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Medical Language: The Ordinary Language Approach

  • Barbara MaierEmail author
  • Warren A. Shibles†
Chapter
Part of the International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine book series (LIME, volume 47)

Abstract

Medical practice is characterized by verbal constructions. The ordinary language approach deals with what the healthcare workers and patients actually say. The paradigm of language games is positioned against formal logic, which as an abstraction has no relevance neither for our lives nor medical practice/thinking. Anamnesis is dealt with as presentation of the self. The self is seen to be a verbal picture we create for ourselves, a biography, a story of our lives, not something we are born with. We may also say that insofar as the physician uses language, the various linguistic selves of the patient are treated depending on the extent of the language used. From the ordinary language philosophy point of view, the language in and of medicine is examined, fallacies are presented and the metaphorical method introduced for analysis of concepts and settings.

Keywords

Language language game ordinary language approach linguo-centric predicament formal logic informal logic mathematics mentalism self-talk metaphor 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Gynecology and ObstetricsParacelsus Medical University SALKSalzburgAustria
  2. 2.University of Wisconsin–WhitewaterWhitewaterUSA

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