Abstract
Carbonell engages with MacCormick’s theory of legal argumentation. Carbonell re-constructs, in a critical fashion, MacCormick’s concept of coherence in legal reasoning, and places it in the context of his theory of legal pluralism. The salience of the theory is determined by analysing the extent to which MacCormick’s theory underlines the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union; and the extent to which coherent argumentation may ground the claim of MacCormick to it being the best possible theory of European Community law. Carbonell finds that the resort to coherence by ECJ as a means of increasing the breadth and scope of Community law does not foster a legally pluralistic re-construction of Community law, but is, indeed, an instrument of its monistic re-construction. Indeed, it turns the Court into the final decision-maker in charge of solving conflicting interpretations or collisions of norms. This casts some doubts not only as to the affinity between legal pluralism and coherence, but also as to the extent to which the European legal order is a pluralistic one.
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Notes
- 1.
Alexy’s special-case thesis is the main reference here. See R. Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation: The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); “The Special Case Thesis”, (1999) 12 Ratio Juris, pp. 374–384.
- 2.
These are, roughly speaking, and without accounting for the particularities that they present in Germany, Finland and Scotland, the Civil-law tradition, the Scandinavian tradition and the Common-law tradition respectively.
- 3.
A further product of the joint concern on this topic were the meetings held between Aarnio, Alexy and Peczenik between 1979 and 1980, which resulted in the well-known collective article by these authors “The Foundation of Legal Reasoning”, (1981) 12 Rechtstheorie, pp. 133–158, pp. 257–279 and pp. 423–448.
- 4.
A. Aarnio, ‘Why Coherence – A Philosophical Point of View’, in: A. Aarnio (ed), On Coherence Theory of Law, (Lund: Juristfoerlaget, 1998), pp. 28–40, at 34. In a different sense, Bobbio refers to coherence as a “legal virtue”. Legal coherence, for this author, is the respect of the legality principle (pacta sunt servanda). N. Bobbio, Studi sulla teoria generale del diritto, (Torino: Giappichelli, 1950), p. 149 et seq.
- 5.
N. MacCormick, “Arguing about Interpretation”, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 132 and p. 139.
- 6.
N. MacCormick, “Being Reasonable”, ibid., p. 188.
- 7.
N. MacCormick, “Coherence, Principles and Analogies”, in: Rhetoric and the Rule of Law, note 5 supra p. 189.
- 8.
As for the role of coherence in legal reasoning see R. Alexy, ‘Coherence and Argumentation or the Genuine Twin Criterialess Super Criterion’ in Aarnio, note 4 supra, pp. 41–49; R. Alexy and A. Peczenick, “The Concept of Coherence and Its Significance for Discursive Rationality”, (1990) 3 Ratio Juris, pp. 130–147; S. Bertea, “The Arguments from Coherence: Analysis and Evaluation”, (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 369–391; K. Günther, “A Normative Conception of Coherence for a Discursive Theory of Legal Justification”, (1989) 2 Ratio Juris, pp. 155–166; J. van Dunné, “Normative and Narrative Coherence in Legal Decision Making”, in: F. Atria and N. MacCormick (eds), Law and Legal Interpretation, (Aldershot: Ashgate-Dartmouth Publishing, 2003), pp. 409–429; L. Moral Soriano, “A Modest notion of Coherence in Legal Reasoning. A Model for the European Court of Justice”, (2003) 16 Ratio Juris, pp. 296–323. For wider views of coherence in legal science, see Nerhot, “Interpretation in Legal Science. The notion of narrative coherence”, in: Nerhot (ed), Law, Interpretation and Reality. Essays in Epistemology, Hermeneutics and Jurisprudence, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990), pp. 193–225, and A. Peczenik, “Coherence in Legal Doctrine”, in: E. Pattaro (ed), Scientia Juris. Legal Doctrines as Knowledge of Law and as a Source of Law. A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, volume 4, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), pp. 115–165; J. Raz, “The Relevance of Coherence”, in: idem, Ethics in the Public Domain. Essays in Morality of Law and Politics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.
- 9.
N. Rescher, The Coherence Theory of Truth, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973); J. Young, “The Coherence Theory of Truth”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-coherence (accessed 20 June 2010).
- 10.
S. J. Pethick, “An Investigation of Coherence and Coherence Theory in Relation to Law and Legal Reasoning”, (DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2000), p. 18. Etymologically, the word comes from the Latin cohærere (“cohere”) that means to stick (hærere) together (com-).
- 11.
N. MacCormick, “Formal Justice and the form of Legal Arguments”, in: C. Perelman (ed), Études de logique juridique, (Brussels: Bruylant, 1976), pp. 103–118, pp. 114–115.
- 12.
This distinction is kept also in his recent writings, for example, in MacCormick, note 6 supra, p. 190.
- 13.
Gianformaggio considers this distinction, together with the one between weak and strong derivability, of fundamental importance. L. Gianformaggio, “Legal Certainty, Coherence and Consensus: Variations on a Theme by MacCormick” in: Nerhot, note 8 supra, pp. 402–430, at 420.
- 14.
P. Comanducci, “Osservazioni in margine a N. MacCormick’s ‘La congruenza nella giustificazione giuridica’”, in: P. Comanducci and R. Guastini, L’analisi del ragionamento giuridico, (Torino: Giappichelli, 1987), pp. 265–272, at 272.
- 15.
N. MacCormick, ‘Universals and Particulars’, in: Rhetoric and the Rule of Law, note 5 supra, pp. 98–99, p. 78 and p. 89.
- 16.
MacCormick, ‘Legal Narratives’, in Rhetoric and the Rule of Law, note 5 supra, pp. 230–231.
- 17.
MacCormick, ‘Formal Justice…’, note 11 supra, pp. 114–115. This is the link also pointed out by M. La Torre, Constitutionalism and Legal Reasoning. A New Paradigm for the Concept of Law, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2007), pp. 63–64.
- 18.
MacCormick, “Arguing about Interpretation” note 5 supra, pp. 127–132.
- 19.
MacCormick, ‘Legal Narratives’, note 16 supra, p. 231.
- 20.
J. Bengoetxea, “Legal System as a Regulative Ideal”, (1994) 53 Archiv für Rechts – und Sozialphilosophie, pp. 59–88.
- 21.
The first two have to do with the major premise (law), and the others with the minor premise (facts). See N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978 – quoted from the second edition of 1994), pp. 65–72 and pp. 87–97.
- 22.
Ibid., p. 132. The first two are requirements of the decision making sense within the given system, while the latter looks for the decision to make sense with the perceptible world.
- 23.
MacCormick, “Coherence, Principles…”, note 7 supra, p. 192.
- 24.
N. MacCormick, “Coherence in Legal Justification”, in: A. Peczenick, L. Lindhal and B. van Roermund (eds), Theory of Legal Science, (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1984), pp. 235–251, at 236–238.
- 25.
MacCormick, “Coherence, Principles…”, note 7 supra, p. 192.
- 26.
Ibid., p. 189.
- 27.
Ibid., p. 194. Concerning A. Aarnio, see On Legal Reasoning, (Turku: Turun Yliopisto, 1977), pp. 126–129; and The Rational as Reasonable. A Treatise on Legal Justification, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1987).
- 28.
Justification through principles has been distinguished from justification through consequences. See J. Wróblewski, “Justification through principles and justification through consequences”, in: C. Farrali and E. Pattaro (eds), Reason in Law, (Milan: Giuffrè, 1984), pp. 129–161, at 161.
- 29.
MacCormick, “Coherence in Legal Justification”, note 24 supra, p. 242.
- 30.
For a contrary view, see Pethik, note 10 supra, p. 315 et seq, who claims that MacCormick does not really explain why coherence justifies, since he treats what is necessary to justify but not what is sufficient for the law to be a complete or finite coherent set.
- 31.
MacCormick, “Coherence, Principles…”, note 7 supra, pp. 203–204.
- 32.
Ibid., p. 189.
- 33.
Dealing with the problems of proof and evidence, MacCormick linked explicitly narrative coherence with a coherence theory of truth. N. MacCormick, “The Coherence of a Case and the Reasonableness of Doubt”, (1980) 2 Liverpool Law Review, pp. 45–50, at 46.
- 34.
MacCormick,, ‘Legal Narratives’, note 16 supra, p. 222.
- 35.
This resembles the supportive relations and mutual consistency as fundamental elements of the theory of coherence exposed by Alexy and Peczenik, note 8 supra, p. 131.
- 36.
MacCormick, “Legal Narratives”, note 16 supra, pp. 226–227.
- 37.
The difference delineated here is between perspective or real time (past, present and future) versus analytical time (before, simultaneously, after). These dimensions are inter-related, since “the capacity for thought in analytical time is a condition for acting in real time”. Ibid., p. 216.
- 38.
MacCormick, “Coherence, Principles…”, note 7 supra, p. 189.
- 39.
Comanducci, “Osservazioni in margine”, note 14 supra, pp. 274–275.
- 40.
Ibid., p. 272.
- 41.
N. MacCormick, Institutions of Law. An Essay in Legal Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 304; N. MacCormick, “The Legal Framework: Institutional Normative Order”, in: idem, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 7.
- 42.
J. Habermas, The Post-National Constellation, (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2001).
- 43.
N. MacCormick, “A Very British Revolution?”, in: idem, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth, note 41 supra, p. 95; idem, “After Sovereignty: Understanding Constitutional Change”, (1998) 9 The King’s College Law Journal, pp. 20–38, at 38.
- 44.
N. MacCormick, “Democracy and Subsidiarity in the European Commonwealth”, in: idem, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth, note 41 supra, p. 143.
- 45.
In this sense, the norms should be not only formally operative in the different Member States, but also operative in the same sense. This is the purpose of the preliminary rulings put before the ECJ by the national courts, to obtain a common or uniform interpretation of the norms, focusing on the principles that underlie them. MacCormick, “Legal Narratives”, note 16 supra, p. 231.
- 46.
M.P. Maduro, “Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action”, in N. Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003), pp. 501–537, at 518–519.
- 47.
Ibid., pp. 527–529. Different concepts of horizontal and vertical coherence are proposed by S. Besson, “From European Integration to European Integrity: Should European Law Speak with Just One Voice?”, (2004) 10 European Law Journal, pp. 257–281, at 262 et seq. See, also, C. Tietje, “The concept of coherence in the Treaty on European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy”, (1997) 21 European Foreign Affairs Review, pp. 224–231.
- 48.
MacCormick, “Juridical Pluralism and the Risk of Constitutional Conflict”, in: idem, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth, note 41 supra, pp. 118–121.
- 49.
The book of Joxerramon Bengoetxea is still the leading text on this topic, providing an interesting and complete account of the legal reasoning of the Court. See J. Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). A previous attempt from the point of view of the interpretation methods was made by A. Bredimas, Methods of Interpretation and Community Law, (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1978). Besides Neil MacCormick, whose important contributions are being examined here, it is worth mentioning the work of Frank Dowrick, René Barents, Ian Ward and Mattias Kumm, and the articles by Bertea and Moral referred in note 8.
- 50.
The reference is to Rasmussen’s approach. See J. Bengoetxea, N. MacCormick and L. Moral Soriano, “Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice”, in: G. de Búrca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), The European Court of Justice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 43–85, at 43–44.
- 51.
Ibid., pp. 57–58. For this classification, see Z. Bankowski and N. MacCormick, “Statutory Interpretation in the United Kingdom”, in: N. MacCormick and R. Summers (eds), Interpreting Statues. A Comparative Study, (Aldershot: Ashgate-Dartmouth Publishing, 1991), pp. 364–373; J. Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice, note 49 supra, pp. 233 et seq.; J. Bengoetxea, “Una defensa del consecuencialismo en el Derecho”, (1993) 2 Telos (Revista Lationoamericana de Estudios Utilitaristas), pp. 31–68, at 34–35; J. Bengoetxea, “Legal System as a Regulative Ideal”, note 20 supra, p. 76.
- 52.
Bengoetxea calls this combination “systemic-cum-dynamic interpretation”. Idem, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice, note 49 supra, p. 234.
- 53.
These general principles are the ones prescribed in Article 6 TEU: liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. To these, one should add the principle of solidarity, ruled in Article 1(3) TEU and Article 2 EEC Treaty.
- 54.
Bruno de Witte defines the principles of supremacy-primacy of EC law, direct effect and direct applicability as “unwritten principles, recognised by the European Court of Justice, which possess a high law status by the fact that they may be invoked as a standard for the review of Community acts”. B. de Witte, “The Role of Institutional Principles in the Judicial Development of the European Union Legal Order”, in: F. Snyder (ed), The Europeanisation of Law. The Legal Effects of European Integration, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), pp. 83–100, at 83.
- 55.
See the classification of principles of EU law proposed by Bengoetxea, note J. Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice, note 49 supra, pp. 76–79, and p. 225 et seq. A further classification is given by P. Pescatore, “Los principios generales del Derecho como fuente del Derecho Comunitario”, (1988) 40 Noticias C.E.E., pp. 39–56; and by J. Raitio, The Principle of Legal Certainty in EC Law, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), p. 94 et seq.
- 56.
J. E. Fossum and A.J. Menéndez, “The Constitution’s Gift”, (2005) 11 European Law Journal, pp. 380–410, at 390 et seq.; A.J. Menéndez, “Some elements of a Theory of European Fundamental rights”, in: A.J. Menéndez and E.O. Eriksen (eds), Arguing Fundamental Rights, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), pp. 155–184, at 156 et seq.
- 57.
J. Bengoetxea, N. MacCormick and L. Moral Soriano,“Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice”, note 50 supra, pp. 64–65. They identify three criteria that play an important role in the balancing of reasons made by the Court: the rule of reason, the test of proportionality, and the principle of non-arbitrariness (pp. 67 et seq & 79). Even if here the notion of balance is used in this collective article, MacCormick thinks that it is inappropriate to use the idea of weight in relation to choice among legal principles, since principles do not always make the same contribution to every act or judgment in which they count as a reason. MacCormick, ‘Universals and Particulars’, note 15 supra, p. 87.
- 58.
For a discussion on three judgments in which the Court of Justice tries to remedy the incoherencies produced by the disobedience of national courts to follow the ECJ’s interpretation, see J. Komárek, “Federal Elements in the Community Judicial System: Building Coherence in the Community Legal Order, (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review, pp. 9–34.
- 59.
These different attitudes, indeed, reflect a much deeper issue, specifically the diverse conceptions of the European Community as a democratic polity. One important theoretical framework is the proposal of conceiving the European Union as a functional (problem-solving) international organisation, as a federal state based upon a collective identity, or as a rights-based post-national union with an explicit cosmopolitan imprint. See the papers by E.O. Eriksen and J.E. Fossum, “Europe in Transformation. How to Reconstitute Democracy?”, RECON Working Paper No. 01/2007, available at: http://www.reconproject.eu/main.php/RECON_wp_0701.pdf?fileitem=5456091 (accessed 30 October 2010); and “A Done Deal? The EU’s Legitimacy Conundrum Revisited”, RECON Working Paper No. 16/2007, available at:http://www.reconproject.eu/main.php/RECON_wp_0716.pdf?fileitem=16662534, (accessed 30 October 2010).
- 60.
At the legislative level, reference to integrity is made in Article 299 (3) TEU. Case C-282/00, Refinarias de Açúcar Reunidas SA (RAR) v Sociedade de Indústrias Agricolas Açoreanas SA (Sinaga) [2003] ECR I-4741 refers to this last disposition. “Consistency and continuity” prescribed by Article 3 TEU have been considered as expressions of the principle of European integrity. Besson, ‘From European Integration to…’, note 47 supra, p. 262 et seq
- 61.
J. Bengoetxea, N. MacCormick and L. Moral Soriano, “Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice”, note 50 supra, pp. 48 and 82–85.
- 62.
Case C-499/04, Hans Werhof v Freeway Traffic Systems GmbH & Co. KG, [2006] ECR I-2397; Case C-1/02, Privat-Molkerei Borgmann GmbH & Co. KG v Hauptzollamt Dortmund [2004] ECR I-3219.
- 63.
Case C-119/05, Ministero dell’Industria, del Commercio e dell’Artigianato v Lucchini SpA, [2007] ECR I-6199; Case C-221/88 European Coal and Steel Community v Acciaierie e Ferriere Busseni SpA, [1990] ECR I-495. See, also, Case 283/81, CILFIT e Lanificio di gavardo SPA v Ministero della sanità, [1982] ECR 3415.
- 64.
These principles, it has been argued, are the result of a selective choice of the best or most suitable principles and traditions that operate in the constitutional systems of the Member States. M. Cappelletti and D. Golay, “The Judicial Branch in the Federal and Transnational Union: Its Impact on Integration”, in: M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), Integration through law: Europe and the American federal experience, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1985), pp. 261–351, at 351.
- 65.
Case 193/85, Cooperativa Co-Frutta Srl v Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato, [1987] ECR 2085. In a different field, the Court has decide that excluding measures adopted by the European Parliament from the action for annulment would lead to results contrary both to the spirit of the Treaty and to its scheme. See Case 294/83, Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament, [1986] ECR 1339.
- 66.
Bengoetxea has suggested that this sub-systemic coherence could resemble a way of institutional thinking according to MacCormick’s theory. The idea of coherence used by the Court would be appealing to the system logic present in these different areas or case studies, and much closer to a regulative ideal than to coherence as a discursive argumentative tool. It could also match with the local coherence in the sense used by Bertea: see S. Bertea, “Looking for Coherence within the European Community”, (2005) 11 European Law Journal, pp. 154–172, at 157–158.
- 67.
Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, pp. 7–50.
- 68.
Case C-371/98, The Queen v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, [2000] ECR I-9235; Case C-508/04, Commission v Republic of Austria, [2007] ECR I-3787.
- 69.
Case C-304/05, Commission v Italian Republic, [2007] ECR I-7495; Case C-239/04, Commission v Portuguese Republic [2006] ECR I-10183; Case C-209/04 Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Austria, [2006] ECR I-2755; Case C-117/03, Società Italiana Dragaggi SpA and Others v Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti and Regione Autonoma Friuli Venezia Giulia, [2005] ECR I-167; Case C-127/02, Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee and Nederlandse Vereniging tot Bescherming van Vogels v Staatssecretaris van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, [2004] ECR I-7405; Case C-324/01, Commission v Kingdom of Belgium, [2002] ECR I-11197. See, also, Case C-220/99, Commission v French Republic, [2001] ECR I-5831; Case C-71/99, Commission v Federal Republic of Germany, [2001] ECR I-5811; Case C-67/99, Commission v Ireland, [2001] ECR I-5757.
- 70.
Case C-244/05, Bund Naturschutz in Bayern eV and Others v Freistaat Bayern, [2006] ECR I-8445; Case C-371/98, The Queen v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, [2000] ECR I-9235.
- 71.
S. Bertea, ‘Looking for Coherence within the European Community’, note 66 supra, p. 162.
- 72.
Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76, Cornelis Kramer and others, [1976] ECR 1279; Case 185/73, Hauptzollamt Bielefeld v Offene Handelsgesellschaft in Firma H. C. König, [1974] ECR 607; Case 22/70, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Communities, [1971] ECR 263.
- 73.
Les Verts, note 65 supra.
- 74.
Case C-461/03, Gaston Schul Douane-expediteur BV v Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit, [2005] ECR I-10513.
- 75.
The acte claire doctrine was first established in CILFIT, note 63 supra.
- 76.
See H. Schermers and D. Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Union, (The Hague: Kluwer, 2001) (6th edition), p. 57 et seq.
- 77.
Schul, note 74 supra (emphasis added).
- 78.
Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, [1987] ECR 4199.
- 79.
See the text that follows in note 38 supra.
- 80.
For a wider discussion concerning the rule of reason in case-law on taxes, see B. Terra and P. Wattel, European Tax Law, (The Hague: Kluwer, 2005) (4th edition), pp. 41 et seq.
- 81.
C-204/90 Hanns-Martin Bachmann v Belgian State, [1992] ECR I-249.
- 82.
B. Terra and P. Wattel, European Tax Law, note 80 supra, p. 108.
- 83.
Opinion of Mr Advocate General Mischo delivered in Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v Finanzamt Steinfurt, [2002] ECR I-11779.
- 84.
B. Terra and P. Wattel, European Tax Law, note 80 supra, p. 120. See Case C-484/93, Peter Svensson and Lena Gustavsson v Ministre du Logement et de l’Urbanisme, [1995] ECR I-3955; Case C-251/98, Baars v Inspecteur der Belastingen Particulieren/Ondernemingen Gorinchem, [2000] ECR I-2787.
- 85.
In the exposition of MacCormick’s ideas, I mainly follow the article “Juridical Pluralism…”, note 48 supra.
- 86.
MacCormick, “Juridical Pluralism…”, note 48 supra, p. 113; see, also, p. 103; N. MacCormick, “On Sovereignty and Post-Sovereignty”, in: idem, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth, note 41 supra, p. 132.
- 87.
MacCormick, “Juridical Pluralism…”, note 48 supra, pp. 116–117.
- 88.
This claim coincides with the one made by S. Prechal and B. van Roermund in the introductory essay to The Coherence of EU Law. The Search for Unity in Divergent Concepts, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 1, stating that there is one single authority, and that this unity opposes pluralism.
- 89.
MacCormick, Institutions of Law…, note 41 supra, p. 305.
- 90.
Bertea highlights this difference between appeals to coherence and the argument from coherence (‘The Arguments from Coherence: Analysis and Evaluation’, note 8 supra, p. 378).
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Carbonell, F. (2011). Coherence and Post-sovereign Legal Argumentation. In: Menéndez, A., Fossum, J. (eds) Law and Democracy in Neil MacCormick's Legal and Political Theory. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 93. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8942-7_9
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