Abstract
It is argued that the models deployed so far capture any instance of legal practice. In particular, they explain participants’ beliefs to the effect that they are under a duty. And they can accommodate disagreement at a fundamental level. The test-case of an actual example of this kind of disagreement in a contemporary legal system is analyzed briefly.
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Notes
- 1.
Recall that, when referring to attitudes such as “believe/conceive/think etc”, I mean actual or counterfactual attitudes.
- 2.
Cf Gardner (2002, 495, 500).
- 3.
See Chapter 1, p. 21
- 4.
This is not to claim, of course, that the only possibility for disagreement at this level is of that sort (for disagreement may occur for many different reasons) As Raz claims, complexity and non transparency of criterial explanations, and the relatively interdependence of concepts, may be some of the reasons that originate disagreement (TVNLP 266–270).
- 5.
For the best explanation of the state of the debate, see n 35.
References
Gardner, John. “Reasons for Teamwork.” Legal Theory 8 (2002): 495
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Sánchez Brigido, R.E. (2010). Developed Instances of Legal Practice. Meeting the Tests. In: Groups, Rules and Legal Practice. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 89. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8770-6_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8770-6_10
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