Monitoring for Modelling Reality and Sound Economics

Abstract

The economics of water resources monitoring has been examined several times in recent years (Cordery and Cloke, 1992; Peck and Teisberg, 1993; Green and Herschy, 1994; Moss, 1970; Stewart, 1994). The motivation for these examinations seem to have been to show that the cost of monitoring is small compared to the benefits (more than nine times the costs) that are being derived from the archive of data. However, though all the published studies show that the benefits of monitoring are in fact large compared to the costs of the monitoring and maintaining of the archived data, monitoring of water resources has steadily declined almost universally, and continues to decline (Cordery, 2003). It would appear that the only country where water resources monitoring has increased in recent years is New Zealand. The cause of the continued decline seems to be that data collection (monitoring) is seen as a public activity, and there is competing needs for public funds in other areas where the connection with public benefit is directly obvious and immediate. The community is not aware of the link between collection of hydrological data and the costs of public infrastructure. If the public was aware that the benefits of monitoring are as large as suggested in the studies cited above it would seem likely that there would be a higher demand to monitor phenomena that have large effects on infrastructure costs. This must mean that leadership is needed to communicate with and convince the direct users of data, then the public and ultimately those approving the public expenditure programmes. In the authorsopinion logical argument has seldom achieved quantum changes. Change only appears to be achieved in response to a significant event which causes damage, usually combined with leadership that can champion the solution.