Abstract
In 1940, Lon Fuller (1940, 2) wrote that the fundamental task of legal philosophy is to give effective and meaningful direction to the application of human energies in the law. However, he added ruefully, judged by this standard, the preceding quarter century had not been a fruitful one. Despite his sympathy with the realists’ practitioner-focused approach to law, he argued that their theoretical lens distorted our perception of the reality of law and that positivism, in both its classical Austinian form and its latter-day reinventions, fared no better. Against the prevailing jurisprudential winds, Fuller proposed a form of jurisprudence that looked to many readers like a natural-law theory, albeit in a subtly qualified, secular form. In philosophical circles, Fuller’s work is remembered largely for the thesis that there is an “internal morality of law,” the principles of which correspond to familiar principles of the rule of law (a close cousin to the notion of Rechtsstaat).
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Postema, G.J. (2011). Implicit Law and Principles of Legality. In: A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8960-1_4
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