Abstract
I explore the problem of “probabilistic causal preemption” in the context of a “propensity trajectory” theory of singular probabilistic causation. This involves a particular conception of events and a substantive thesis concerning events so conceived.
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Acknowledgements
I thank Dan Hausman, Christopher Hitchcock, Stephen Leeds, Alfred Mele, and Elliott Sober for useful comments or discussion.
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Eells, E. (2010). Propensity Trajectories, Preemption, and the Identity of Events. In: Eells, E., Fetzer, J. (eds) The Place of Probability in Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 284. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3615-5_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3615-5_8
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