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Three Systems of Judicial Review

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Judicial Review of Legislation

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 5))

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Abstract

Judicial review as an instrument in pursuit of constitutionalism must be understood in relation to its particular constitutional system. One can only hope to understand the feature of review and its contours by grasping the context against which it came to develop and function. This chapter charts the state of the judicial review of legislation in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and South Africa, mindful of each country’s background and legal system. The resulting overview will be used in later chapters to further study review as a means of controlling power.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See generally, Lord Bingham, “The Rule of Law”, 66 Camb. L. J. 67 (2007); Parpworth, supra note 31, at 36–38.

  2. 2.

    For the classic exposition, see A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: Macmillan, 10th ed., 1959), at 406–414.

  3. 3.

    Parpworth, supra note 31, at 14–15.

  4. 4.

    Israel and New Zealand are also usually referred to as countries with unwritten constitutions.

  5. 5.

    David Feldman (ed.), English Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), at 3–4, 6–8; O. Hood Phillips, Paul Jackson and Patricia Leopold, Constitutional and Administrative Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 8th ed., 2001), at 18. Since the Norman Conquest the country has only known customary constitutions, except between 1653 and 1660 when following the Civil War the Instrument of Government was drafted under Oliver Cromwell.

  6. 6.

    Dicey, supra note 34, at 23.

  7. 7.

    Ibid., at 24.

  8. 8.

    Madzimbamuto v. Lardner Burke, [1969] 1 AC 645, PC, at 724; Feldman, supra note 37, at 16.

  9. 9.

    Feldman, supra note 37, at 7–8.

  10. 10.

    Ibid. Similarly, Dicey, supra note 34, at 145, warned that it would be “political madness to tamper gratuitously” with important acts of parliament, although doing so would be procedurally quite easy.

  11. 11.

    George Winterton, “The British Grundnorm: Parliamentary Supremacy Re-examined”, 92 L. Quart. Rev. 591 (1976).

  12. 12.

    H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), at 145.

  13. 13.

    Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe, [1965] AC 172, PC, at 198.

  14. 14.

    Winterton, supra note 43, at 594–595.

  15. 15.

    Ann Lyon, Constitutional History of the United Kingdom (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2003), at 221–227.

  16. 16.

    Ibid., at 235–255.

  17. 17.

    The Charter of Liberties of 1100 and the Magna Carta of 1215 can also be mentioned as early forerunners in seeking to limit the power of the king.

  18. 18.

    Dicey, supra note 34, at 39–40. Footnotes omitted. Cf. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999).

  19. 19.

    Winterton, supra note 43, at 596; Koopmans, supra note 6, at 18.

  20. 20.

    Michael Foley, The Politics of the British Constitution (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), at 25.

  21. 21.

    Ibid., at 20–21.

  22. 22.

    E.g. Dicey, supra note 34, at 199, argued that: “The Habeas Corpus Acts declare no principle and define no rights, but they are for practical purposes worth a hundred constitutional articles guaranteeing individual liberty.”

  23. 23.

    Tony Wright, Citizens and Subjects. An Essay on British Politics (London: Routledge, 1994), at 16.

  24. 24.

    Feldman, supra note 37, at 36–37.

  25. 25.

    John Wadham, Helen Mountfield, Anna Edmundson and Caoilfhionn Gallagher, Blackstone’s Guide to the Human Rights Act (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 4th ed., 2007), at 3.

  26. 26.

    John Doyle and Belinda Wells, “How Far Can the Common Law Go Towards Protecting Rights?”, in Philip Alston (ed.), Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives 17 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

  27. 27.

    Cf. Dicey, supra note 34, at 73 arguing that: “The electors can in the long run always enforce their will.”

  28. 28.

    Wadham et al., supra note 57, at 3; T.R.S Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), at 135–143.

  29. 29.

    E.g., in Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, at 1066, the C.J. of the Common Pleas identified what today would be called the right to property in the following terms: “The great end, for which men entered society, was to secure their property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances, where it has not been taken away or abridged by some public law for the good of the whole.” Cf. Ian Loveland, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 4th ed., 2006), at 59–61.

  30. 30.

    R. v. Lord Chancellor, Ex parte Witham, [1997] 2 All ER 779.

  31. 31.

    Ibid., at 783f–784a.

  32. 32.

    Loveland, supra note 61, at 691–692.

  33. 33.

    The Court’s judgments do not automatically change national law, it is up to the United Kingdom to effect any change. For example, the well-known decision in Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom of 26 April 1979, Publ. Eur. Court of H.R., Series A, no. 30, led to changes in the law on contempt of court in 1981.

  34. 34.

    R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Brind, [1991] UKHL 4, [1991] 1 AC 696.

  35. 35.

    Wadham et al., supra note 57, at 4.

  36. 36.

    Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers, [1992] QB 770; R. v. Khan, [1996] 3 WLR 162.

  37. 37.

    Cf. Wadham et al., supra note 57, at 101–109.

  38. 38.

    E.g. Rabinder Singh, The Future of Human Rights in the United Kingdom (Oxford: Hart, 1997), at 17–37; Lord Steyn, “2000–2005: Laying the Foundations of Human Rights Law in the United Kingdom”, 4 Eur. Hum. Rights L. Rev. 349 (2005), at 351.

  39. 39.

    James Young, “The Politics of the Human Rights Act”, 26 J. L. Soc. 27 (1999), at 29–30.

  40. 40.

    Cf. Bingham, supra note 2, at 390; Singh, supra note 70, at 38–44.

  41. 41.

    Steyn, supra note 70, at 349, opined that the traditional approach to protecting rights had become inadequate.

  42. 42.

    The Government’s White Paper, Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, Cm. 3782, October 1997, at par. 1.14.

  43. 43.

    ECmHR, no. 4403/70 (joined with other applications), East African Asians v. The United Kingdom of 10 October 1970; 3 EHRR 1981, 76, at paras. 197–202, 207–209.

  44. 44.

    Ronald Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain (London: Chatto & Windus, 1990), at 1. Justifying these assumptions, see K.D. Ewing and C.A. Gearty, Freedom Under Thatcher: Civil Liberties in Modern Britain (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990).

  45. 45.

    Cf. Richard Gordon and Tim Ward, Judicial Review and the Human Rights Act (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2000); Feldman supra note 37, at 373–445.

  46. 46.

    Cf. White Paper, Rights Brought Home, supra note 74, at paras. 1.18–1.19.

  47. 47.

    S. 6(1)-(2) of the HRA. Cf. Wadham et al., supra note 57, at 72–76 on the meaning of the term “public authority”.

  48. 48.

    S. 4 of the HRA.

  49. 49.

    The so-called fast-track option, see § 303.

  50. 50.

    By July 2006 15 declarations of incompatibility had been made, one of which was remedied by a s. 10 remedial order. Cf. Department for Constitutional Affairs, Review of the Implementation of the Human Rights Act, July 2006, at 17.

  51. 51.

    Cf. Wadham et al., supra note 57, at 52–53.

  52. 52.

    Cf. A.W. Bradley and K.D. Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Edinburgh, Pearson, 13th ed., 2003), at 418–419; Wadham et al., supra note 57, at 7–8; Conor Gearty, Principles of Human Rights Adjudication (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 21–26.

  53. 53.

    J.W.F. Allison, The English Historical Constitution: Continuity, Change and European Effects (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 175.

  54. 54.

    R. v. A., [2001] UKHL 25, [2001] 3 All ER 1, at par. 44 (per Lord Steyn). Cf. Aileen Kavanagh, Constitutional Review Under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 19–117, for an extensive treatment.

  55. 55.

    In this, it goes further than the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act of 1990, but not as far as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982, see § 300.

  56. 56.

    Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council, [2002] EWHC, 195, [2003] QB 151, at par. 63.

  57. 57.

    E.g. the pressure group Charter 88. See http://www.unlockdemocracy.org.uk/, last accessed on 19 November 2009; Wadham et al., supra note 57, at 17–18, who highlight gaps in the HRA’s protection.

  58. 58.

    “Cameron to Fight Human Rights Act”, Daily Telegraph (13 May 2006); Theo Rycroft, “The Rationality of the Conservative Party’s Proposal for a British Bill of Rights”, 1 UCL Hum. Rights Rev. 51 (2008).

  59. 59.

    Department for Constitutional Affairs, Review of the Implementation of the Human Rights Act, July 2006, 35.

  60. 60.

    Wadham et al., supra note 57, at 18.

  61. 61.

    Jackson v. Her Majesty’s Attorney General, [2005] UKHL, 56, at par. 159. See also Mark Elliott, “United Kingdom: Parliamentary Sovereignty under Pressure”, 2 Int. J. Const. L. 545 (2004), at 551.

  62. 62.

    Burkens et al., supra note 13, at 11–37; Willem Witteveen, “Inhabiting Legality”, in Sanne Taekema (ed.), Understanding Dutch Law 75 (The Hague: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2004).

  63. 63.

    Cf. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, State, Society, Liberty: Studies in Political Theory and Constitutional Law (New York: Berg, 1991), at 53 et seq.

  64. 64.

    S. 7 states that publishing thoughts or opinions may only be limited by an act of parliament, while the authority to limit radio and television broadcasts may be delegated. Commercial advertising is excluded from constitutional protection altogether.

  65. 65.

    Cf. Böckenförde, supra note 95, at 60 et seq.

  66. 66.

    Cf. Constantijn A.J.M. Kortmann and Paul P.T. Bovend’Eert, Dutch Constitutional Law (The Hague: Kluwer, 2000), at 28–34.

  67. 67.

    S. 43 of the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (1954).

  68. 68.

    Foreword to J.R. Stellinga, De Grondwet systematisch gerangschikt (Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink, 1950). Author’s translation of “De hoofdzaak van ons staatsrecht staat niet in de Grondwet. De Grondwet opene slechts de gelegenheid, dat zich een stelsel ontwikkele.”

  69. 69.

    Kortmann and Bovend’Eert, supra note 98, at 20. On the shortcomings of the Constitution, see also A.D. Belifante and J.L. de Reede, Beginselen van het Nederlandse staatsrecht (Deventer: Kluwer, 16th ed., 2009), at 24–25.

  70. 70.

    Cf. G. Leenknegt, “The Protection of Fundamental Rights in a Digital Age”, in E. Hondius and C. Joustra (eds.), Netherlands Report to the Sixteenth International Congress of Comparative Law 325 (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2002), at 327–328.

  71. 71.

    “De rechter treedt niet in de beoordeling van de grondwettigheid van wetten en verdragen” in Dutch.

  72. 72.

    D.J. Elzinga, R. de Lange and H.G. Hoogers, Handboek van het Nederlandse staatsrecht (Deventer: Kluwer, 15th ed., 2006), at 205–206. See generally on judicial review in the Netherlands, Heringa and Kiiver, supra note 15, at 111–113; Belifante and de Reede, supra note 101, at 196; L.F.M. Besselink, “Constitutionele toetsing in internationaal perspectief”, 52 Ars Aequi 89 (2003); Richard Happé and Hans Gribnau, “The Netherlands – National Report: Constitutional Limits to Taxation in a Democratic State: The Dutch Experience”, 15 Mich. State J. Int. L. 417 (2007), at 420–423.

  73. 73.

    Hoge Raad, 14 April 1989, AB 1989, 207 (Harmonisation Act), at par. 4.6. Cf. E.M.H. Hirsch Ballin, “De harmonisatiewet: Onschendbaarheid van de wet en van het rechtszekerheidsbeginsel”, 38 Ars Aequi 578 (1989).

  74. 74.

    Parliamentary Proceedings II, 1974–1975, at 2325, 2431.

  75. 75.

    Harmonisation Act judgment, supra note 105, at par. 3.1; A.W. Heringa, “Constitutionele schijnbewegingen”, in A.W. Heringa and N. Verheij (eds.), Publie-krechtelijke bewegingen 67 (Deventer: Kluwer, 1990), at 68–69; M.L.P. van Houten, Meer zicht op wetgeving (Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink, 1997), at 8–11.

  76. 76.

    Harmonisation Act judgment, supra note 105, at par. 3.1.

  77. 77.

    Leenknegt, supra note 102, at 328.

  78. 78.

    Cf. Gert-Jan Leenknegt, Raymond Kubben and Beatrix Jacobs, Opstand en eenwording: Een institutionele geschiedenis van het Nederlandse openbaar bestuur (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006); Sanne Taekema, “Introducing Dutch Law”, in Sanne Taekema (ed.), Understanding Dutch Law 17 (The Hague: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2004), at 24–27.

  79. 79.

    P.J. Oud and J. Bosmans, Staatkundige vormgeving in Nederland 1840–1940, vol. 1 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 10th ed., 1990), at 208–224.

  80. 80.

    Th.L. Bellekom, A.W. Heringa, J. van der Velde and L.F.M. Verhey, Compendium van het staatsrecht (Deventer: Kluwer, 10th ed., 2007), at 280.

  81. 81.

    Rudy B. Andeweg and Galen A. Irwin, Governance and Politics of the Netherlands (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), at 148.

  82. 82.

    Gert-Jan Leenknegt and Gerhard van der Schyff, “Reforming the Electoral System of the Dutch Lower House of Parliament: An Unsuccessful Story”, 8 German L. J. 1133 (2007), at 1141–1142. To be found at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/ (last accessed on 19 November 2009).

  83. 83.

    Kortmann and Bovend’Eert, supra note 98, at 28.

  84. 84.

    Hoge Raad 6 March 1959, NJ 1962, 2 (Nyugat).

  85. 85.

    E.C.M. Jurgens, “Wetgever heeft laatste woord over uitleg van Grondwet”, Regelmaat 68 (1995).

  86. 86.

    Cf. Burkens et al., supra note 13, at 90.

  87. 87.

    Kortmann and Bovend’Eert, supra note 98, at 28.

  88. 88.

    In Dutch “Binnen het Koninkrijk geldende wettelijke voorschriften vinden geen toepassing, indien deze toepassing niet verenigbaar is met een ieder verbindende bepalingen van verdragen en van besluiten van volkenrechtelijke organisaties.”

  89. 89.

    A provision of international law is considered to bind all persons, if it is directed at people and not only the state, requires no further legislative or executive clarification and is based on a written instrument, see further Burkens et al., supra note 13, at 339–341.

  90. 90.

    The precondition is that s. 91(3) of the Constitution provides that treaties which detract from the Constitution must be adopted by the States General with a two-thirds majority, and not a simple majority as would otherwise be the case. Cf. D. Breillat, C.A.J.M. Kortmann and J.W.A. Fleuren, Van de constitutie afwijkende verdragen (Deventer: Kluwer, 2002).

  91. 91.

    The debate is a long and extensive one in the Netherlands. No attempt will be made to restate the debate here, except for a number of important points in order to understand and evaluate it. Cf. Elzinga et al., supra note 104, at 204–205; Van Houten, supra note 107; Bellekom et al., supra note 112, at 322–337; L. Prakke, “Bedenkingen tegen het toetsingsrecht”, 122 Handelingen Nederlandse Juristen-Vereniging 1 (1992); L. Prakke, Toetsing in het publiekrecht (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972); J.M. Barendrecht, “Het constitutionele toetsingsrecht van de rechter”, 122 Handelingen Nederlandse Juristen-Vereniging 85 (1992), for more extensive treatments.

  92. 92.

    Proeve van een nieuwe Grondwet (The Hague: Government Publication, 1966).

  93. 93.

    J.L.M.Th. Cals and A.M. Donner, Tweede Rapport van de Staatscommissie van advies inzake de Grondwet en de Kieswet (The Hague: Government Publication, 1969).

  94. 94.

    Harmonisation Act judgment, supra note 105, at par. 5.2.

  95. 95.

    Ibid., at par. 3.1.

  96. 96.

    S. 43(1): “Each of the Countries shall promote the realisation of fundamental human rights and freedoms, legal certainty and good governance.” In Dutch: “Elk der landen draagt zorg voor de verwezenlijking van de fundamentele menselijke rechten en vrijheden, de rechtszekerheid en de deugdelijkheid van het bestuur.”

  97. 97.

    Harmonisation Act judgment, supra note 105, at par. 4.2

  98. 98.

    Ibid., at par. 3.6.

  99. 99.

    Ibid., at par. 3.1.

  100. 100.

    Nota inzake rechterlijke toetsing (The Hague: Government Publication, 1991). The Supreme Court gave its support to the idea of lifting the bar on judicial review in s. 120 of the Constitution, but only in respect of a number of predominantly civil and political rights (published in 7 NJCM-bulletin 243 (1992)).

  101. 101.

    Parliamentary Proceedings II, 2001–2002, 28, 331, no. 2; 2002–2003, 28, 331, no. 9.

  102. 102.

    Parliamentary Proceedings II , 2002–2003, 28, 331, no. 9, at 20.

  103. 103.

    R.J. Hoekstra, Hart voor de publieke zaak: Aanbevelingen van de Nationale Conventie voor de 21e eeuw (The Hague: National Convention, 2006).

  104. 104.

    Ibid., at 9, 47. See also the working group’s preparatory report which lists a few possibilities, Carla Zoethout, Jan Willem Sap, Roel Kuiper and Omar Ramadan, Een grondwet voor de 21 ste eeuw: Voorstudie van de werkgroep Grondwet van de Nationale Conventie (The Hague: National Convention, 2006), at 34.

  105. 105.

    Parliamentary Proceedings II, 2002–2003, 28, 331, no. 9, at 11.

  106. 106.

    W.J. Witteveen, Evenwicht der machten (Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink, 1991), at 85–86.

  107. 107.

    Cf. C.L.G.F.H. Albers and R.J.N. Schlössel, “Terrorismebestrijding: Het bestuursrecht aan zet, de rechtsstaat in gevaar?”, Nederlands Juristenblad 2526 (2006).

  108. 108.

    Parliamentary Proceedings II, 2002–2003, 28, 331, no. 9, at 15.

  109. 109.

    Ibid., at 14.

  110. 110.

    Ibid., at 12–15.

  111. 111.

    S. 137 of the Constitution.

  112. 112.

    Parliamentary Proceedings II, 2003–2004, 28, 331, no. 11.

  113. 113.

    Parliamentary Proceedings I, 2004–2005, 28, 331, B, C.

  114. 114.

    Ibid., at B, 4–5. The party eventually voted in favour of the bill, which shows the unpredictability of the debate.

  115. 115.

    On the low rate of success of constitutional amendments, see Maurice Adams and Gerhard van der Schyff, “Constitutional Review by the Judiciary in the Netherlands: A Matter of Politics, Democracy or Compensating Strategy?”, 66 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 399 (2006), at 405; M.M. Bense, “Aandacht voor recente grondwetswijzigingen”, Regelmaat 89 (2002).

  116. 116.

    Cf. Rautenbach and Malherbe, supra note 22, at 15–22; Ziyad Motala and Cyril Ramaphosa, Constitutional Law: Analysis and Cases (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 1–12; Iain Currie and Johan de Waal (eds.), The New Constitutional and Administrative Law, vol. I (Lansdowne: Juta, 2001), at 57–71.

  117. 117.

    Francois Venter, “Aspects of the South African Constitution of 1996: An African Democratic and Social Federal Rechtsstaat”, 57 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 51 (1997), emphasises the rechtsstaat paradigm. Martin Chanock, “A Post-Calvinist Catechism or a Post-Communist Manifesto? Intersecting Narratives in the South African Bill of Rights Debate”, in Philip Alston (ed.), Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives 392 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), at 397, speaks of a transition from the “rule of law” to a “bill of rights”.

  118. 118.

    Leonard Monteath Thompson, The Unification of South Africa: 1902–1910 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd ed., 1961); Martin Chanock, Unconsummated Union: Britain, Rhodesia, and South Africa 1900–1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977).

  119. 119.

    Motala and Ramaphosa, supra note 148, at 2.

  120. 120.

    E.g. Anthony S. Matthews, Law, Order and Liberty in South Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), used the classic Westminster rule of paradigm to analyse South African public law.

  121. 121.

    Dicey, supra note 34, at 73.

  122. 122.

    Peter Warwick, Black People and the South African War 1899–1902 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), at 181.

  123. 123.

    Motala and Ramaphosa, supra note 148, at 2.

  124. 124.

    Representation of Natives Act, no. 12 of 1939. Cf. John Dugard, Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), at 29.

  125. 125.

    Dugard, supra note 157, at 28–30.

  126. 126.

    Separate Representation of Voters Act, no. 46 of 1951.

  127. 127.

    Harris v. Minister of the Interior, 1952 (2) SA 428 (A). Cf. Erwin N. Griswold, “The ‘Coloured Vote Case’ in South Africa”, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1361 (1952); the foreword by E.C.S. Wade to Dicey, supra note 34, at LVII–LXII.

  128. 128.

    High Court of Parliament Act, no. 35 of 1952.

  129. 129.

    Minister of the Interior v. Harris, 1952 (4) SA 769 (AD). Cf. Erwin N. Griswold, “The Demise of the High Court of Parliament in South Africa”, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 864 (1953).

  130. 130.

    Senate Act, no. 53 of 1955; Appellate Division Quorum Act, no. 27 of 1955.

  131. 131.

    South Africa Act Amendment Act, no. 9 of 1956.

  132. 132.

    National States Citizenship Act, no. 26 of 1970.

  133. 133.

    Coloured Persons Representative Council Act, no. 49 of 1964; South African Indian Council Act, no. 31 of 1968.

  134. 134.

    Cf. Dugard, supra note 157, at 53–202.

  135. 135.

    Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, no. 110 of 1983.

  136. 136.

    Heinz Klug, “Historical Background”, in Matthew Chaskalson, Janet Kentridge, Jonathan Klaaren, Gilbert Marcus, Derek Spitz and Stuart Woolman (eds.), Constitutional Law of South Africa 2/10 (Kenwyn: Juta, Revision Service 5, 1999).

  137. 137.

    Harold MacMillan delivered his famed “Wind of Change” speech to the South African parliament in Cape Town on 3 February 1960. In it, he accepted that the era of colonialism in Africa was coming to an end with the increase of national consciousness among the continent’s peoples. This meant that apartheid was a doomed policy, as it negated the aspirations of the country’s African population, something which the Zeitgeist would not tolerate forever.

  138. 138.

    Willem de Klerk, “The Process of Political Negotiation: 1990–1993”, in Bertus de Villiers (ed.), Birth of a Constitution 4 (Kenwyn: Juta, 1994).

  139. 139.

    Motala and Ramaphosa, supra note 148, at 5–9; George Devenish, “The Interim Constitution in the Making”, 60 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 612 (1997).

  140. 140.

    The negotiations faltered on the required majority with which the new constitution had to be adopted by an elected constitution-making body. The ANC supported a threshold of 70% for ordinary constitutional provisions and 75% for the bill of rights, while the National Party government insisted on 75% for the entire text. Matters were also complicated by the fact that the Inkatha Freedom Party went so far as to reject an elected constitution-making body altogether. Instead, it suggested Codesa as the appropriate forum to draft a consensus-based constitution, which would then have to be approved by referendum. For an overview, see Heinz Klug, “Participating in the Design: Constitution-making in South Africa”, 3 Rev. Const. Stud. 18 (1996), at 31–39.

  141. 141.

    Motala and Ramaphosa, supra note 148, at 9-12.

  142. 142.

    Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, no. 200 of 1993. Cf. Lourens du Plessis and Hugh Corder, Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights (Kenwyn: Juta, 1994); A.J. Steenkamp, “The South African Constitution of 1993 and the Bill of Rights: An Evaluation in Light of International Human Rights Norms”, 17 Hum. Rights Quart. 101 (1995).

  143. 143.

    Interestingly, the inclusion of fundamental rights stood in stark contrast to previous views held by many whites that recognising inalienable rights contradicted religion and was therefore unacceptable. Cf. Johannes A. van der Ven, Jaco S. Dreyer and Hendrik J.C. Pieterse, Is There a God of Human Rights? The Complex Relationship between Human Rights and Religion: A South African Case (Leiden: BRILL, 2004), at 307 et seq.

  144. 144.

    E.g. in S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 32, at par. 9, it was made clear that the approach of the Constitutional Court had to be “generous” and “purposive” in giving “expression to the underlying values of the Constitution”. For a critique of the courts traditional approach to textual interpretation, see Du Plessis and Corder, supra note 174, at 62–72, and on the way forward at 72–83; Christo Botha, Statutory Interpretation (Cape Town: Juta, 4th ed., 2005), at 118–128.

  145. 145.

    Cf. Francois Venter, “Requirements for a New Constitutional Text: The Imperatives of the Constitutional Principles”, 112 S. Afr. L. J. 32 (1995).

  146. 146.

    The Constitutional Court made this point quite forcefully in New National Party of SA v. Government of the RSA, 1999 (5) BCLR 489 (CC), 1999 (3) SA 191 (CC), at par. 120: “Many injustices of the past flowed directly from the denial of the right to vote on the basis of race to the majority of South Africans. The denial of the right to vote entrenched political power in the hands of white South Africans. That power was used systematically to further the interest of white South Africans and to disadvantage black South Africans. As South Africans, therefore, we should be aware of the power of the franchise, and the importance of its universality.”

  147. 147.

    The transition also included a power-sharing arrangement that allowed smaller parties representation in the executive if they polled enough votes. Secs. 84, 88 of the interim Constitution of South Africa (1993).

  148. 148.

    On public participation and the legitimacy it brought to the drafting of the new Constitution, see Klug, supra note 172, at 56–57.

  149. 149.

    Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC), 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC). Jeremy Sarkin, “The Drafting of South Africa’s Final Constitution from a Human Rights Perspective”, 47 Am. J. Comp. L. 67 (1999), at 72–77; Hirschl, supra note 6, at 184–187.

  150. 150.

    Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, supra note 181, at paras. 34, 36, 38.

  151. 151.

    Ibid., at par. 482.

  152. 152.

    Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1997 (1) BCLR 1 (CC), 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC).

  153. 153.

    Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, supra note 181, at par. 10.

  154. 154.

    Alfred Cockrell, “The South African Bill of Rights and the ‘Duck/Rabbit’”, 60 Mod. L. Rev. 513 (1997); Peter N. Bouckaert, “The Negotiated Revolution: South Africa’s Transition to Multiracial Democracy”, 33 Stanford J. Int. L. 375 (1997); Richard J. Goldstone, “The South African Bill of Rights”, 32 Texas Int. L. J. 1451 (1997); Rassie Malherbe, “The South African Constitution”, 55 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 61 (2000).

  155. 155.

    S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 32, at par. 88. Cf. Max du Plessis, “Between Apology and Utopia: The Constitutional Court and Public Opinion”, 18 S. Afr. J. Hum. Rights 1 (2002).

  156. 156.

    S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 32.

  157. 157.

    Government of the RSA v. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC), 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC).

  158. 158.

    Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v. Minister of Home Affairs (CC), supra note 25, at par. 114.

  159. 159.

    Hirschl, supra note 6, at 92–93, 216–218.

  160. 160.

    Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 55.

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    Dr. Gerhard Van Der Schyff

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Van Der Schyff, G. (2010). Three Systems of Judicial Review. In: Judicial Review of Legislation. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9002-7_2

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