Abstract
This chapter attempts to explore Huizhao’s theory of svalakṣaṇa (particular) and sāmānyalakṣaṇa (universal) on the basis of his works, especially his Treatise on Two Means of Valid Knowledge. In this treatise, the main question regarding the nature of cognition in the context of mental cultivation is addressed as such: Is the cognition of universals or the cognition of particulars capable of guiding the practitioner to attain liberation? According to Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā, universal is the correct answer to the question, since only the path that takes universal as the object is able to eliminate the defilements. For the Chinese Yogācārins and logicians who followed Dignāga, conversely, only the particular can be taken as the object of valid cognition that leads to the final awakening. In the case of Huizhao, he grounds the ontology of universal in the doctrinal framework of Yogācāra idealism, which leads him to compromise between nominalism and conceptualism. This chapter concludes that, as far as the issue of particular and universal is concerned, the Indian side is more devoted to the debate among different philosophical theories, such as realism, nominalism, and conceptualism, whereas on the Chinese side more interests are directed to contextualizing the issue within the practice of cognitive cultivation.
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Notes
- 1.
This paper was presented at the International Workshop on “Ontology of Asian Philosophy: Perspectives from Buddhist Study and Analytic Philosophy” organized by Kyoto University and Ryukoku University on April 13–14, 2013. I am grateful for the comments by Shōryū Katsura, Mark Siderits, Tom Tillemans, as well as for the proofreading by Ernest Brewster. Mark Siderits reminds me to pay attention to the broader background in which the motive for attaining the enlightenment is not merely found in Buddhist epistemology, but also found in non-Buddhist theories of knowledge. Shōryū Katsura points out that in Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (Collected Works for Investigating the Means of Valid Knowledge, hereafter PSV) I.2, non-eternality (anityatā), one of the sixteen features (ākāra) of Four Noble Truths, is mentioned as the object of perception. This indicates that Dignāga was aware of the fact that, as the Abhidharma literature has shown, the analysis of cognition should be conducted within the context of meditation. Dignāga did not fully elaborate this issue, which he might not consider it the priority of his philosophical project for the reason that most of the Buddhists do not lack such kind of knowledge. By contrast, Dharmakīrti and his followers never lost sight of the soteriological agenda of Buddhist epistemology.
- 2.
Huizhao is regarded as the second patriarch of the East Asian Yogācāra School (Faxiang/Hossō School). For the study on Huizhao’s biography, see Nemu 1987: 161–168.
- 3.
- 4.
Xuanzang spent a month to learn the Pramāṇasamuccaya from a Brahmin when he traveled to Kosalā. See Huili’s biography of Xuanzang, T 50, 2053: 241b.
- 5.
pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca pramāṇe lakṣaṇadvayam / prameyaṃ tasya sandhāne na pramāṇāntaram. See Steinkellner, Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter 1. Also cf., Hattori 1968: 24.
- 6.
眼識但能了青,不了是青。意識了青,亦了是青。(T 29, 1558: 52c)
- 7.
Five aggregates: physical form, feeling, conception, volition, consciousness. Twelve fields: six faculties of cognition plus six corresponding objects of cognition. Eighteen realms: twelve fields plus six types of consciousness. These categories are employed by the Buddhist to depict the totality of phenomena.
- 8.
唯共相境道能斷煩惱 (T 27, 1545: 820a)
- 9.
Huizhao, Erliang zhang: “One theory holds that in the concentrated state of mind both particular and universal are cognized by perception, whereas according to the logical treatises (hetūvidya) [e.g., Nyāyamukha and Nyāyapraveśa] it is in the non-concentrated state of mind that the characters of particular and universal are taken as the object of cognition.” 一云,定心通緣自共二相,並是現量,而因明論中,約緣自共二種相者,據散心說。(X 55, 882: 162c)
- 10.
Kuiji, Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji: “The cognition of general character is also included in [the category of] perception by which the defilement can be definitely eliminated. The mind in the concentrated state is called ‘perception’ because due to concentration it illuminates the universal in the thing itself”. 由此總緣智亦現量攝,斷惑無失,即由定照共相自體故,說定心為現量也。(T 43, 1830: 584b)
- 11.
Huizhao, Erliang Zhang: “The second theory holds that the mind in the concentrated state only takes the particular as the object of cognition, because cognition as such is induced by means of [the cognition of] universal and by the cognition of the truth/principle manifested in the various characters of universal. “Cognition of universal” is thus named when it is viewed as provisional condition (upāya). It is called “cognition of particular” when it is not so viewed. For this reason, some consider “suchness” (tathatā), “emptiness” (sūnyat) or “selflessness” (nairātmya) to be the universal of existents. The others consider “suchness” to be manifested by the two kinds of emptiness (of self and things), and therefore it is not the universal.” 二云,定心唯緣自相,然由共相方便所引,緣諸共相所顯理故,就方便說,名知共相。不如是者,名知自相。由此道理,或說真如,名空、無我,是法共相。或說真如,二空所顯,非是共相。(X 55, 882: 162c22–163a1)
- 12.
This theory is also found in the Maitreya Chapter of the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (Lin 2010: 2, 261–275).
- 13.
陳那依此二相,唯立二量,其二相體,今略明之。一切諸法,各附己體,所有別理,如於色等上苦、無常等,不由安立,本有自性,即名自相。不同經中所說自相,以分別心,假立一法,貫通諸法,如縷貫華。由智安立,方說為有,此名共相。(X 53, 852: 791b–c)
- 14.
Cf., Katsura 2011: 271–279. Dignāga’s notion of svalakṣaṇa needs to be further clarified. Since Dignāga stands for the position of Sākāravijñānavāda, it is reasonable to construe svalakṣaṇa as sense-data. Dan Arnold’s interpretation is worthy of note: “On this reading, the only ‘unique particulars’ that can be the direct objects of knowledge are (as Dignāga had argued in his Ālambanaparīkṣā) finally something like internal sense-data—mental events (such as “representations”) our acquaintance with which is uniquely immediate” (Arnold 2005: 25).
- 15.
“Faxiang zong” (法相宗) is used as a general label for the whole East Asian Yogācāra tradition. In this paper, however, I use the phrase “Xuanzang School” to emphasize the contribution of Xuanzang as the founder of the school. This view is different from the traditional ascription of Kuiji as the first patriarch of the school.
- 16.
Four types of transformed cognition refer to those purified forms of cognition which are transformed from the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna), the seventh consciousness (manas), the sixth consciousness (mano-vijñāna) and five kinds of sensory consciousness respectively. They are called “mirror-like cognition”, “cognition of equality”, “cognition of profound observation”, and “cognition of unrestricted activities”.
- 17.
The Sanskrit equivalent of youti 有體 could be tādātmya (see Wogihara 1936: 44, line 17–20), meaning “sameness or identity of nature”. It could also refer to bhava (existence).
- 18.
“If sāmānyalakṣaṇa (universal) lacks substance, under what condition does the cognition arise? Answer: Although sāmānyalakṣaṇa superimposes appearance (siyou 似有) upon the svalakṣaṇa qua bimba (benzhi zixiang 本質自相), as far as the conceptual mind cognizes, it transforms the original stuff (bimba) into the object part of mind (xiang-feng 相分). Both bimba and xiang-feng lack the substance of universals. Cognition merely takes the object part of mind (xiang-feng, noema) as its object. It cannot take the sāmānyalakṣaṇa of that [xiang-feng] as the object.” (Huizhao, T 43, 1832: 716a) 共相體無,智緣何起?答:共相雖依本質自相增益似有,假智緣時,還依本質以變相分,質相俱無彼共相體,智但緣相,不能緣著彼之共相。
- 19.
According to the interpretation in the Xuanzang School, Dignāga proposes a theory of the threefold structure of the mind: the seeing part (jianfen 見分), the image part (xiangfen 相分), and the part of self-cognition (svasaṃvedana; zizhengfen 自證分). Based on this model, Dharmapāla adds one more part: the cognition of self-cognition (zhengzizhengfen 證自證分). For details, cf., Yao 2005: 145–146.
- 20.
“Question: In this treatise, under which category of hundred dharmas is subsumed the universal and the noematic part (xiangfen) [of cognition] carried by the mind in the concentrated state when permanence, impermanence and so forth are cognized? Answer: There are two [explanations]. First, owing to the non-substantiality [of universal and the noematic part] they are not subsumed under any category of hundred dharmas. According to the second explanation, they are subsumed under [the category of] commonality (sabhāga) of existents. Now we classify [universal and the neomatic part] under the category of commonality [of existents] for the reason that they can be classified under the same category to which the five aggregates belong. In other words, they follow the mind of transformation (隨能變心) and cannot be separated from it. Commonality is established on the basis of the similarity of various existents. It completely lacks substance. The universal character of this sort can be said to have substance if it refers to the noematic part as the result of transformation of causal conditions. The direct object of cognition must exist as real entity. It [i.e., universal] is also different from the noematic part, which is substantially real, being the result of the same seeds of the noetic part, and serving as the object of the intended part. It is non-substance if it is viewed from the “original matter”. Awareness of permanence, impermanence and so on, in the concentrated state of mind is merely to directly perceive the transformation of mind. If the universal is taken [as the object of cognition] by the mind of inference, it is provisionally established by the mind of reference.” (Huizhao X 55, 882: 163a) 問:此論共相及定心緣常無常等所帶相分,百法何攝?答:一云,以無體故,百法不取。一云,法同分攝。今謂可通五蘊所攝,隨能變心,不可離心,判屬同分。同分依相似眾多法立,而全無體。此之共相,若據緣所變相分,可言有體。親所緣緣,定應有故。亦不同於相分體實,與見同種,義分所緣。若據本質,即是無體。定心所緣常無常等,但現觀心變。若比量心所緣共相,但比量心假所安立。
- 21.
問:修煖加行,其相云何?答:以要言之,三慧為相。謂聞所成慧、思所成慧、修所成慧。問:云何修習聞所成慧?答:修觀行者,或遇明師,為其略說諸法要者,唯有十八界、十二處、五蘊。或自讀誦素怛纜藏、毘奈耶藏、阿毘達磨藏,令善熟已,作如是念:三藏文義甚為廣博,若恒憶持,令心厭倦。三藏所說要者,唯有十八界、十二處、五蘊。作是念已,先觀察十八界。彼觀察時,立為三分:謂名故、自相故、共相故。名者,謂此名眼界,乃至此名意識界。自相者,謂此是眼界自相,乃至此是意識界自相。共相者,謂十六行相。所觀十八界、十六種共相。彼緣此界,修智修止。(T 27, 1545: 34a–b)
- 22.
Cf. Anacker 1984: 186.
- 23.
問:現比量心緣自共相,與名句詮二相何別? (X 55, 882: 163a).
- 24.
Cf. Sthiramati’s Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya §8B (2): svabhāvādhivacanaṃ cakṣuḥ śrotraṃ devo manuṣya ityevamādi / viśeṣādhivacanaṃ sarvasaṃskārā anityāḥ sarvasattvā mariṣyantīty evamādi //. For Xuangzang’s Chinese translation, see T 31, 1606: 700c. This passage reminds us of what Bertrand Russell said: “When we examine common words, we find that, broadly speaking, proper names stand for particulars, while other substantives, adjective, propositions, and verbs stand for universals” (Russell 2008, 63).
- 25.
實之,名詮自相,句詮差別,但依心變,無實體性,共相而轉。(X55, 882: 163b) To be noted, in the Zokuzōkyō version, the phrase “wubien tixing” 無變體性 makes no sense. In Zhizhou 智周’s Cheng Weishi Lun Yanmi 成唯識論演秘, the same phrase is cited as “wushi tixing” 無實體性, which makes much better sense. See T43, 1833: 850c.
- 26.
Huizhao, The Continued Commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa: “Some says that ‘particular character’ refers to the character of heat in fire, etc. When particular character is expressed by words, it is called ‘universal character.’ This theory is wrong, because it is in opposition to what is said in the Buddhabhumyūpadeśa. If [we agree that] the heat of fire and so on can be called ‘particular,’ [we have to agree that] when the mind in the concentrated state cognizes fire without perceiving the heat, it must cognizes the universal character. [However, this is not the case.] Further, when the mind in the concentrated state cognizes the truth/principle expressed by the teaching, which is also expressed by the words, [the truth] must be the universal character. If this is the case, the mind in the concentrated state should be called ‘inference’, because it does not cognize the particular character. [However, this is not the case.]” (X 53, 852: 791c) 有說自相,如火熱相等,名為自相。若為名言所詮顯者,此名共相。此釋不然,違佛地論。若如火熱等,方名自相者,定心緣火,不得彼熱,應名緣共。及定心緣教所詮之理,亦為言所詮,亦應名共相。若爾,定心應名比量,不緣自相故。
- 27.
For Kuiji’s theory of apoha, see Katsura 2014: “Kuiji is well aware of the fact that …Dignāga and other Buddhist logicians define it [i.e., universal; gongxiang 共相] as the ‘exclusion/negation of others’. Kuiji says that when we use the word ‘fire’, we exclude non-fire (zhe feihuo 遮非火), and that the exclusion of non-fire shared by all fires.”
- 28.
夫立宗法,略有二種。一者但遮而無有表。如言我無,但欲遮我,不欲立無。喻亦但遮而不取表。二遮亦表。如說我常,非但遮無常,亦表有常。體喻即具遮表。(X 53, 852: 788a)
Abbreviations
- PS:
-
Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga
- PSV:
-
Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti of Dignāga
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Lin, Ck. (2018). How to Attain Enlightenment Through Cognition of Particulars and Universals? Huizhao on Svalakṣaṇa and Sāmānyalakṣaṇa . In: Wang, Y., Wawrytko, S. (eds) Dao Companion to Chinese Buddhist Philosophy. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2939-3_11
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