Introduction

Abstract

A central claim made in the book is that there exist two radically different notions of practical reasons. The word ‘reason’ is ambiguous between them. This ambiguity is one source of confusion in discussions where the term ‘reason’ appears, as in the anecdote above. These two notions of practical reasons are, on the one hand, something I will speak of as the ‘Humean’ notion of practical reasons, and, on the other hand, the moral or normative notion of practical reasons. To simplify, I will sometimes allow myself to speak of Humean and moral (normative) reasons, even though this is slightly misleading. We are not here dealing with two types of one and the same thing, to wit, practical reasons, but with two radically different notions of practical reasons. In the anecdote the Judge leans heavily towards the moral notion while the Accused tries to stick to the Humean one.