

  10. 10.

    There need not necessarily be a conflict between legislation and higher law. One can think of an action based on legislation also constituting an interference with higher law. However, this study restricts itself primarily to legislation, as explained earlier in § 11.

  11. 11.

    Limitation provisions need not only be written, but can also be unwritten. That is, implied by the courts, as in the case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium v. Belgium of 23 July 1968, Publ. Eur. Court H.R., Series A, no. 6, at par. B 5 of the Law, regarding the right to education in art. 2 of the Protocol no. 1 to the European Convention. See Van der Schyff, supra note 18, at 16, 127.

  12. 12.

    Art. 10(2) reads: “The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” (Emphasis added.)

  13. 13.

    Cf. Susan Marks, “The European Convention on Human Rights and its ‘Democratic Society’ ”, 66 Br. Yearb. Int. L. 209 (1995).

  14. 14.

    Van der Schyff, supra note 18, at 152–154; the Canadian decision in The Queen v. Oakes, (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200 (SCC), at 225.

  15. 15.

    Karen Reid, A Practitioner’s Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), at 37.

  16. 16.

    Tushnet, supra note 284, at 170–171.

  17. 17.

    For example, Chahal v. The United Kingdom of 15 November 1996, Reports, 1996-V, at par. 80.

  18. 18.

    In Selmouni v. France of 28 July 1999, Reports and Judgments and Decisions, 1999-V, at par. 101, the European Court of Human Rights explained that as times change, so do interpretations, which could mean that actions which did not previously qualify as torture, may come to be qualified as such at a later stage. Cf. Michael K. Addo and Nicholas Grief, “Does Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Enshrine Absolute Rights?”, 9 Eur. J. Int. L. 510 (1998).

  19. 19.

    Traditionally acts of parliament are viewed as the highest form of law without being subject to higher law, in order to respect parliament’s sovereignty; parliament can theoretically not be bound by any source of law apart from its own political will. Cf. Anthony Bradley, “The Sovereignty of Parliament – Form or Substance?”, in Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver (eds.), The Changing Constitution 26 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 5th ed., 2004), at 28–29.

  20. 20.

    Wadham et al., supra note 57, at 17–18, list a number of protection gaps in the HRA, arguing that the right to an effective remedy, article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, had to be incorporated as well, instead of assuming that adopting the HRA is sufficient in providing such a remedy.

  21. 21.

    Edinburgh and Dalkeith Railway Co v. Wauchope, (1842) 8 Cl and F 710, at 725. Confirmed by Lord Bingham of Cornhill in Jackson v. Her Majesty’s Attorney General, supra note 93, at par. 27.

  22. 22.

    Bradley, supra note 554, at 35–37; Feldman, supra note 37, at 32.

  23. 23.

    Pickin v. British Railways Board, [1974] AC 765. Confirmed in Jackson v. Her Majesty’s Attorney General, supra note 93, at par. 27 (per Lord Bingham of Cornhill), at par. 49 (per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead).

  24. 24.

    Jackson v. Her Majesty’s Attorney General, supra note 93, at paras. 9–21; Feldman, supra note 37, at 113; Parpworth, supra note 31, at 87–91; Richard Ekins, “Acts of Parliament and Parliament Acts”, 123 L. Quart. Rev. 91 (2007).

  25. 25.

    The effect of the Parliament Acts is that the House of Lords may not delay money bills for more than a month. All other public bills (save those wanting to extend the life of parliament beyond five years) may be passed by the Commons alone after two successive sessions and a year has passed between the first reading and the bill’s acceptance in the second session.

  26. 26.

    The Acts have only been used the pass the Government of Ireland Act (1914); Welsh Church Disestablishment Act (1915); Parliament Act (1949); War Crimes Act (1991); European Parliamentary Elections Act (1999); Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act (2000); Hunting Act (2004).

  27. 27.

    Jackson v. Her Majesty’s Attorney General, supra note 93, at paras. 39–41, 68–70, 128. In this matter the Hunting Act (2004) was challenged. The Act was passed under the 1911 and 1949 Parliament Acts. It was argued that the 1949 Act, which amended the 1911 Act, had to have been adopted by both legislative chambers, as it wished to amend the 1911 Act which was passed by both chambers. The House of Lords rejected the argument; the 1911 Act was itself not immune from the qualified procedure it created.

  28. 28.

    Silver v. The United Kingdom of 25 March 1983, Publ. Eur. Court H.R., Series A, no. 61, at par. 86.

  29. 29.

    Jackson v. Her Majesty’s Attorney General, supra note 93, at par. 27.

  30. 30.

    Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. I (1765), at 45–46.

  31. 31.

    R. v. Shayler, [2002] UKHL 11.

  32. 32.

    As to executive power, Helen Mountfield, “The Concept of a Lawful Interference with Fundamental Rights”, in Jeffrey Jowell and Jonathan Cooper (eds.), Understanding Human Rights Principles 5 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), at 19–21, argues that the HRA’s legality requirements will mean that the Crown is no longer able to do everything which is not forbidden (a negative conception), but that the exercise of executive power must be based on a positive basis in law (only that which is allowed). This is undoubtedly correct. Yet, issue can be taken with Mountfield’s overreliance on the “predictability” requirement to fetter discretion (at 23–24). This reading is contestable, as it runs the risk of stealing the wind from legitimacy review by asking too many substantive questions under legality review. Cf. Van der Schyff, supra note 18, at 180–183.

  33. 33.

    For example, A. and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (no. 2), [2005] UKHL, 71[2006] 2 AC 221, where the use of evidence in British courts that was obtained under torture was discussed. On the function of civil and political versus social rights, see Barak-Erez and Gross, supra note 544, at 1–2.

  34. 34.

    Cf. Alastair Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations Under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004).

  35. 35.

    Cf. Eva Brems, “Indirect Protection of Social Rights by the European Court of Human Rights”, in Daphne Barak-Erez and Aeyal M. Gross (eds.), Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice 135 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007); Ana Gomez Heredero, Social Security as a Human Right: The Protection Afforded by the European Convention on Human Rights (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2007).

  36. 36.

    Cyprus v. Turkey of 10 May 2001, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 2001-IV, at par. 219.

  37. 37.

    Bernard and Another v. Enfield LBC, [2002] EWHC 2282, [2003] 2 HRLR 4.

  38. 38.

    Cf. Ellie Palmer, Judicial Review, Socio-economic Rights and the Human Rights Act (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007).

  39. 39.

    Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza, supra note 220, at par. 46.

  40. 40.

    Ibid., at par. 41.

  41. 41.

    For example, A. and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (no. 2), supra note 568, at par. 53.

  42. 42.

    Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza, supra note 220, at par. 18.

  43. 43.

    R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Brind, supra note 66; Parpworth, supra note 31, at 310; Sir Stephen Sedley, “The Rocks or the Open Sea: Where Is the Human Rights Act Heading?”, 32 J. L. Soc. 3 (2005), at 9.

  44. 44.

    Cf. Lord Irvine of Lairg, “Judges and Decision-makers: The Theory and Practice of Wednesbury Review”, Pub. L. 59 (1996); Paul Kearnes, “United Kingdom Judges and Human Rights Cases”, in Esin Örücü (ed.), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases 63 (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2003), at 73; Ian Leigh and Laurence Lustgarten, “Making Rights Real: The Courts, Remedies, and the Human Rights Act”, 58 Camb. L. J. 509 (1999), at 522.

  45. 45.

    R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Daly, [2001] UKHL 26, at par. 27.

  46. 46.

    R. v. Ministry of Defence, Ex parte Smith, [1996] QB 517, CA, at 554.

  47. 47.

    Howard Charles Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of the European Human Rights Jurisprudence (The Hague: Kluwer, 1996); Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2002), at 300; Stefan Sottiaux and Gerhard van der Schyff, “Methods of International Human Rights Adjudication: Towards a More Structured Decision-making Process for the European Court of Human Rights”, 31 Hastings Int. Comp. L. Rev. 115 (2008), at 134–136.

  48. 48.

    R. v. Director of Public Prosecutions, Ex parte Kebilene, [1999] UKHL 43; Wadham et al., supra note 57, at 48–49. However, the doctrine keeps rearing its head from time to time. For example, in A. and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, supra note 230, at par. 37, where the Attorney General referred to the doctrine and argued that British courts should afford the same discretion in issues of national security afforded national authorities by the European Court of Human Rights.

  49. 49.

    Cf. Lord Lester of Herne Hill and David Pannick, Human Rights Law and Practice (London: Butterworths, 1999, first supplement 2000), at par. 3.21.

  50. 50.

    Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead reasoned in A. and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, supra note 230, at par. 80, that parliament and the executive deserved “an appropriate degree of latitude” because they were “primary decision-makers” – the courts’ role being to check their decisions.

  51. 51.

    For example, Feldman, supra note 37, at 387; Sir David Keene, “Principles of Deference under the Human Rights Act”, in Helen Fenwick, Gavin Phillipson and Roger Masterman (eds.), Judicial Reasoning under the Human Rights Act 206 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

  52. 52.

    See again § 113. For example, Aileen Kavanagh, “Deference or Defiance? The Limits of the Judicial Role in Constitutional Adjudication”, in Grant Huscroft (ed.), Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory 184 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), at 189–190, argues that showing “deference” is not by definition pejorative, but only when it is taken too far.

  53. 53.

    R. v. Director of Public Prosecutions, Ex parte Kebilene, supra note 583.

  54. 54.

    Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (London: Cavendish Publishing, 3rd ed., 2007), at 189–190.

  55. 55.

    A. and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, supra note 230. See generally, Aileen Kavanagh, “Judging the Judges under the Human Rights Act: Deference, Disillusionment and the ‘War on Terror’”, Pub. L. 287 (2009).

  56. 56.

    This because of international law or “practical considerations” according to the act.

  57. 57.

    A. and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, supra note 230, at par. 68.

  58. 58.

    Ibid., at paras. 39, 40, 42.

  59. 59.

    Ibid., at paras. 80–81.

  60. 60.

    Gearty, supra note 84, at 121.

  61. 61.

    Cf. Fenwick, supra note 589, at 195, who warns that neglecting the HRA might be more damaging to people’s rights than the constitutional position prior to the HRA had been.

  62. 62.

    On these sources, see Kortmann, supra note 348, at 90 (Constitution), 106 (Charter), 131 (international law), 135 (fundamental principles), and 113 (on EU law in particular).

  63. 63.

    On constitutional review, see § 39 and on treaty review, §§ 43–44.

  64. 64.

    Parliamentary Proceedings II, 2002–2003, 28, 331, no. 9, at 11. See also § 51.

  65. 65.

    See the discussion of the abstract review of bills in §§ 188–193.

  66. 66.

    Hoge Raad, 27 January 1961, NJ 1963, 248; Van Houten, supra note 107, at 41–46; Kortmann, supra note 348, at 376–377; Leonard F.M. Besselink, Constitutional Law of the Netherlands: An Introduction with Texts, Cases and Materials (Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri, 2004), at 91–94.

  67. 67.

    Currently s. 63 of the Constitution.

  68. 68.

    Van den Bergh judgment, supra note 473, 31.

  69. 69.

    Ibid., at 33.

  70. 70.

    Ibid.

  71. 71.

    On the enrolled rule in the United Kingdom, see §§ 228–229.

  72. 72.

    R. Kranenburg, Het Nederlands staatsrecht (Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 8th ed., 1958), at 289; C.W. van der Pot, Handboek van het Nederlandse staatsrecht (Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 6th ed., 1957), at 111.

  73. 73.

    Hoge Raad, 25 November 1912, W. 9419.

  74. 74.

    S. 87(1) of the Constitution provides: “A Bill shall become an Act of Parliament once it has been passed by the Parliament and ratified by the King.”

  75. 75.

    On non-binding review, see Van Houten, supra note 107, at 8–11, as well as §§ 40, 93 and § 311.

  76. 76.

    See the opinion expressed in § 188.

  77. 77.

    In Dutch: “(1) Ieder heeft het recht zijn godsdienst of levensovertuiging, individueel of in gemeenschap met anderen, vrij te belijden, behoudens ieders verantwoordelijkheid volgens de wet. (2) De wet kan ter zake van de uitoefening van dit recht buiten gebouwen en besloten plaatsen regels stellen ter bescherming van de gezondheid, in het belang van het verkeer en ter bestrijding of voorkoming van wanordelijkheden.”

  78. 78.

    On treaty review in terms of s. 94 of the Constitution, see §§ 43–44 and § 308.

  79. 79.

    On these legality requirements, see § 222.

  80. 80.

    For example, art. 18(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) stipulates that interferences with the right to freedom of religion must be “prescribed by law”, without including any instructions on whether the power to limit the right may be delegated or not – a simple legal basis suffices. Compare s. 7 of the Dutch Constitution, which sets out how different forms of media may be limited – some may only be limited by an act of parliament, others through delegated legislation.

  81. 81.

    Burkens et al., supra note 13, at 337–341.

  82. 82.

    Hoge Raad, 10 May 1996, NJ 1996, 578.

  83. 83.

    Goodwin v. The United Kingdom of 27 March 1996, Reports, 1996-II.

  84. 84.

    Cf. A.J. Nieuwenhuis, “Van proportionaliteit tot appreciatiemarge: De noodzakelijkheidstoets in de jurisprudentie van het EHRM”, in Aernout J. Nieuwenhuis, Ben J. Schueler and Carla M. Zoethout (eds.), Proportionaliteit in het publiekrecht 37 (Deventer: Kluwer, 2005), at 56–59.

  85. 85.

    Cf. Besselink, supra note 601, at 154.

  86. 86.

    Hoge Raad, 30 May 1986, NJ 688.

  87. 87.

    Cf. Wilhelm Wengler, Die Unanwendbarkeit der Europäischen Sozialcharta im Staat (Bad Homburg: Gehlen, 1969).

  88. 88.

    Evert Alkema, “The Effects of the European Convention on Human Rights and Other International Human Rights Instruments on the Netherlands Legal Order”, in Rick Lawson and Matthijs de Blois (eds.), The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe: Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, vol. III, 1 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), at 13–14.

  89. 89.

    For example, Hoge Raad, 18 January 1980, NJ 1980, 463; Hoge Raad, 4 June 1982, NJ 1983, 32; Hoge Raad, 21 March 1986, NJ 1986, 585; Hoge Raad, 10 November 1989, NJ 1990, 628; Alkema, supra note 623, at 4–6.

  90. 90.

    Henry G. Schermers, “Some Recent Cases Delaying the Direct Effect of International Treaties in Dutch law”, 10 Mich. J. Int. L. 266 (1989), at 275. Exploring judicial activism, see Marc de Werd and Reiner de Winter, “Judicial Activism in the Netherlands: Who Cares?”, in Rob Bakker, Aalt Willem Heringa and Frits Stroink (eds.), Judicial Control: Comparative Essays on Judicial Review 101 (Antwerp: Maklu, 1995).

  91. 91.

    Cf. Alkema, supra note 623, at 5.

  92. 92.

    Wiarda, supra note 250, at 97–104, argued that although the separation of powers in the Netherlands was not absolute, it did not mean that judges could be allowed to act as arbiters distinguishing the reasonable from the unreasonable. He lamented the tendency of calling on judges to enforce principles of good governance, instead of simply applying the objective law as presented them. To him, the solution in keeping the judiciary strictly separate from the legislature and executive when it comes to law-making lies in enacting clear norms that will leave little or no room for judicial creativity (at 105–107). Similarly C.A.J.M. Kortmann, Staatsrecht en raison d’Etat (Deventer: Kluwer, 2009), at 11–12, criticises the Supreme Court’s “law-making” as overstepping its powers resulting in more confusion than good.

  93. 93.

    Van den Bergh judgment, supra note 473, at 33.

  94. 94.

    Hoge Raad, 19 February 1858, W. 1936; Hoge Raad, 28 February 1868, W. 2995; Hoge Raad, 5 May 1959, NJ 1959, 361; Hoge Raad, 28 January 1994, NJ 1994, 687; Van Houten, supra note 107, at 46–51; F.T. Groenewegen, Wetsinterpretatie en rechtsvorming (The Hague: Boom, 2006), at 160. On the promise that this type of interpretation holds, see R. de Lange, “Constitutionele toetsing van wetgeving in Nederland”, Regelmaat 142 (2006), at 148–150.

  95. 95.

    Harmonisation Act judgment, supra note 105. Cf. Belifante and De Reede, supra note 101, at 197–198.

  96. 96.

    For other references, see §§ 47–49 and § 311.

  97. 97.

    Harmonisation Act judgment, supra note 105, at paras. 5.2, 5.3.

  98. 98.

    Ibid., at paras. 3.3, 3.4, 4.1.

  99. 99.

    Ibid., at paras. 3.8, 4.6.

  100. 100.

    Ibid., at par. 3.4; Hoge Raad, 12 April 1978, NJ 1979, 533; Hoge Raad, 15 July 1988, RvdW 1988, 133. This refers to what are known as the contra legem cases where an act of parliament is not applied because its strict application would be at odds with the legislature’s intention. At first glance, this may seem like a form of legitimacy review, as it can lead to the wording of an act being ignored, but it is actually an interpretive method designed to ascertain and give effect to the legislative will without being distracted by the wording of an enactment.

  101. 101.

    Ibid., at par. 3.1.

  102. 102.

    Parliamentary Proceedings II, 2002–2003, 28, 331, no. 9, at 18–19.

  103. 103.

    Secs. 54(1), (2)(a)-(b), 56, 99, 113(3), 114, 121, and 129(1).

  104. 104.

    In what is probably the only exception, s. 15(4) of the Constitution reads: “A person who has been lawfully deprived of his liberty may be restricted in the exercise of fundamental rights in so far as the exercise of such rights is not compatible with the deprivation of liberty.” The words “in so far as” are generally understood to require a proportionality exercise.

  105. 105.

    Studiecommissie VMC, “Preadvies inzake een nieuwe tekst voor de artikelen 7 en 13 van de Grondwet”, 11(11–12) Mediaforum (1999) on http://www.mediaforum.nl/ (last accessed on 19 November 2009).

  106. 106.

    H. Franken, Rapport: Commissie grondrechten in het digitale tijdperk (The Hague: Ministry of the Interior, 2000), at 56–58; Parliamentary Proceedings II, 2000–2001, 27 460, no. 1, at 6.

  107. 107.

    Schutgens, supra note 249, at 26.

  108. 108.

    A.W. Hins, “Constitutionele toetsing, proportionaliteit, Verhältnismässigkeit”, in Aernout J. Nieuwenhuis, Ben J. Schueler and Carla M. Zoethout (eds.), Proportionaliteit in het publiekrecht 61 (Deventer: Kluwer, 2005), at 77–78; Prakke, supra note 123, at 23.

  109. 109.

    Hins, ibid., at 66.

  110. 110.

    S. 2 of the Constitution.

  111. 111.

    Moreover, apart from a single exception relating to the equality of the two official languages in s. 89, the 1983 Constitution could be amended by simple majority, s. 99. This reaffirmed the idea that parliament’s will had to decide the day while being obstructed as little as possible.

  112. 112.

    See generally Dion Basson and Henning Viljoen, South African Constitutional Law (Cape Town: Juta, 1988), at 169–200.

  113. 113.

    Consider, for example, the president or premier’s constitutional power to refer a bill whose constitutionality they doubt to the Constitutional Court before agreeing to assent to it, provided that the bill was first sent back to the relevant legislature for fresh consideration. Secs. 79, 121 of the Constitution. On the abstract review of bills in South Africa, see also §§ 202–204.

  114. 114.

    Dawood; Shalabi; Thomas v. Minister of Home Affairs, 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC), 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC), at par. 47; the separate opinion of Mokgoro J. in President of the RSA v. Hugo, 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC), 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC), at paras. 99, 102.

  115. 115.

    Doctors for Life International v. Speaker of the National Assembly, supra note 278; Rassie Malherbe, “Openbare betrokkenheid by die wetgewende proses kry oplaas tande”, J. S. Afr. L. 594 (2007); Rassie Malherbe, “South Africa: The National Council of Provinces”, in Gerhard van der Schyff (ed.), Constitutionalism in the Netherlands and South Africa: A Comparative Study 103 (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2008), at 115–118.

  116. 116.

    Doctors for Life International v. Speaker of the National Assembly, supra note 278, at paras. 4–7.

  117. 117.

    On public involvement as a constitutional imperative, see Doctors for Life International v. Speaker of the National Assembly, supra note 278, at par. 14; King and Others v. Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control and Another, 2006 (4) BCLR 462 (SCA), 2006 (1) SA 474 (SCA), at par. 7.

  118. 118.

    S. 59(1)(a) of the Constitution; Doctors for Life International v. Speaker of the National Assembly, supra note 278, at par. 5.

  119. 119.

    Doctors for Life International v. Speaker of the National Assembly, supra note 278, at par. 164.

  120. 120.

    Ibid., at paras. 167–197.

  121. 121.

    Ibid., at par. 24.

  122. 122.

    Ibid., at paras. 22, 36, 70, 122–124; President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. South African Rugby Football Union and Others, 1999 (7) BCLR 725 (CC), 1999 (4) SA 147 (CC), at par. 72.

  123. 123.

    Doctors for Life International v. Speaker of the National Assembly, supra note 278, at paras. 22, 199.

  124. 124.

    Ibid., at par. 146.

  125. 125.

    Ibid., at paras. 146, 198.

  126. 126.

    Ibid., at par. 194.

  127. 127.

    Ibid., at paras. 225, 245, 339.

  128. 128.

    Ibid., at par. 200.

  129. 129.

    S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 32, at par. 104.

  130. 130.

    Coetzee v. Government of the RSA; Matiso v. Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison, 1995 (10) BCLR 1382 (CC), 1995 (4) SA 631 (CC), at par. 11: “At the very least a law or sanction limiting the right to freedom must have a reasonable goal (…).”

  131. 131.

    Minister of Home Affairs v. National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-integration of Offenders, 2004 (5) BCLR 445 (CC), 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC), at par. 2.

  132. 132.

    Ibid., at par. 28; August and Another v. Electoral Commission and Others, 1999 (4) BCLR 363 (CC), 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC), at par. 16.

  133. 133.

    Minister of Home Affairs v. National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-integration of Offenders, supra note 666, at par. 55.

  134. 134.

    Ibid., at par. 56.

  135. 135.

    Ibid., at par. 57.

  136. 136.

    Richter v. Minister for Home Affairs and Others, [2009] ZACC 3, 2009 (3) SA 615 (CC).

  137. 137.

    Ibid., at paras. 72–73.

  138. 138.

    S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 32.

  139. 139.

    Ibid., at paras. 5, 25.

  140. 140.

    Ibid., at paras. 112, 116, 125, 136, 141.

  141. 141.

    Ibid., at par. 104.

  142. 142.

    Ibid., at paras. 144–146.

  143. 143.

    Ibid., at paras. 87–89.

  144. 144.

    Dennis Davis, “The Case Against the Inclusion of Socio-economic Demands in a Bill of Rights Except as Directive Principles”, 8 S. Afr. J. Hum. Rights 475 (1992).

  145. 145.

    For example, Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal, 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC), 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC); Khosa and Others v. Minister of Social Development and Others; Mahlaule and Another v. Minister of Social Development and Others, supra note 499; President of the RSA and Another v. Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, 2005 (8) BCLR 786 (CC), 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC).

  146. 146.

    Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), at 221–237; Rassie Malherbe, “The Development of Social and Economic Rights in South Africa”, 60 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 111 (2005); Motala and Ramaphosa, supra note 148, at 390–408; Pierre de Vos, “Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Human Rights? Social and Economic Rights in South Africa’s 1996 Constitution”, 13 S. Afr. J. Hum. Rights 67 (1997); Marius Pieterse, “Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights”, 20 S. Afr. J. Hum. Rights 383 (2004); Theunis Roux, “Legitimating Transformation: Political Resource Allocation in the South African Constitutional Court”, in Siri Gloppen, Roberto Gargarella and Elin Sklaar (eds.), Democratization and the Judiciary: The Accountability Function of Courts in New Democracies 92 (London: Frank, 2003).

  147. 147.

    Government of the RSA v. Grootboom, supra note 189.

  148. 148.

    Ibid., at par. 3.

  149. 149.

    Ibid., at paras. 34–35.

  150. 150.

    Ibid., at paras. 20, 94.

  151. 151.

    Ibid., at paras. 41, 96–99.

  152. 152.

    Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others (no. 2), 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC), 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC), at par. 38.

  153. 153.

    Chassagnou v. France of 25 April 1999, Reports, 1999-III, at par. 112; Leyla Şahin v. Turkey of 10 November 2005, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 2005-XI, at par. 108.

  154. 154.

    See §§ 268–271, where the decision was discussed.

  155. 155.

    See §§ 245–247.

  156. 156.

    Jackson v. Her Majesty’s Attorney General, supra note 93, at par. 168.

  157. 157.

    For example, the Government of Ireland Act (1914); Welsh Church Disestablishment Act (1915); Parliament Act (1949); War Crimes Act (1991); European Parliamentary Elections Act (1999); Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act (2000); Hunting Act (2004).

  158. 158.

    For example, Hins, supra note 643, at 77–78; Prakke, supra note 123, at 23. See § 264.

  159. 159.

    For example, Mevis, supra note 301, at 934–935, laments the fact that the Halsema Proposal is “stingy” and only “supplements” current judicial protection, whereas it should have been a “revolution”.

  160. 160.

    Robert A. Schrire, “Parliamentary Opposition After Apartheid: South Africa”, 14 J. Legis. Stud. 190 (2008), at 206.

  161. 161.

    I.e. civil and political rights are treated as core instruments of constitutionalism.

  162. 162.

    Parliamentary Proceedings II, 2002–2003, 28, 331, no. 9, at 20.

  163. 163.

    See again §§ 235–236 on the United Kingdom, and §§ 253–255 on the Netherlands.

  164. 164.

    On socio-economic rights before South African courts, see again §§ 278–280.

  165. 165.

    United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report (2008) table 1.

  166. 166.

    For example, the National Health Service in the United Kingdom, the publically funded health care system which is based on the needs of the patients and not on their ability to pay, was introduced by legislation and started operating in 1948. In 1957, the Algemene Ouderdomswet (AOW, General Old Age Pensions Act) was adopted by the Dutch legislature, the effect of which was to create a guaranteed state pension for every resident in the country irrespective of their employment history.

  167. 167.

    Gerhard van der Schyff, “The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Netherlands and South Africa Compared: Can the Many Differences be Justified?”, Potchefstroom Electr. L. J. 1 (2008), at 14–15.

  168. 168.

    See the remarks by the Constitutional Court in Government of the RSA v. Grootboom, supra note 189, at par. 1.

  169. 169.

    Sunstein, supra note 681, at 235–237.

  170. 170.

    Ibid., at 235.

  171. 171.

    Hirschl, supra note 6, at 92–93, 216–218. Also putting the views of Hirschl into perspective, see Maurice Adams and Gerhard van der Schyff, “Grondwettigheidstoetsing door de rechter als ‘list van de rijke’? Methodologische en andere vragen bij processen van rechtsverandering”, 45 Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht 913 (2008), at 958–959; Leslie Friedman Goldstein, “From Democracy to Juristocracy”, 38 L. Soc. Rev. 611 (2004), at 626.

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    Dr. Gerhard Van Der Schyff

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Van Der Schyff, G. (2010). Content of Review. In: Judicial Review of Legislation. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9002-7_6

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