Abstract
The demise of deterministic theories and the rise of indeterministic theories clearly qualifies as the most striking feature of the history of science since Newton, just as the demise of teleological explanations and the rise of mechanistic explanations dominates the history of science before Newton’s time. In spite of the increasing prominence of probabilistic conceptions in physics, in chemistry and in biology, for example, the comprehensive reconciliation of mechanistic explanations with indeterministic theories has not gone smoothly, especially by virtue of a traditional tendency to associate “causation” with determinism and “indeterminism” with non-causation. From this point of view, the very idea ofindeterministic causation seems to be conceptually anomalous if not semantically inconsistent. Indeterminism, however, should not be viewed as the absence of causation but as the presence of causal processes of non-deterministic kinds, where an absence of causation can be called “non-causation”.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Armstrong DM (1983) What is a law of nature? Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Eells E (1983) Objective probability theory. Synthese 57:387–442
Fetzer JH (1971) Dispositional probabilities. In: Buck R, Cohen R (eds) PSA 1970. D Reidel, Dordrecht, pp 473–482
Fetzer JH (1974) Statistical probabilities: single case propensities vs long run frequencies. In: Leinfellner W, Kohler E (eds) Developments in the methodology of social science. D Reidel, Dordrecht, pp 387–397
Fetzer JH (1981) Scientific knowledge. D Reidel, Dordrecht
Fetzer JH (1983) Transcendent laws and empirical procedures. In: Rescher N (ed) The limits of lawfulness. University Press of America, Lanham, pp 25–32
Fetzer JH (1987) Critical notice: Wesley Salmon’s scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world. Philos Sci 54:597–610
Good IJ (1961/62) A causal calculus I–II. Brit J Philos Sci 11:305–318 and 12:43–51
Hempel CG (1962) Deductive-nomological vs statistical explanation. In: Feigl H, Maxwell G (eds) Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp 98–169
Hempel CG (1965) Aspects of scientific explanation. The Free Press, New York
Hempel CG (1968) Maximal specificity and lawlikeness in probabilistic explanation. Philos Sci 35:116–133
Humphreys P (1986) Review of Wesley Salmon’s scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world. Found Phys 16:1211–1216
Levi I (1977) Subjunctives, dispositions, and chances. Synthese 34:423–455
Levi I (1979) Inductive appraisal. In: Asquith P, Kyburg H (eds) Current research in philosophy of science. Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, pp 339–351
Salmon WC (1967) The of scientific inference. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh
Salmon WC (1970) Statistical explanations. In: Colodny R (ed) The nature and function of scientific theories. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, pp 173–231
Salmon WC (ed) (1971) Statistical explanation and statistical relevance. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh
Salmon WC (1975) Theoretical explanations. In: Korner S (ed) Explanation. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp 118–145
Salmon WC (1978) Why Ask, ‘Why?’ Proc Addresses Amer Philos Assoc 51: 683–705
Salmon WC (1980) Probabilistic causality. Pac Philos Quart 61:50–74
Salmon WC (1984) Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Skyrms B (1980) Causal necessity. Yale University Press, New Haven
Suppes P (1970) A probabilistic theory of causality. North-Holland, Amsterdam
van Fraassen B (1980) The scientific image. Oxford University Press, Oxford
von Mises R (1964) Mathematical theory of probability and statistics. Geiringer H (ed) Academic, New York
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Paul Humphreys and especially to Ellery Eells for criticism. I have also benefitted from the stimulating comments of an anonymous referee.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Fetzer, J.H. (2010). Probabilistic Metaphysics. In: Eells, E., Fetzer, J. (eds) The Place of Probability in Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 284. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3615-5_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3615-5_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-3614-8
Online ISBN: 978-90-481-3615-5
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)