Abstract
Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1085) was born in Huangpi 黃陂 in what is the present Hubei Province, where his father was a local administrator. Baichun 伯淳 was his courtesy name, but he was better known as Mingdao 明道. Together with his younger brother Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107), he strove to restore the tradition of Confucius and Mencius in the name of “the learning of the way” (daoxue 道學), which eventually developed as the main concern in various schools of Neo-Confucian thought. Although the philosophical views of the two brothers are diverse in some respects, they are usually identified as together as the “Cheng brothers” to signify their common contribution to Neo-Confucian thought.
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Notes
- 1.
Cheng Yi took a very different approach from that of Cheng Hao in his understanding of core concepts such as principle (li 理), heart/mind (xin 心), and the way (dao 道) of moral cultivation. Although Cheng Yi has had a tremendous impact on the course of Confucian philosophy, and lived 20 years longer than his brother, I do not think he resolved problems inherent in Cheng Hao’s positions. The similarities and differences between the two brothers needs to be examined at length and in detail, a task which exceeds the scope of this essay.
- 2.
All page numbers in this essay refer to this work, and unless otherwise indicated, quotations are those of Cheng Hao.
- 3.
Cheng Hao sometimes used “heaven and earth” in a metaphysical sense which equates with dao, but sometimes he used them to signify a material entity. Hereafter I will use upper case for the former meaning and lower case for the latter.
- 4.
The speaker of the above two passages has not been specified. The editor of Song -Yuan Case Studies (Song-Yuan xue’an 宋元學案) combined them and included them in the “case study” of Cheng Hao (“Mingdao xue’an” 明道學案). Mou thought that the combination was a mistake (Mou 1969: 94). Nevertheless, the ideas are in line with the first passage quoted above and therefore probably should be attributed to Cheng Hao.
- 5.
Here the mind refers to an empirical/habitual mind (xixin 習心), therefore I use “the mind” to distinguish it from the heart/mind (benxin 本心).
- 6.
The speaker of this saying has not been specified. Song-Yuan xue’an includes it in “Mingdao xue’an.” Judging from the content as well as the style, it should be attributed to Cheng Hao.
- 7.
Although sincerity and respect bear different connotations, they can be regarded as constituting a single way of Change.
- 8.
Huang Yong understands Mou Zongsan’s view of principle (li) to be “some thing, some entity, some substance, whose fundamental feature is to act.” He argues that “li remains a being, although a being that always acts. This is what Mou meant by Cheng Hao’s li as ‘something with both being and activity’ ” (Huang 2007: 198). I doubt that Huang’s understanding of Mou is accurate. Although Mou sometimes spoke of the substance (ti 體) of Change, or heart/mind, or dao, sincerity, human nature etc., he always emphasized that this substance can only be understood as function or activity. Therefore the relationship between the substance and activity is not a substance-attribute relationship, rather, they are one thing with different names (Mou 1969: 137).
- 9.
The speaker is not specified. Song-Yuan xue’an includes it in “Mingdao xue’an.” Judging from the content as well as the style, it should be attributed to Cheng Hao (Mou 1969: 95).
- 10.
The speaker of this saying has not been identified. Song-Yuan xue’an includes it in “Mingdao xue’an.” Mou Zongsan attributes it to Cheng Hao (Mou 1969: 22).
- 11.
Zhong Caijun (1992) has argued that there was naturalistic element in Cheng Hao’s thought. I return to this in Section 6.
- 12.
The speaker has not been identified but the views expressed are consistent with Cheng Hao’s thought.
- 13.
The speaker of these two passages has not been specified. Song-Yuan xue’an includes it as part of “Mingdao xue’an.” Judging from the content as well as the style, it should be attributed to Cheng Hao.
- 14.
This is shown in his original notes under the quotation from Gaozi.
- 15.
- 16.
- 17.
- 18.
One form of naturalism takes things that appear in the realm of phenomena as the entire content of metaphysical being. In this sense Cheng Hao’s thought resembles a kind of naturalism. Nevertheless, for Cheng Hao behind the appearance of the realm of phenomena there is the operation of principle. Therefore I do not think it is appropriate to attribute naturalism to his thought.
- 19.
The speaker of this saying has not been specified. Song-Yuan xue’an includes it in “Mingdao xue’an.”
Bibliography
Cheng, Hao 程顥, and Cheng Yi 程頤. 1981. The Works of the Two Chengs 二程集. Beijing 北京: Zhonghua Shuju 中華書局. (This is a collection that contains most of the Cheng brothers’ writings and conversations. It is an amended edition of Complete Works of the Two Chengs 二程全書 published in Qing dynasty.)
Graham, A.C. 1992. Two Chinese Philosophers: The Metaphysics of the Brothers Ch’êng. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company. (In this book the author provides an in-depth discussion on the philosophy of Cheng brothers based on their own writings and conversations. He also referred to the interpretations made by Zhu Xi 朱熹.)
Guo, Xiaodong 郭曉東. 2006. Understanding Humaneness and Stabilizing the Nature 識仁與定性. Shanghai 上海: Fudan daxue chubanshe 復旦大學出版社. (This is a small book containing a good summary of Cheng Hao’s philosophy and its influence.)
Huang, Yong. 2007. “The Cheng Brothers’ Onto-theological Articulation of Confucian Values.” Asian Philosophy, 17:3 187–211.
Mou, Zongsan 牟宗三. 1969. Onto-cosmological State of the Original Heart/Mind and Human Nature 心體與性體, vol. 2. Taibei 臺北: Zhengzhong shuju 正中書局. (This work stands out for its extraordinary depth and clarity in the study of Neo-Confucian philosophy of Song and Ming dynasties. It provides a historical as well as philosophical framework to understand various systems of Neo-Confucian philosophy in that period.)
Zhong, Caijun 鍾彩鈞. 1992. “From Naturalism to Teleology: A Study of the General Principles of the Ontology of the Ch’eng Brothers” 二程本體論要旨探究—從自然論向目的論的展開, Bulletin of the Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy 中國文哲研究集刊 2: 385–422. (In this article the author argues that Cheng Hao held an Immanent Vitalism whereas Cheng Yi established a teleology of moral discipline.)
Zhu, Xi 朱熹. 1986. Topically Arranged Conversations of Master Zhu 朱子語類. Beijing 北京: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局.
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Wai-ying, W. (2010). The Thesis of Single-Rootedness in the Thought of Cheng Hao. In: Makeham, J. (eds) Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2930-0_5
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