Abstract
In this chapter I discuss ways of generating inquiries in relation to the quality of life in social settings via what is considered as another qualitatively oriented mode of inquiry, namely, ethnographic research. The chapter is set around my discussion of two examples of ethnographic research, namely, a study of a particular high school in the USA (undertaken with reference to Critical Race Theorizing – CRT) and an autoethnographic study of my own – in a university setting in the UK. But before I discuss these examples, I offer an indication of some definitions of ethnography and of some debates that have arisen around its practice.
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Notes
- 1.
Layder labels his own preferred approach as a “realist” one in order to distinguish it from what he sees as the narrow theory-testing approach that he sees Hammersley as still espousing (1993, p. 7). However, the approach that Layder supports has been labeled as “scientific realism” by certain authors (e.g., Marsden, 1998; Joseph & Kennedy, 2000) – and it is this label that I use when referring to Layder’s kind of approach. See also Footnote 10 in Chapter 1. In Romm (1991, 2001), I provide detailed accounts of the scientific realist position and its links to other forms of realism.
- 2.
This is the Popperian idea of deduction as the logic of scientific discovery that I pointed to in Section 1.5.1, and discussed further in Section 3.1.1.1. Layder is aware of the argument advanced by those supporting this hypothetico-deductive position that the theoretical frameworks provided by larger theories become untestable unless broken into smaller portions. Layder counter-argues that working with such theoretical frameworks need not amount to proceeding simply “to ‘explain’ all empirical evidence within the terms of the framework” (1993, p. 53). According to Layder, this way of using evidence to bolster theoretical frameworks reinforces the boundaries between different frameworks and is not conducive to “cross-fertilization of ideas from different frameworks” (1993, p. 53). But he believes that theoretical conceptualizations offering analyses at the level of social structure can and should be subjected to debate – and in this sense are not untestable/unchallengable. See also Chapter 8 in this regard.
- 3.
Zuberi and Bonilla-Silva make their point regarding the need for an alternative when they raise concerns, with Duberman (1999, whom they cite), about the current state of affairs where “too many scholars do ‘small scale research backed by large-scale grants’” (2008, p. 334). They indicate in the light of this context that they concur with “feminist and Marxist scholarship” in this regard (2008, p. 334).
- 4.
Although both Keat and Urry (1975) and Layder (1993, citing Keat and Urry) label this a realist epistemology, I call the approach “scientific realism” to specify its difference from (realist-oriented) positivist/hypothetico-deductive argumentation and to indicate the orientation to get to grips with structures and mechanisms in reality (see also Romm, 2001, pp. 36–54). Some authors also refer to this kind of approach as critical realism (cf. Parks, 2007, who develops what he calls a critical race realist approach, as discussed in Section 6.3.1).
- 5.
Gergen and Gergen likewise indicate that sometimes those forwarding a commitment to reflexivity may put the focus on, as they put it, people pausing to “consider the biases”. They indicate that alternatively reflexivity can take on a different meaning, where it implies recognition that “confronting the world from moment to moment is [at the same time] also confronting the self”. The investigator hereby reveals his or her work as historically, culturally, and personally situated (2003, p. 579).
- 6.
This can be seen as similar to what Romm and Adman call “reflexive ethnography”, which we distinguish from more traditional “qualitative ethnography”. We indicate that the epistemology of reflexive ethnography is geared to highlighting “researcher honesty” and to nurturing the recognition that “there is no final answer” in the attempt to appreciate diverse interpretations of experienced worlds.
- 7.
Phumla Nhlumayo, upon reading this chapter and offering feedback to me (May 2009), pointed out that her son experienced a similar situation at a (predominantly White, and costly) school to which she had sent him in post-apartheid South Africa, hoping that he would thereby be exposed to the “White world”. She indicated that he experienced that he became “judged according to color”. Nevertheless, she still felt it important that he became exposed to a different style of teaching – as she found that the (Bantu) education of most of the teachers at Black schools (still springing from the apartheid era) was too focused on rote learning. She felt that most of the teaching at these schools (based on some of her other children’s experiences) still tended to rely on this. She found that the “White schools” did offer a better education in this respect (and therefore if she could afford it, she would have sent all her children there). Furthermore, the advantage of these schools is that children become more fluent in speaking the kind of English that equips them in the Western-oriented “White world” and they learn cultural ways of behaving that are also necessary to operate in this world – such as, for instance, looking (White) people in the eye when speaking to them. She indicated that unless they learn this, they are not easily able to operate in this world. She lamented that it is unfortunate, though, that opportunities for cross-cultural learning seemed not to be encouraged at these schools (with still predominantly White teachers) – albeit that they are now supposed to be “integrated”. This observation is supported by Granville Whittle, who mentioned in my interview with him (2008) that many Black children feel that they are marginalized – see Section 5.6.1.
- 8.
He also points out that on the international level, Habermas offers no kind words for the “self-centered course of a callous superpower” with its strategy of unilateral war. He points out too that the “language of crusades that accompanied the USA declaration of the war on terror (after 9/11) were snubbed by most commonsense Europeans” – but that these critical attitudes are “normative rather than anti-American” (2006, p. 283). He cites Derrida as indicating that in this political context he sides with “the camp that in principle, by right of law, leaves a perspective open to perfectibility in the name of the political, democracy, international law, international institutions and so on” (Derrida, 2003, as cited in Matuŝtīk, 2006, p. 283). Habermas too calls for the need to strengthen world citizenry and its requisite institutions like the United Nations and the World Court (Habermas, 2003, as cited in Matuŝtīk, 2006, p. 283).
- 9.
Gergen and Gergen similarly attempt to “reframe validity” when they suggest that “if we abandon the traditional goal of research as the accumulation of products …, then a chief aim of research becomes that of establishing productive forms of [human] relationship” (2003, p. 598). This echoes Collins’s understanding of the importance of tying the validation of social knowing to the project of fostering social justice – which she suggests should be understood in a “transnational context” (2000, p. 290).
- 10.
Bell suggests that this idea of Behar’s is similar to Clark’s coining of the term “involved observer” to point to “observers” who are “in some way shaped by and connected to the individuals, groups and communities they are studying” and who do not try to become detached from the issues faced within these settings (2001, p. 52). Bell points out that in both Clark’s (1973) understanding of the “involved observer” and Behar’s (1996) understanding of the “vulnerable observer” reference is made in research write-ups to “the researchers’ emotional relationship with and involvement in their work” (2001, p. 52).
- 11.
Lincoln and Denzin argue that it may be necessary to introduce a political vulnerability that goes beyond Behar’s position. They call for an autoethnography that not only “breaks your heart” but that “challenges the reader to take action in the world [and] to reconsider the conditions under which the moral terms of the self and community are constituted” (2003, p. 623). They are concerned that Behar’s position falls short of embracing a (moral) “call to action” (2003, p. 623). Nevertheless, I would suggest that Behar could be interpreted as calling for this – by trying to “move” readers so that they feel the need to address “serious social issues” (1996, p. 14).
- 12.
Mr. Jin Yi was happy to have his name revealed in my reporting of the saga – which he experienced as “horrible” throughout – so I have kept his real name in this recounting.
- 13.
Some witness statements were obtained by me more or less accidentally (but were never elicited by the University). One case in point is a statement from an exchange student from France who volunteered her views to the course leader (when matters were being investigated). She wrote that “Christine does not make enough effort to understand people from other countries who she thought were not as good as her,” and that Christine created “an upsetting atmosphere in the class.” She pointed out that she had “never seen such a case before.” Another student (from Nigeria) also was keen to offer a statement expressing her “deep anger and bitterness” over the “matter which I [she] felt should have been dealt with properly and adequately during the MSc session.” She continued that “Christine, Gail, and Raymond should have been disciplined and taught how to behave to foreigners.” She indicated (to me) that she had never been questioned by anyone about the attitude of Christine and Gail to the other students. Meanwhile, an (external) lecturer who specifically stated (both verbally and in a written report sent to Dr. Smith) that a “small cohort of the Caucasians seemed to be openly hostile to the Chinese majority” was not on the list of witnesses (even as an anonymized name) that the Dean eventually offered to Jin Yi.
- 14.
Jin Yi had mentioned when he lodged his complaint to the Vice-Chancellor that although the Dean had promised in writing (subsequent to the “investigation”) that action against those who had acted inappropriately and offensively would be taken, no one of whom he knew was informed of anything that had occurred; nor had a report (stating the substance of the issues and how they were examined by the investigator) been provided. To this the Vice Chancellor replied to Jin Yi that “the response of the Business School was not within the strict guidelines prescribed by University procedures [for dealing with student complaints in general]”, while at the same time he stated that the matter was handled informally in the Business School “(Section 9 [of the Student Complaints Procedure] ‘Informal Resolution’)” – apparently unbeknownst to the complainants.
- 15.
The investigator of Christine and Gail’s complaints was never given any of these documents (relating to the Chinese students’ prior complaints) – as confirmed by the personnel officer who was one of the witnesses for the University testifying at the later Tribunal hearing (2004).
- 16.
My witnesses at the Tribunal were: Jin Yi (the Chinese student leading the complaint); the course leader of the Masters course; a trade union officer; and myself. The Tribunal hearing was in 2004 (May and September). The case number of the case was number 1806710/03. After the judgment (February 2005), I applied for a review, which was heard in June 2005. The Tribunal stood by its original decision – but the Tribunal chairman did indicate to me that I had “won” the point that there had indeed been a complaint of racial discrimination. It was also stated in their original report on their judgment that “any doubt about the matter” of whether a complaint of racial discrimination had been made was “answered” by various pieces of evidence (Tribunal Judgment, p. 28).
- 17.
The University’s position as expressed to the Tribunal was that the complaint of the Chinese students had been “minor”, and had not been a complaint of racial discrimination (Respondent’s written submission, October 2004).
- 18.
I had argued that the Dean and the Director of post-graduate programs were actual comparators because they had been afforded the protection of the University – despite the University admitting (in writing to Jin Yi) that they had not acted in accordance with University Regulations in the handling the Chinese students’ complaints.
- 19.
In this case the University had indicated to my lawyer a few days before the original proceedings (in May 2004) that if I withdrew they would not “pursue me” for costs (and had suggested that if I continued, they might). I pointed out to the Tribunal (in my objection to the costs application received after I applied for a review of judgment – April 2005) that this way of threatening can easily become (ab)used as a mechanism to prevent private individuals from daring to access the Tribunal system of justice. As far as making decisions as to whether cases are misconceived, this depends on particular perceptions (in this case, a Tribunal’s) of whether the applicant has been (un)reasonable in pursuing a case.
- 20.
It was this person (of Indian descent) who asked the Dean how he thinks racism can be defined, thus bringing to the fore the definition and naming of racism within the Tribunal hearing.
- 21.
Sommers and Norton note in this respect that “denial of problem” kinds of behaviors “capture the subtle, ambiguous nature of modern racism” (2006, p. 131). They point out that many of the behaviors that psychologists consider indicative of racial bias (see Section 2.3.3) have not at this point entrenched themselves in “consensus lay conceptions of racism” (2006, p. 132). But they note that in a survey that they conducted “Non-White participants were significantly more likely than Whites to view subtle behaviors in the discomfort/unfamiliarity and denial of problem factors as indicative of racism” (2006, p. 132). Sommers and Norton utilized closed and open-ended questions in their survey; and they also later invited vignettes in a subsequent study. They suggest that the vignettes also provided evidence for “between race differences in how people think about racism” (2006, p. 132).
- 22.
Gergen and Gergen make this point in the context of their concern that although “much has been said about the value of global forums of exchange, national dialogues on prejudice, and the revitalization of communities (the ‘civil society’) … efforts to achieve these ends have been scattered and have infrequently included social science researchers” (2003, pp. 598–599).
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Romm, N. (2010). Ethnographic Research: Exploring the Quality of Social Life in Social Settings. In: New Racism. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8728-7_6
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