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Rational Choice Theory and the Environment: Variants, Applications, and New Trends

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Abstract

Rational choice theory (RCT) is a research paradigm based on methodological individualism. Collective phenomena are explained by assumptions about the behavior of (subjectively) rational individual or corporate actors. In environmental research, RCT is used to predict ecological perceptions, attitudes and behavior on the micro level, and to shed light on environmental outcomes on the macro level. The most fundamental insight from RCT is that environmental problems are often the result of a social dilemma, that is, individuals’ purposive action leads to unintended negative collective consequences. This chapter addresses variants of RCT including game theory, shows applications in the field of environmental sociology on the micro and macro level, and points to new trends in RCT such as neuroeconomics and happiness research which may also be useful for environmental sociology.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For sociologically oriented review articles on RCT, see Hedström and Swedberg (1996), Hechter and Kanazawa (1997), Voss and Abraham (2000).

  2. 2.

    In fact, the existence of a utility function representing some preference relation on a countableset is characterized by these two axioms. However, a complete and transitive preference relation on an uncountableset might not have a representing utility function (Rubinstein 2006: 16).

  3. 3.

    See Schoemaker (1982) for a survey of variants. In contrast to maximizing decision rules are non-maximizing decision rules such as the principle of “satisficing” in models of bounded rationality(e.g., Simon 1979). Since situations are often too complex from the actors’ point of view, they choose to “satisfice”, i.e. to choose an action that is “good enough”. In general, RC explanations can also be differentiated according to assumptions about “available information” on the part of actors (complete/perfect versus incomplete/imperfect information).

  4. 4.

    With regard to empirical applications of SEU models, it is not necessary to measure the perceived probabilities and outcome evaluations directly. They can also be obtained or assumed by using what are known as bridge hypotheses (Kelle and Lüdemann 1998; Opp and Friedrichs 1996). A second type of bridge hypotheses is relevant for the macro-micro link. These hypotheses link the “objective structure” of the social situation with actors’ perceptions, subjective ideas, and goals (Esser 1998).

  5. 5.

    Simplified, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile, including one strategy for each actor, such that no actor has any incentive to unilaterally change her action. In our example, the profile (“catch them all”, “catch them all”) is a “Nash equilibrium.” Note that the two-person PD in Fig. 9.2can be easily extended to a logically similar n-person PD with more than two actors (cf. Hardin 1971).

  6. 6.

    Note that in empirical applications it is not useful to consider environmental behavior as a “global concept” (Diekmann and Preisendörfer 1998: 80). Instead, most studies investigate specific behaviors.

  7. 7.

    Public goods are characterized by “non-excludability” from and “non-rivalry” of consumption, whereas common pool resources are characterized by “non-excludability” and “rivalry”. A social dilemma perspective can also be applied in studies of individual environmental behavior such as commuting (e.g., Van Lange et al. 1998 ; Joireman et al. 2004 ) and in studies of environmental activism such as protesting or contributing to environmental organizations (e.g., Opp 1986 ; Lubell 2002 ).

  8. 8.

    For example, if environmental quality is improving and the property rights are assigned to the status quo, WTP refers to the welfare measure “compensating variation” and is the maximum amount an individual is willing to pay to achieve the environmental improvement. Thus, the WTP amount brings the actor’s utility level back to exactly the status quo (the situation before the change).

  9. 9.

    Besides brain imaging, other neuroscience methods are (Camerer et al. 2005: 11): single-neuron measurement, electrical brain stimulation, investigating psychopathology and brain damage in humans, and psychophysical measurement (heart rate, blood pressure, etc.).

  10. 10.

    Of course, the possibility of spurious correlations between changes of environmental conditions and changes of life satisfaction is always a major issue for these types of analyses.

  11. 11.

    Note that economic incentives can sometimes have contra-intuitive effects, e.g., by crowding out intrinsic motivation (Frey 1992; Frey et al. 1996). Thus, “tradeable permits” with regard to environmental pollution might be perceived as a “license to pollute” and “may even be perceived to imply that those who, for reasons of environmental ethics, do not pollute as much as the permits allow, are irrational” (Frey 1992: 171).

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Acknowledgment

We would like to thank Andreas Tutic for critical comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 5, 37073, Göttingen, Germany

    Ulf Liebe

  2. Institute for Sociology, University of Mainz, Colonel-Kleinmann-Weg 2, 55099, Mainz, Germany

    Peter Preisendörfer

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  1. Ulf Liebe
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Correspondence to Ulf Liebe .

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  1. Umweltforschung GmbH (UFZ), Dept. Stadt- und Umweltsoziologie, Helmholtz-Zentrum für, Permoserstr. 15, Leipzig, 04318, Germany

    Matthias Gross

  2. Inst. Umweltkommunikation, Universität Lüneburg, Scharnhorststr. 1, Lüneburg, 21335, Germany

    Harald Heinrichs

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Liebe, U., Preisendörfer, P. (2010). Rational Choice Theory and the Environment: Variants, Applications, and New Trends. In: Gross, M., Heinrichs, H. (eds) Environmental Sociology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8730-0_9

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