Ideology and the Problem of Naming

Abstract

In the previous chapter, I argued that an important similarity obtains between the philosophies of Karl Marx and John Rawls. Both philosophers rely on a supposed ability to divest oneself of the limitations and lenses of particularity in order to reason freely. This similarity, I noted, might strike readers as odd given that it seems as if Marx would deny the very possibility of Rawls’ project due to the obstacle of ideology standing in the way of such reasoning. Yet, it was my contention that this similarity nonetheless holds because it is this same ability to escape the false paradigm of ideology that allows Marx to recognize the existence and nature of ideology and to understand the true forces at work in history. As Alasdair MacIntyre explains, a theorist of ideology such as Marx “is claiming that, in his own case at least, he can separate the ideologically contaminated element from the rest of his theorizing” [38, p. 321]. To be able to recognize that consciousness is false, one must be able to identify the truth. In other words, “to identify ideological distortion one must not be a victim of it oneself” [38, p. 322].