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The Place of Probability in Science pp 101–131Cite as

Chance and Necessity

From Humean Supervenience to Humean Projection

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Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 284))

Abstract

Probability abounds in the natural and social sciences. Yet, science strives for objectivity. Scientists are not pleased when told that probability is just opinion and there is no more sense to it. They are prone to believe in objective probabilities or chances. This is an essay about how to understand them.

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Acknowledgements

I am most grateful to Ludwig Fahrbach and Jacob Rosenthal for thorough-going discussions of earlier drafts of this paper; it gained immensely thereby.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, 78457, Konstanz, Germany

    Wolfgang Spohn

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  1. Wolfgang Spohn
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Correspondence to Wolfgang Spohn .

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  1. Springer, Dordrecht, 3311 GC, Netherlands

    Ellery Eells

  2. Dept. Philosophy, University of Minnesota, Duluth, 55812, USA

    J.H. Fetzer

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Spohn, W. (2010). Chance and Necessity. In: Eells, E., Fetzer, J. (eds) The Place of Probability in Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 284. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3615-5_5

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