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Rites as the Foundations of Human Civilization: Rethinking the Role of the Confucian Li

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Reconstructionist Confucianism

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture ((PSCC,volume 17))

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Abstract

Rituals are roughly fixed and repetitive social practices. They are not general principles that depend on specific interpretations to determine their requirements. Instead, rituals provide concrete and detailed instructions, specifying what individuals should say and do in particular contexts. Evidently, every civilization or tradition carries distinct, important rituals in its community.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Li” could have various English translations. As Wing-tsit Chan points out, “li originally meant ‘a religious sacrifice’ but has come to mean ‘ceremony,’ ‘ritual,’ ‘decorum,’ ‘rules of propriety,’ ‘good form,’ ‘good custom,’ etc.” in the Confucian tradition (Chan, 1967, p. 367). This chapter explores the central meaning and function of li in order coherently to bring its various uses together.

    The quotations of the Analects in this chapter are adapted from D. C. Lau’s translation with reference to additional versions offered by other translators. The quotations of the Records of Li () are adapted from James Legge (1967).

  2. 2.

    For detailed descriptions of these Confucian ceremonial rituals, see the Confucian classic Yili (); for the English version of this classic, see Steele (1966).

  3. 3.

    As the Confucian classic Records of Li discloses, “At the first use of ceremonies (li), they began with meat and drink. They roasted millet and pieces of animal meat; they excavated the ground in the form of a jar, and scooped the water from it with their two hands; they fashioned a handle of clay, and struck with it an earthen drum. (Simple as these arrangements were), they yet seemed to be able to express by them their reverence for spiritual beings” (Liji: Liyun  ; Legge, 1967, Vol. I, p. 368).

  4. 4.

    Archery can serve as a useful example here. In the Confucian tradition, archery is not a casually-performed game. Instead, it is one of the important ceremonial rituals, created and governed by a system of Confucian constitutive rules for the purpose of virtue cultivation. “The archers, in advancing, retiring, and all their movements, were required to observe the rules. With minds correct, and straight carriage of the body, they were to hold their bows and arrows skillfully and firmly; and when they did so, they might be expected to hit the mark. In this way their virtues could be seen. …Archery suggests to us the way of the cardinal virtue” (Liji: Sheyi  ; Legge, 1967, Vol. II, pp. 446, 452). As Confucius points out, “there is no contention between gentlemen. The nearest to it is, perhaps, archery. In archery they bow and make way for one another as they go up, and on coming down they drink together. Even the way they contend is gentlemanly” (Analects 3.7). For the detailed constitutive rules of the Confucian archery ritual, see Yili: Dasheyi  ; for an English translation, see Steele (1966, Vol. I, pp. 150–160).

  5. 5.

    The distinction between closed practices and open practices is made by Tom Morawetz (1973, pp. 860–861), and is further developed by Emily Martin Ahern in explaining Chinese rituals (1981, pp. 64–74). However, Ahern failed to recognize that the Confucian rituals, as to be argued in this essay, are closed and quasi-closed practices. My argument in this section has been developed based on these two essays as well as the distinction between constitute and regulative rules made by John Searle (1969, pp. 33–42).

  6. 6.

    A specific activity inside a game, such as playing the national anthem, may be taken as a ritual.

  7. 7.

    The most comprehensive and popular classification of the Confucian li was offered by a Qing dynasty scholar, Qin Huitian ( , 1702–1764), who integrated all li into five sorts: auspicious li ( jili, ), propitious li (jiali, ), diplomatic li (binli, ), military li (junli, ), and ominous li (xiongli, ). See Qin (1994). Nowadays Chinese people still use the word of li in broad ways, such as political li, business li, everyday life li, etc.

  8. 8.

    Quli” constitutes the title of the first chapter of the Liji. I translate quli into “minute rituals” because it is formally taken to be partially-employed yili or small pieces of yili. We are told that the Confucian tradition used to include 300 ceremonial rituals and 3,000 minute rituals (Liji : Liqi  ; Legge, Vol. I, p. 404). Although these figures were not meant to provide accurate statistics, they do indicate that a great amount of the Confucian rituals were practiced and recorded in the ancient Chinese society. Unfortunately, most ancient corpora covering the Confucian li were destroyed in the anti-Confucian, despotic Qin () dynasty (4th–3rd century BCE).

  9. 9.

    This understanding of the minute rituals is suggested and supported by the Confucian classic of the Records of Li. It has also been upheld by some Neo-Confucian scholars, such as the great Neo-Confucian master Zhu Xi (, 1130–1200). Zhu Xi emphasized the role of li, seeing that yili serves as a primordial model from which quli is derivable. From his view, it is incorrect to say that quli is changeable while yili is unchangeable. Instead, both yili and quli include adjustable and nonadjustable aspects in their practices (Zhu, 1994, p. 2194). His view is consistent with the idea expressed in the Records of Li.

  10. 10.

    Indeed, for Confucians, it is the rituals, not languages, that distinguish humans out of the natural animal world. “The parrot can speak, and yet is nothing more than a bird; the ape can speak, and yet is nothing more than a beast. Here now is a man who observes no ritual; is not his heart that of a beast? …Therefore, the sages arose and framed the rituals to teach men, by their possession of the rituals, to make a distinction between themselves and brutes” (Liji: Qili,  ; Legge, 1967, Vol. I, pp. 64–65). Although the classical Confucian understanding of animals’ language capacity may not be accurate, it is clear that, from this passage, Confucianism does not take the essential distinction between humans and animals to consist in language. Humans differ dramatically from the beasts not because they have superior language capacity, but because they have the rituals that the beasts cannot have.

  11. 11.

    This interpretation is consistent with Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of functional concepts. Confucian names for individuals can be taken as functional concepts. As MacIntyre points out, a functional concept (such as father) must be defined in terms of the purpose or function which the concept bearer (the father) is characteristically expected to serve. Accordingly, the criterion of some individual’s being a father and the criterion of some individual’s being a good father are not independent of each other. Both criteria are factual so that there would be no problem of a “is-ought” gap in functionalist ethical argument (1984, p. 58). In my interpretation, the Confucian constitutive rules for creating and specifying the Confucian individuals and their roles are both descriptive and prescriptive.

  12. 12.

    Even when one is alone, Confucianism emphasizes that one must be watchful over oneself (shendu, ) in observing the rituals (Great Learning 6; Doctrine of the Mean 1).

  13. 13.

    Of course, this process of harmonizing the inner and outer cannot be completed overnight. Confucius described the process of his life experience this way: “At fifteen I set my heart on learning [the rituals]; at thirty I took my stand; at forty I came to be free from doubts; at fifty I understood the Decree of Heaven; at sixty my ear was attuned; at seventy I followed my heart’s desire without overstepping the line” (Analects 2.4). This is to say, Confucius acquired a perfect freedom or unity between his inner and outer at the age of seventy: at that point what he desired to do was always what he ought to do.

  14. 14.

    In Fingarette’s words, the Confucian Way is “a Way without a crossroads” (p. 18). To a great extent this chapter shares his view on the significance of the Confucian rituals. But I don’t need to accept his behaviorist assumptions on Confucian ethics taken in his book.

  15. 15.

    Since the Confucian ceremonial rituals have particular music (yue, ) to accompany the proceeding, Confucian rituals are also called ritual-music (liyue, ). That is, the Confucian concept of li generally covers the concept of yue.

  16. 16.

    In Randall Collin’s words, “participation in a ritual gives the individual a special kind of energy, which I will call emotional energy. …it makes individual feel not only good, but exalted, with the sense of doing what is most important and most valuable. …rituals are the source of the group’s standards of morality. It is the heightened experience of intersubjectivity and emotional strength in group rituals that generates the conception of what is good” (2004, pp. 38–39, italics original).

  17. 17.

    The attempt to abstracting the Confucian morality from its rituals happened in the mid history of China. About one thousand years ago, a reformative premier of the Song Dynasty decided to abolish the rituals as recorded in the Yili () as a subject for civil examination. Instead, he arranged only the general principles upheld in the Liji () in their place for examination. This change was critiqued by the contemporary Confucian Master, Zhu Xi, as “putting the cart before the horse” (Zhu, 1994, p. 2225).

  18. 18.

    Rawls’ discussion in his essay (1955) is very helpful for understanding the rule-governing nature of practices. Unfortunately, Rawls fails to distinguish closed practices from open practices, although most examples he offers in the essay are closed practices by my standard, such as court trials. From my understanding, general practices to which people usually refer, such as farming, medicine, law, architecture, painting, music, enquiries of physics, chemistry and biology, and so on, include a lot of closed practices as well as open practices in themselves. Distinguishing open and closed practices is necessary for understanding the nature of ritual.

  19. 19.

    However, a Song-dynasty Confucian, Li Gou ( , 1009–1059), challenges Mencius’ solution on the ground that Mencius has misunderstood the nature of the Confucian rituals and weighing. From Li’s view, stretching out to save one’s sister-in-law is not violating the rule of a family ritual that does not allow physical contact with one’s sister-in-law in the usual family life. Rather, holding one’s sister-in-law to save her is employing a totally different ritual in a totally different context. For him, this different ritual requires that one must stretch out to save one’s sister-in-law (or any known or unknown woman) in the context of danger, and this ritual has nothing to do with the family ritual that requires a man not to have physical contact with his sister-in-law in normal family circumstances. See Li (1981, pp. 18–19). However, Li’s view could be criticized as begging the question – when one is not following an obviously relevant ritual in one’s situation, one could always claim observing another different ritual as an excuse for not following the first ritual. The “exception-making” strategy seems to be more defensible than this “different-ritual-performing” strategy.

  20. 20.

    Concerning the Confucian rituals through the earliest three Chinese dynasties, Xia (), Yin () and Zhou (), the Master said, “the Yin built on the rites of the Xia. What was added and what was omitted can be known. The Zhou built on the rites of the Yin. What was added and what was omitted can be known. Should there be a successor to the Zhou, even a hundred generations hence can be known” (Analects 2.23).

  21. 21.

    This is clearly stipulated in the following passage of another classic, the Records of Li. After stating that certain items used in the rituals, such as clothes and calendars, could be changed, the passage continues that

    “no changes could be enjoined upon the rituals in what concerned affection for kin (qinqin, ), the honor paid to the honorable (zunzun, ), the respect due to the aged (zhangzhang, ), and the different functions of male and female (nannuyoubie, )” (Liji: Dazhuan  ; Legge, 1967, Vol. II, p. 62).

  22. 22.

    There are numerous other examples of this kind in the Analects: “a ren man helps others to take their stand in so far as he himself wishes to take his stand, and gets others there in so far as he himself wishes to get there” (6.3); “do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire” (12.2); “a ren man is loath to speak” (12.2); “when faced with an opportunity to practice ren, do not give precedence even to your teacher” (15.36); “a ren man…may have to accept death in order to have ren accomplished” (15.9), and so on. As complete virtue, ren is also often explained by Confucius in terms of more specific virtues. For example, “filial piety (xiao, ) and fraternal submission (di, ) are the root of ren” (1.2); “while at home hold yourself in a respectful attitude (gong, ); when serving in an official capacity be reverent (jing, ); when dealing with others be loyal (zhong, )” (13.19); “unbending strength (gang, ), resoluteness (yi, ), simplicity (mu, ) and reticent (ne, ) are close to ren” (13.27); “to be able to practice five things under heaven constitutes ren…: respectfulness (gong, ), tolerance (kuan, ), trustworthiness (xin, ), quickness (min, ) and generosity (hui, )” (17.6), and so on.

  23. 23.

    Here I overlook the other possible interpretations of keji (), which do not affect my argument.

  24. 24.

    There is a remarkable difference between this Confucian “reflective equilibrium” (made between Confucian virtue principles and ritual rules) and the reflective equilibrium (made between principles of justice and considered judgments) Rawls adopts in constructing his theory of justice. “Considered judgments are simply those rendered under conditions favorable to the exercise of the sense of justice” (Ralws, 1971, p. 47). They are, indeed, not specific rules entrenched in practices, but are rather “new” beliefs resulted from reflections – reflections made under conditions guided by certain principles, or senses of principles. As a result, from the Confucian view, Ralwisan liberalism, through this kind of reflective equilibrium, fails to give due respect to established practices and rules.

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Fan, R. (2010). Rites as the Foundations of Human Civilization: Rethinking the Role of the Confucian Li . In: Reconstructionist Confucianism. Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3156-3_11

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