Abstract
To explain phenomenon R by showing how mechanism M yields output R each time it is triggered by circumstances C, is to give a causal explanation of R. This paper analyses what mechanistic analysis can contribute to our understanding of causation in general and of downward causation in particular. It is first shown, against Glennan, that the concept of causation cannot be reduced to that of mechanism. Second it is shown, against Craver and Bechtel, that mechanistic explanation allows us to make sense of causal processes that cut across levels, either in bottom-up direction where a change in a part of a system causes a change in the whole, or in downward direction where a change at the level of the system causes a change at the level of its parts. I suggest construing a decision’s influence on molecules in muscle cells as a global constraint. Microscopic laws determine the detailed evolution of muscle cells and glucose molecules, but this evolution is constrained by the fact that it must be compatible with the action caused by the decision.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
See Ludvig et al. (2001).
- 3.
- 4.
I have analysed Kim’s argument in more detail in Kistler (2005, 1999/2006a, 2006b).
- 5.
It has been argued, e.g. by Mills (1996) and Walden (2001), that the effects of mental causes are systematically overdetermined by mental and physical causes, and that this overdetermination is not the result of the dependency of the mental causes on the physical causes. Mills makes it clear that “causal overdetermination requires the distinct, independent causal sufficiency of P [a physical cause] and of my believing” (Mills 1996, p. 107; italics Mills’). For lack of space, I cannot here examine Mills’ and Walden’s arguments in detail. Let me just note that Mills’ own justification for the causal efficacy of a certain belief, with respect to the fact that his arm raises, contradicts this claim of independence. He justifies it by the truth of a counterfactual according to which the belief causes the arm movement in a possible world in which its physical cause is absent. Now, this counterfactual is true only because “worlds in which my belief is accompanied by some physical event that causes the arm-raising preserve actual laws, whereas worlds in which my belief is unaccompanied by any such physical event do not” (Mills 1996, p. 109). This reasoning seems to presuppose that there is a nomic correlation between physical and mental properties, which contradicts their independence.
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- 8.
- 9.
I have justified this sketch in a little more detail in Kistler (2006b).
- 10.
I thank my auditors in Madrid and Reinaldo Bernal for helpful criticism and discussion.
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Kistler, M. (2010). Causation Across Levels, Constitution, and Constraint. In: Suárez, M., Dorato, M., Rédei, M. (eds) EPSA Philosophical Issues in the Sciences. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3252-2_14
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