Abstract
In the previous chapter I indicated my reasons for my belief in moral (normative) realism. We have already seen that if moral realism is true, and, if there are some moral (normative) facts that have moral explanations, then there exist objective moral reasons. I will here defend some claims in addition to this one. One of them is that the moral nihilist doesn’t have access to moral reasons. This is perhaps not a very surprising consequence of moral nihilism. We have seen that it follows already from nihilism with respect to moral principles (particularism). Another consequence is that, somewhat more unexpectedly, the same goes for the moral naturalist. Finally I will discuss whether the notion of an objective moral reason, which I have defended, could help us to answer what Christine Korsgaard has called the normative question. I will argue that it can.
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Notes
- 1.
See his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.
- 2.
See C.L. Stevenson, Facts and Values, for a defence of this view of truth in ethics.
- 3.
The problem got its name from Peter Geach in his 1960 article ‘Ascriptivism’ where he attributes it to Frege.
- 4.
Blackburn, S., Spreading the Word. Groundings in the Philosophy of Language, p. 198.
- 5.
The Moral Problem, p. 185.
- 6.
‘Truth in Ethics’, p. 10.
- 7.
I follow tradition and attribute this argument to Moore, even though it is doubtful whether he ever stated it. See Fred Feldman’s fascinating ‘The Open Question Argument: What it Isn’t and What It Is’.
- 8.
Scanlon, T., What We Owe to Each Other, p. 12.
- 9.
See his ‘Moral Explanations’.
- 10.
For further references, see D.O. Brink’s instructive, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.
- 11.
The Sources of Normativity.
- 12.
Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality, p. 3.
- 13.
The Methods of Ethics, p. 5.
- 14.
Ibid.
- 15.
‘Normative Practical Reasoning’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
- 16.
Wedberg lectures given at Stockholm University in Mars, 2004 (unpublished).
- 17.
I owe this qualification to a comment from John Broome (December 2008).
- 18.
Including John Broome who writes, in correspondence (May 2004), that he has ‘no formed views about the relation between rationality and normativity. He has made the same claim recently in conversation.
- 19.
The Sources of Normativity. p. 16.
- 20.
Ibid. p. l8.
- 21.
Alan Gewirth, ibid., pp. 25-26.
- 22.
Stephen L. Darwall, ‘Automist Internalism and the Justification of Morals’, p. 263.
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Tännsjö, T. (2010). Some Consequences of Moral Realism. In: From Reasons to Norms. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 22. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3285-0_5
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