Abstract
We are all lovers of the good (by our own lights), and we tend to admire what we find beautiful. Are we under any obligation to do so? We may have instrumental Humean reasons to love what we find good and to admire what we think is beautiful, of course, but have we here identified, not only some interests that people often hold, but also a special source of obligation? Are we objectively required to love what we find good and to admire what we find beautiful? Or, are we even required to love what is good (in itself) and to admire what is beautiful, irrespective of what we may think of it? Or, if we don’t, do we at least all share a common emotional goal, like the epistemic goal discussed in the previous chapter, in terms of which our likes and dislikes can be rationalised?
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Notes
- 1.
Critique of the Power of Judgment, p. 96.
- 2.
Principia Ethica, pp. 189-190.
- 3.
Ibid., p. 209.
- 4.
This example is an elaboration of an example suggested by Ragnar Ohlsson in Morals Based on Needs, pp. 91-92.
- 5.
Brentano F. (1889) The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong.
- 6.
See Ewing, Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy, p. 63.
- 7.
Scanlon, T. M., What We Owe to Each Other, p. 11.
- 8.
In ‘A concrete view of intrinsic value’ I defend such a view of value, and in Hedonistic Utilitarianism I take it for granted. Roger Crisp speaks, in Reasons and the Good of this line of argument as the ‘redundance argument’.
- 9.
Arrhenius, G. Future Generations: A Challenge for Moral Theory.
- 10.
See for example Parfit, D. ‘Overpopulation and the Quality of Life’, Blackorby, C., Bossert, W., and Donaldson, D., ‘Critical-Level Utilitarianism and the Population-ethics Dilemma’ and John Broome, Weighing Goods.
- 11.
‘Mere Addition and Two Trilemmas of Population Ethics’, p. 302.
- 12.
Ibid.
- 13.
Ibid.
- 14.
§89 p. 147.
- 15.
§17 p. 25.
- 16.
In my Moral Realism I opted instead for intrinsic value as the basic moral category. I did so for what I (now) believe were bad epistemic reasons.
- 17.
Ethics, pp. 107-108.
- 18.
C.f. his ‘A Reply to My Critics’ about this.
- 19.
‘Rationality and Reasons’, ibid.
- 20.
Derek Parfit, in correspondence.
- 21.
I build here on a critical comment on my argument put forward by Sven Nyholm (in correspondence).
- 22.
‘Rationality and Reasons’, p. 24.
- 23.
This kind of objection has been known under the name ‘The Wrong Kind of Reasons’-objection. It is discussed in Jonas Olson, ‘Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons’.
- 24.
Essays on Actions and Events, p. 9.
- 25.
‘Normative Practical Reasoning’.
- 26.
This claim was made in ‘Actions, Reasons and Causes’ (1963), but seems to have been given up later, at least from ‘Intending’ (1978), both reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events.
- 27.
In English we say that I believe ‘that’ so and so, but that I intend ‘to’ do so and so. In Swedish the same phrase (‘att,’ the indicator of the infinitive mood) is used for attributions of beliefs and intentions alike.
- 28.
Essays on Actions and Events, p. 90.
- 29.
‘Normative Practical Reasoning’.
- 30.
This has been suggested by Broome in correspondence.
- 31.
The number of such attempts is legion. The best version, to my knowledge, is Lars Bergström, Imperatives and Ethics.
- 32.
For an illuminating discussion about the difference between picking and choosing, see Ullmann-Margalit E. and Morgenbesser, S., ‘Picking and Choosing’.
- 33.
Humanity, pp. 62-63.
- 34.
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, p. 288. Gibbard here speaks of ‘norms’ but he holds an expressivist view of norms so, according to his analysis, these are indeed pro- and con-attitudes of a kind. Therefore, the consistency here discussed is indeed a practical one.
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Tännsjö, T. (2010). Reasons to Desire. In: From Reasons to Norms. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 22. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3285-0_9
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