Abstract
In Section 2.4.1 we argued in favour of semantic anti-actualism: the actual of all the possible worlds should play no semantic role. In this and the following sections we outline an essentialism that likewise accords no privileged status to the actual world by making the notion of essence independent of world and time and a priori instead .1 At the same time we are arguing in favour of ontological actualism: all the individuals at the actual world are all the individuals there are at all the other possible worlds as well (hence, there are no merely possible individuals, or possibilia).
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Notes
- 1.
This section and the next draw in part on material published as Jespersen and Materna (2002).
- 2.
By ‘purely contingent intension’ we mean an intension that is not constant and does not have an essential core. See Section 1.4.2.1 for the classification of empirical properties.
- 3.
Tichý first broached the notion of requisite in 1979, but abstained from further developing it in later works.
- 4.
In a programming language, one would say that ⊃ is a strict function returning an error value for an error value: \(\bot \to \bot\).
- 5.
See Section 1.4.3.
- 6.
We also often say that the property of being a whale implies the property of being a mammal; or, in the vernacular of computer science, that the concept of whale subsumes, or contains, the concept of mammal.
- 7.
See Section 1.5.2.2 for the ambiguity between the two readings.
- 8.
We take the property of having stopped smoking as presupposing that the individual previously smoked. For instance, that Charles stopped smoking can be true or false only if Charles was once a smoker. Similarly for the property of having stopped whacking one’s wife. For more on presuppositions, see Section 1.5.2.1, Definition 1.14.
- 9.
Nortmann distinguishes between what he calls property essentialism and individual essentialism (2002, pp. 8ff). The property essentialist inquires about the essence of those properties that he considers accidental in whatever bearers they may have. This inquiry contributes nothing to the question of what the nature of any bearer of the relevant property is, if the property is contingently borne by the bearer. If an individual a has the property F at time T then this only means that the following may be known a priori: If something has F at T then it has F throughout its existence. But whether a actually has F is something that can, in general, not be known a priori. (Ibid., pp. 26–27.) TIL comes close to qualifying as property essentialism in Nortmann’s sense; though not entirely – we do not require that if a is an F then a must be an F from beginning to end of its cycle. First, we do not wish to exclude nomologically deviant worlds in which an F-object may shed F at some point without ending its cycle. This is to say that in such a world a may end its cycle as an elephant without thereby dying (but, e.g., becoming a different sort of mammal or something much more exotic). Second, our ι-objects are incapable of going out of existence, so coming into and going out of existence will often have to be recast as being born and dying, being created and destroyed, etc., and then only in an individual’s capacity as an F-thing, a G-thing, etc.
- 10.
Bordering on morbidity, Kim Il Sung was made Eternal President of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 1998, 4 years after his death. If a dead human being is not a human being then it is not a requisite of this office to be a human being. Since the ontological status of deceased people is far from obvious (just as it is uncertain whether deceased is a privative modifier), it is far from obvious what it takes to occupy the office. This suggests that the office of Eternal President of the DPRK is ill-defined; so, strictly speaking, there may be no such office (but only a vacuous title with no office to back it up). Nor is it entirely clear what it actually means to say that Kim was made Eternal President after his death; for, assuming that a dead person is not a person, who acquired, in 1998, the property of being the occupant of the office of Eternal President? Colloquially, one would say that Kim did (as we just did a few lines up); but he died in 1994, so in what (non-ghoulish) sense was he around in 1998 to acquire any new properties at all? Our concern is with the exact requisites of an (alleged) office and the possibility of a deceased person (hence, probably non-person) occupying it.
- 11.
On a similar note, Sartre says, ‘[Essence] precedes existence for Leibniz, and the chronological order depends on the eternal order of logic’ (1943, p. 469). The priority of essence over existence holds for complete individual offices; i.e., entire life-stories. The only dash of contingency is choosing one such office at the expense of all the rest. Once that choice is made, all the rest follows as a matter of necessity. We side with Leibniz against Sartre in saying that essence does precede existence. But we also deny that what an individual is and does throughout its life-span is a matter of unfolding an entire, pre-programmed individual office. One could, in principle, individuate any two individuals strictly in terms of what is true of either of them with respect to worlds and times. But such a principle of individuation would be of no use to us humans, since the respective sets of truths applying to two individuals are infinite and as such cannot be grasped in full by humans. If individuals would enter into our ontology only as values of intensions, especially of individual offices, we would never be entitled to Trivialize an individual a: 0 a. We would never get ‘closer’ to individuals than in terms of \(A_{wt} ,\;A/{\upiota}_{{\uptau \upomega}}\).
- 12.
Whether a is an F or the G, for instance, is, logically speaking, irrelevant. What is relevant is only whether some individual or other is an F or the G at some \(\left\langle {w,\;t} \right\rangle\) of evaluation, whether the same individual is both the G and the H at \(\left\langle {w,\;t} \right\rangle\), etc., and not whether it is a, b, c, etc. This will come across as exceedingly cynical if a is a human being; for it may well be extremely relevant to a whether he or she is an F or the G or both the G and the H (etc.). We wish to emphasise, therefore, that our top-down approach from condition to satisfier combined with an exterior, or outside-in, perspective on individuals is no theory of the good (human) life, but adopted for strictly logical and semantic purposes, having ‘little to do with how men (or men and animals) fare in [the actual world]’, as Rescher says about Leibniz’s struggle with squaring the well-being of rational creatures with God’s choice of the possible world that will combine the fewest and simplest laws with the greatest multitude of phenomena (1986, p. 157).
- 13.
See Kripke (1980, pp. 125–27) regarding ‘the actual cats that we have’ versus demons masquerading as cats, where it is assumed that we would be able to know of something that it is a cat prior to knowing what the species-specific essence of cats is.
- 14.
Though a statue owes its origin to much more than just some lump of matter. A statue is an artistic artefact that also embodies an artistic idea which is materialized by means of a lump of matter. From the point of view of artistic idea, it matters little which lump of matter happens to embody Michelangelo’s ideal male youth. Yes, the statue at Accademia in Florence is the original and the one in front of Palazzo Vecchio is a copy; but they manifest the same idea(l) of male youth. The bottom-line is that a statue is at the intersection of matter and idea, and is not reducible to a chunk of clay, marble, or stone.
- 15.
Berkovski notes that, ‘The full specification of Napoleon’s origin will be recursive. If the question is how we identify Letizia Bonaparte [Napoleon’s mother], the same proof of origin is to be repeated for her, her own parent, and so forth.’ (2005, p. 17.) Berkovski, however, fails to point out that the recursion is going to be infinite, unless terminated by fiat. (We thank Berkovski for permitting us to quote from his unpublished manuscript.)
- 16.
If a table, T1, has its origin in a hunk of wood, H1, at one world then T1 must have its origin in H1 at all other worlds as well, except that there are worlds where H1 fails to exist and T1, therefore, also fails to exist. However, there are still other worlds at which H1 exists without T1 existing; the existence of H1 is a necessary but not sufficient condition for T1 to exist. (Hence, the set of worlds at which T1 exists is a proper subset of the set of worlds at which H1 exists.) Rohrbaugh and deRosset allow that at worlds lacking T1, H1 may be the origin of wooden objects different from T1 or of no artefacts at all. However, their principle of origin uniqueness (ibid., p. 715) is not immune to the infinite-regress objection. The principle grounds the necessary distinctness of T1, T2 in the distinctness of their origins H1, H2. But the necessary distinctness of H1, H2 must in turn be grounded in the distinctness of their origins; and so on, with no end in sight.
- 17.
Cameron (2005, p. 264) says, ‘Given a block of wood I could make a table that was four-legged or three-legged, tall or short, round or square, thin or wide. Am I to believe that it would be the same table I was making in each case?’ Cameron thinks not, citing a lack of essentialist intuitions. But the obvious answer is Yes―for being four-legged and all the rest are all accidental properties of one and the same table (entailing that the table might be many different kinds of table).
- 18.
See Sections 3.3, 4.3.
- 19.
Though there is no way to find out, since no advocate of metaphysical modality that we are aware of has ever bothered to actually define the notion. This is not a satisfactory situation, considering the frequency and abandon with which the notion is being bandied about.
- 20.
Kripke famously claims that, ‘One might very well discover essence empirically.’ (1980, p. 110.) We agree with Nortmann’s qualification of this claim. A chemist, he says, may very well discover the essence (e.g., the molecular structure) of some liquid; but he can hardly be said to have discovered that this molecular structure (or whatever) is the essence of the liquid in question. Discovering what the essence of some stuff is, is not a purely empirical matter (‘keine allein in der Natur vorfindbare Tatsache’), as it also contains conventional components, (ibid., p. 10.) Perhaps Kripke makes a similar qualification in 1971 (p. 153) when claiming that one knows by philosophical analysis a priori that if some table is made of wood then it is necessarily not made of ice, while knowing a posteriori whether some particular table is wooden.
- 21.
The discussion appears to fall within a larger discussion of identity sentences, yet two examples of theoretical identifications Kripke gives are ‘light is a stream of photons’ and ‘lightning is an electrical discharge’ (ibid., p. 116, emphasis ours); so theoretical identifications need not be phrased as identity sentences; so it is not certain that the identification of water as H2O should be, either.
- 22.
Some sort of ‘pedigree essentialism’ construed in terms of requisites may be relevant to inheritance in monarchies, clan-based Stalinist regimes and suchlike. By the way, Kripke’s origin essentialism comes with a tacit physicalist premise pertaining to personal identity that we see no cogent reason for adopting.
- 23.
Thus, Cocchiarella says, ‘[N]ot only need not all the worlds in a given logical space be in the model structure..., even the worlds in the model structure need not all be possible alternatives to one another... Clearly, such a restriction...only deepens the sense in which the necessity in question is no longer a logical but a material or metaphysical modality.’ (1984, p. 323).
- 24.
This is argued by, e.g., Cocchiarella (1984, p. 325), Berkovski (2005) , Farrell (1981) , whereas Kripke appears to be suggesting that metaphysical modality is identical, or else very close, to logical modality; see, e.g., (1980, pp. 99, 125). Rohrbaugh and DeRosset (2004) assume an independent category of metaphysical necessity, yet fail in our view to differentiate it from either nomological or logical necessity. On the one hand, when talking about the production processes from hunks of wood to wooden tables, the possibilities and impossibilities they consider are in effect nomological (ibid., pp. 711ff). On the other hand, all four formulae in the formal argument in ibid. (p. 715, fn. 18) contain strings like ‘\(\ldots \square \ldots \Rightarrow \ldots\)’. But ⇒ is entailment, which is a logical relation between (hyper-) propositions and too strong for metaphysical necessity, provided it is to be something other than logical necessity. Furthermore, ‘...□...⇒...’ looks like overkill. Entailment is defined as the necessitation of implication, \(\square (p \supset q)\); so what is the point and sense of necessitating entailment?
- 25.
We do not consider the―admittedly interesting―question of whether possible worlds devoid of laws of nature could possibly have elephants and tables in them. A reasoned answer to this question would presuppose a discussion of what the nomological prerequisites are for a given intension to be instantiated.
- 26.
Worlds whose laws of nature deviate from the actual ones are what G. Priest calls ‘nomologically impossible worlds’ (1992, p. 292).
- 27.
See also Section 2.3.
- 28.
A recent discussion of a cluster of arguments whose conclusion is that Aristotle exists necessarily is a good example of what we have in mind (see Stephanou, 2000). Stephanou assumes that people would find the conclusion counter-intuitive because they would find it unacceptable that Aristotle should exist of necessity. But nobody is in a position to know whom Stephanou is talking about for want of a description of the intended individual. An individual office would have come in handy.
- 29.
Simchen claims, ‘To be an [ontological] actualist requires dealing with the metaphysics directly and letting the logic track the metaphysics rather than the other way around.’ (2006, p. 18.) We beg to differ, since this conceptual order of priority is tantamount to rejecting analytic philosophy as we know and love it. Analytic philosophy starts out with a logical analysis of expressions and concepts pertaining to a particular discourse on (say) metaphysics and only then enters the sphere of (say) metaphysics proper.
- 30.
Similarly, though less interestingly, it is logically possible that there be nomologically more restrictive worlds at which the donkeys’ (the talkers’) potential is a fraction of what it is at the actual world.
- 31.
For purely contingent properties, see Section 1.4.2.1. See Bergmann (1967, pp. 24ff) for the term ‘bare particular’.
- 32.
Along similar lines, Jaakko Hintikka says, ‘[I]n the question, Who administers the oath to a new President?, the relevant alternatives might be the different officers (offices) (Secretary of State, Chief Justice, Speaker of the House, etc.) rather than persons holding them. Then my criterion of answerhood will require that the questioner knows what office it is that an answer refers to, not that he knows who the person is who holds it’ (Hintikka, 1962, p. 45 ). Similarly, Fred Dretske says, ‘Once an object occupies such an office, its activities are constrained by the set of relations connecting that office to other offices…; it must do some things, and it cannot do other things’ (1977, pp. 264ff). To be sure, Dretske is concerned to make an analogy between legal and nomological modalities, but his discussion of what he himself dubs ‘offices’ is kindred to ours, particularly ‘by talking about the relevant properties rather than the sets of things that have these properties’ (ibid., p. 266).
- 33.
For examples of such interplay, see Sections 3.3.1, 4.3.
- 34.
See Section 4.4 on property modification.
- 35.
- 36.
If being Superman is a sufficient condition for being Clark Kent, whereas being Clark Kent is a necessary condition for being Superman, it follows that the Superman office is more exclusive than the Clark Kent office, in the sense specified in Section 4.1, Definition 4.2, and the following Remark.
- 37.
Another attempt at a purely semantic approach is Forbes (1999), which introduces (so-called!) logophors that receive no mention in the sentences under analysis. What speaks against Forbes’ proposal is, as Predelli observes (2004, p. 112), that Forbes’ allegedly simple sentences are not simple, logophors being a quotational device.
- 38.
Saul’z puzzle bears some resemblance to the Partee puzzle from around 1970 (see Section 2.6):
$$\begin{array}{*{20}l} {{\textrm{The temperature is 90}}^\circ {\textrm{F}}} \\ {{\textrm{The temperature is rising}}} \\\hline {90^\circ {\textrm{F is rising}}{\textrm{.}}} \\\end{array}$$Saul also wishes to come up with a flawed argument in order to make a point, but none of Saul’s arguments in 1997 is invalid, provided Saul’s semantic stipulations are accepted.
- 39.
However, see Spencer (2006) for a convincing case that ‘Russellian’ philosophers of language in effect overstretch Grice’s concept of implicature.
- 40.
Note that if Clark Kent, Superman are of type ι then both 0 Kent and 0 Superman occur with ι-intensional supposition in the premises. Thus two-way substitution is valid in intensional contexts; see Section 2.7 for the intensional rule of substitution.
- 41.
The only other commentator that we know of to point out the non-symmetry between being Superman and being Clark Kent caused by the diachronicity between Clark Kent’s entrance and Superman’s exit is Zimmermann (2005, p. 55, pp. 68ff).
- 42.
The Superman office might just as well have been a requisite of the Clark Kent office, but since the sentence to be analysed is ‘Superman is Clark Kent’ and not ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ (cf. Saul, ibid., p. 104, display [11]), the antisymmetry is in this particular direction.
- 43.
To the best of our knowledge, the offices of Pope and Head of State of the Vatican are distinct, and can be ordered in the requisite relation, such that the latter is a requisite of the former. This relation obtains on condition that it be conceptually possible that the office of Head of State is occupied while the papacy goes vacant. This scenario might obtain if, for instance, somebody is the political leader of the Vatican while nobody is its religious leader.
- 44.
What underlies both rules is the principle of predication de re explained in Section 2.6.
- 45.
Similarly, when in a monarchy the previous king is dead and the new king is proclaimed—‘The king is dead. Long live the king!’—the old king and the new king are two different individuals.
- 46.
- 47.
In some natural languages the two types seem to be flagged grammatically. For instance, ‘Jumbo ist ein kleiner Elefant’, but ‘Jumbo ist klein’. Strictly speaking, however, we are imposing a particular interpretation on German grammar by claiming that the form ‘kleiner’ as it occurs in ‘ein kleiner Elefant’ signals that the adjective denotes a modifier here. It could be objected that ‘glückliches’ as it occurs in ‘Karl ist ein glückliches Kind’ is an intersective adjective and that the sentence has been generated by telescoping the conjunction ‘Karl ist glücklich, und Karl ist ein Kind’. Though ‘ein kleiner Elefant’ and ‘ein glückliches Kind’ are grammatically on a par, ‘klein’ denotes a modifier and ‘glücklich’ a property. But even if we grant this point, we are still able to claim that the morphology of German grammar displays a grammatical link between ‘kleiner’ and ‘Elefant’ (which is absent in the corresponding English phrase ‘small elephant’) that shows that ‘kleiner’ calls for complementation, as is indeed characteristic of modifying predicates. (‘Jumbo ist kleiner’ is actually well-formed, but means that Jumbo is smaller, not small, and demands complementation.)
- 48.
More precisely, substitution of identical properties according to the intensional rule of substitution; see Section 2.7.
- 49.
‘Modal modifier’ is the term used by, e.g., Partee; see (2001, p. 7). Such modifiers are also known as ‘intensional’. E.g., Cresswell (1978, p. 17) suggests that ‘Arabella walked across the park for fifteen minutes’ fails to entail, ‘Arabella walked across the park’, making for an intensional modifier. Nor does ‘Arabella walked across the park for fifteen minutes’ exclude that Arabella did walk across the park. Rotstein and Winter (2004, p. 276, n. 14) point out that, ‘Many modifiers, especially intensional ones, are neither restrictive nor co-restrictive. For instance, the sentence John is hopefully a good student does not entail that John is a good student, and it does not entail that John is not a good student. Hence, the (sentential or predicational) modifier hopefully is neither restrictive nor co-restrictive.’ Similarly, the intensional property modifier alleged allows that some alleged assassins are assassins while others are not. It is interesting to note a strong similarity between modal modifiers and non-factive attitudes. If, for instance, a believes that b is an assassin then it does not follow that b is an assassin, but nor does its negation. We suppose that a deeper study of modal/intensional modifiers (a hitherto marginalized kind of modifiers in formal semantics and linguistics) will reveal that many of them are attitudinal in nature, as exemplified by a hoped-for result or being presumed innocent.
- 50.
Hence ║is an operation of extensionalising properties, which corresponds in TIL to B wt .
- 51.
In the second case, however, it can be inferred that b once was a Stalinist.
- 52.
Partee (2001) attempts to reduce privative modifiers to subsective modifiers so that ‘the [linguistic] data become much more orderly’ (ibid.). In her case guns would divide into fake guns and real guns, and fur into fake fur and real fur. Her argument is that only this reduction can do justice to the meaningfulness of asking the following sort of question: ‘Is this gun real or fake?’ At first blush, however, it would seem the question pre-empts the answer: if some individual is correctly identified as a gun, then surely it is a real gun, something being a gun if, and only if, it is a real gun. However, if we go along with the example, we think the argument is easily rebutted by putting scare quotes around ‘gun’ so that the question becomes, ‘Is this ‘gun’ fake or real?’ The scare quotes indicate that ‘gun’ is something like ‘gun-like’, including toy guns, which are not guns. If the answer is that the gun-like object is a fake gun (hence not a gun), the scare quotes stay on. If the answer is that it is a real gun (i.e., a gun), the scare quotes are lifted. Similarly with ‘Is this ‘fur’ fake or real?’ A more direct way of phrasing the question would be, ‘Is this fur?’, which does not pre-empt the answer and which does not presuppose that there be two kinds of fur, fake and real. For an intuitive test, ask yourself what the sum is of a fake 10-Euro bill and a 10-Euro bill. For a comparison between the respective kinds of procedural semantics of TIL and Martin-Löf’s constructive type theory, see Jespersen and Primiero (forthcoming) .
- 53.
For the sake of simplicity we now consider only individual properties. Generalization to any type of property is straightforward.
- 54.
See Section 4.1, Definition 4.1.
- 55.
In colloquial speech we may ask, ‘Is this a genuine banknote or a Monopoly banknote?’, where it would be sufficient to ask, ‘Is this a banknote or a Monopoly banknote?’, Monopoly having the effect of a privative modifier not unlike toy in being a toy gun.
- 56.
There is a viable alternative to construing Genuine, True and suchlike as trivial modifiers, though not along the lines suggested by Partee (2001). Consider the sentence, ‘True men of the desert know no fear’. It would be tempting to construe it as having only rhetoric import, as ‘true’ does in, ‘True beer lovers prefer Czech Budweiser to American Budweiser’. But the property True man of the desert may also partition a set of men of the desert into those who are male desert dwellers and those who are male desert dwellers plus something more. The latter would be the natural-born male desert dwellers. They know no fear; the former may, and some of them no doubt will. One might, though need not, go one step further and construe Knowing_no_fear as a requisite of True_man_of_the_desert: [0 Req Know_no_fear [0 True 0 Man_of_the_desert]].
- 57.
Proper-function theory holds that a malfunctions as an F iff a falls short of fulfilling its proper function, and systemic-function theory holds that a malfunctions as an F iff a lacks the current capacity to function as an F. See Kroes and Meijers (2006) and Jespersen and Carrara (ms) .
- 58.
For details, see Jespersen and Carrara (ms.).
- 59.
Cf. Mitchell (2000, p. 247): ‘Laws are about our world for all time.’ However, we bracket the question of whether theoretical physics will eventually bear out this assumption.
- 60.
- 61.
See Materna (2005).
- 62.
Though we acknowledge that essentialists about the velocity of light will claim that c is the same value for all logically possible physical universes. This is not to say that light will travel at the speed of c in all logically possible universes; for at some of them light will not travel at all or light will be missing altogether. So it still constitutes a non-trivial, empirical discovery that the speed of light is c and not any other numerical value.
- 63.
So-called necessitarians flatly deny, of course, that logical contingency is a constraint at all. Instead (strong) necessitarianism holds that the laws of the actual world are identical to the laws of all other logically possible worlds. For a clear statement of (strong) necessitarianism, see Bird (2004) . Bird’s theory is based on the highly problematic premise of dispositional essentialism, which is a variant of extensional essentialism as applied to natural kinds. Given that properties are defined (and individuated) in terms of their dispositional essences, it is little wonder that if (as Bird argues) all logically possible worlds share the same properties then all worlds must share the same laws. But it does leave one wondering how the strong necessitarians avoid making it cognizable a priori what the laws of nature are.
- 64.
For details, see Tichý (1984, 2004, pp. 543–75).
- 65.
See Section 3.5.
- 66.
There are many impossible propositions, which differ only by being false or undefined at different \(\left\langle {w,\;t} \right\rangle\) pairs.
- 67.
Cf. Davies and Humberstone (1980), as well as Segerberg’s seminal (1973): ‘[I]n “two-dimensional” modal logic one wants to evaluate formulas at two points: at a point x, with respect to a point y.’ (Ibid., p. 79.)
- 68.
See Section 2.4.1 for objections to semantic actualism.
- 69.
see Section 2.3.2.
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Duží, M., Jespersen, B., Materna, P. (2010). Requisites: the logic of intensions. In: Procedural Semantics for Hyperintensional Logic. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8812-3_4
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