Anything You Can Do, I Can Do Also: Humans, Our Capacities, and the Powers We Share

  • Russell DiSilvestroEmail author
Part of the Philosophy and Medicine book series (PHME, volume 108)


In this chapter, I defend the first step of the main argument: if something is human, it has a set of typical human capacities. A more precise way of putting this step is as follows: there is some set, H, of capacities, such that for any individual X, if X is human, then X has H. I defend this step in the face of three main problem areas: the obvious diversity of capacities among normal humans, the nebulous sense in which undeveloped humans have capacities, and the apparent absence of certain capacities among abnormal humans.


Personal Identity Moral Status Genetic Condition Human Organism Brain Damage 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyCalifornia State University, SacramentoSacramentoUSA

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