Abstract
Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107), also known as Cheng Yichuan 伊川, and his brother Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1085), are often referred to as “the two Chengs” (er Cheng 二程). They are both identified with the group known as the Five Masters of the (Northern) Song period (with the other three being Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 [1016–1073], Zhang Zai 張載 [1020–1077], and Shao Yong 邵庸 [1011–1077]). To the extent that Neo-Confucian philosophy can be characterized as the learning of li (li xue 理學, normally translated as “principle”), as it is most commonly called in contemporary Chinese scholarship, the two brothers can be properly credited as its founders: it is only in their philosophy that li obtains its central position for the first time. Thus, in comparison with classical Confucian philosophy, Neo-Confucian philosophy has a more fully developed metaphysics. However, moral life is still the central concern for Neo-Confucians as for classical Confucians. The metaphysics they develop is to provide an ontological articulation of classical Confucian values, and so it is essentially a moral metaphysics. Thus, in this essay on Cheng Yi, I focus on his moral philosophy, paying particular attention to such issues as why be moral, whether one can be moral, how to be moral, the possibility of a virtue politics, and moral metaphysics.
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Notes
- 1.
The question has often been regarded as something absurd and therefore to be safely ignored. Stephen Toulmin, for example, argues that, just like the question “why are all scarlet things red,” it is a tautological question (Toulmin 1964: 162). F.H. Bradley, on the other hand, thinks that it is a self-contradictory question because it asks for self-interested reason to be moral, i.e., to be not self-interested (Bradley 1935: 61–62). However, Kai Nielsen claims that the question makes sense because it really asks “whether it is rational for me to be moral” (Nielsen 1989: 286–287). David Copp also thinks that the question is intelligible as it asks:“does morality override self-interest?” (Copp 1997: 86).
- 2.
For a more detailed discussion of the topic of why one should be moral, as featured in the history of Western philosophy, see Huang (2008c: 321–330).
- 3.
For a more detailed discussion of the issue of weakness of the will in the Western philosophy, see Huang (2008a: 439–444).
- 4.
For example, Pang Wangli argues that “genuine knowledge is from direct experience and originates from the heart/mind, whereas ordinary knowledge is from indirect experience. Genuine knowledge comes from life experience and practice, whereas ordinary knowledge comes from hearsay” (Pang 1992: 152).
- 5.
In his study of Neo-Confucianism, de Bary devotes a whole chapter to this idea in his book, Learning for One’s Self. On his view, zide—which he translates as “getting it by or for oneself”—has two important senses: “One, relatively low-keyed, is that of learning or experiencing some truth for oneself and deriving inner satisfaction therefrom. Here zide has the meaning of‘learned to one’s satisfaction,’ ‘self-contented,’ ‘self-possessed.’ The other sense of the term is freighted with deeper meaning: ‘getting it or find the Way in oneself” (De Bary 1991: 43); and he relates this second sense to the one used in Mencius 4B.14.
- 6.
It is interesting to note that, while in the Western philosophical tradition, body and mind are usually considered as two separate entities, in this Confucian tradition, they are both regarded as ti: one is the small ti and one is the great ti.
- 7.
Thus, although it is wrong for Feng Richang 馮日昌 to claim that “knowledge from hearing and seeing is what Cheng Yi valued most” (Feng 1991: 175–177), as well as for Lu Lianzhang 蘆連章 and Chen Zhongfan 陳鍾凡 to claim that these two types of knowledge are equally important (see Lu 2001: 142 and Chen 1996: 104), there is still a distinction between a person with knowledge of hearing and seeing and one who is without this knowledge, for one’s knowledge of hearing and seeing can be transformed into knowledge of/as virtue. It is in this sense that Qian Mu 錢穆 pointed out that “it is not that we do not need knowledge from hearing and seeing; it is rather that we need the effort of thinking over and above hearing and seeing” (Qian 2001: 68). This, however, does not mean that all knowledge of/as virtue comes from knowledge of hearing and seeing, as Wen Weiyao 溫偉耀 argues (Wen 1996: 158). For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between these two types of knowledge, see Huang (2008a: 449–451).
- 8.
It is in this connection particularly interesting to see the unique interpretation Cheng Yi gives of two controversial passages in the Analects: “People can be made to follow [the way] but cannot be made to know it” (8.9); and “Only the wise above and stupid below cannot be transformed into each other” (17.3). For a detailed discussion of this interpretation in contrast to the common interpretations, see Huang (2008b).
- 9.
- 10.
Indeed, the Mohist term for universal love, jian ai 兼愛, is used by Zhang in a different passage:“Nature is the one source of ten thousand things. It is not something that only I have privately. Only great persons can fully realize the dao. Therefore, their establishing [themselves] must be establishing all, their knowing must be knowing all, and their love must be universal love (jian ai 兼愛)” (Zhang 1978: 21).
- 11.
It is important to note that, while Cheng’s emphasis on fen shu makes him a moral particularist, his emphasis on li yi sets him apart from that group, particularly the more radical ones who undermine the significance of moral experience. For example, stressing moral particularity, John McDowell argues that from our moral experiences we can get nothing but “the capacity to get things right occasion by occasion” (McDowell 1998: 94); and Jonathan Dancy maintains that “there is nothing than one brings to the new situation other than a contentless ability to discern what matters where it matters, an ability whose presence in us is explained by our having undergone a successful moral education” (Dancy 1993: 50; emphasis added). For Cheng however, because of li yi, our appropriate love in one situation, for example our love for our parents, can teach us how to love in a different situation, for example our love for our neighbors’ parents, in far more than a contentless way.
- 12.
Here I agree with David Wong that “loving well requires more of a knowing how than a knowing that. It involves being able to yield to the other’s wishes and claims at the right time and in the right way, and being able to refuse these wishes and claims at the right time and in the right way” (Wong 1989: 255–256).
- 13.
This is similar to what Aristotle says: “Those who are not angry at the thing they should be angry at are thought to be fools, and so are those who are not angry in the right way, at the right time, or with the right persons” (Aristotle 1963: 1126a.5–6).
- 14.
This liberal position is based on the time-honored idea that even a band of robbers needs just rules to be effective. For example, in his Republic, Plato says that “utter rascals completely unjust are completely incapable of effective action” (Plato 1963a: 352e). Later, Saint Augustine makes a similar point: “Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms but great robberies? For what are robberies themselves, but little kingdoms? The band itself is made up of men; it is ruled by the authority of a prince, it is knit together by the pact of confederacy; the booty is divided by the law agreed upon” (Augustine 1963: IV.4). At the center of the liberal tradition, Immanuel Kant (1965) also claims that “however harsh it must sound, the problem of establishing a state is soluble even for a nation of devils (as long as they are rational)” (cited in Höffe 1992: 142).
- 15.
For example, although Rawls acknowledges that his principles of justice are chosen by people in the original position who are self-interested (Rawls 1999: 12), such liberals as Robert Audi and Edwin Baker argue that such principles will not make all people self-interested: self-interested people are not allowed to go beyond the bounds of the principles, whereas altruistic people can decide to contribute their just shares to others (Baker 1985: 917–920; Audi 1989: 294).
- 16.
So for Cheng, li (propriety) means three different things: external rules, human feelings, and human nature (which is identical to li [principle]). I hold a different view from Wong Wai-ying, according to whom, ultimately li means external rules and therefore has only an auxiliary function in moral development in Cheng’s philosophy (Wong 2003).
- 17.
In their study of the Cheng brothers, Pan Fuen 潘富恩 and Xu Yuqing 徐余慶 also note this: “humanity, rightness, propriety, and wisdom all originate from people’s feelings. They are made systematic by rulers above and then applied to the people” (Pan and Xu 1988: 160).
- 18.
In recent years, some scholars, following Willard Peterson, prefer to interpret and translate li as “coherence” (Ziporyn 2008, Angle 2009). By coherence, Peterson means the “straight-forward sense of ‘the quality or characteristic of sticking together,’ with the connotations varying according to context” (Peterson 1986: 14). I agree with Peterson that this interpretation is flexible enough to accommodate almost all occurrences of li in the writings of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi. However, this strength perhaps is also its weakness: it is so flexible that it becomes very vague. In particular, it cannot catch the meaning of li as the life-giving activity (sheng 生) that I think is its central meaning, at least in Cheng, and that I will stress in this section.
- 19.
Lu Lianzhang 蘆連章 is wrong to claim that for Cheng, while li is primary, other categories such as tian, xing (nature), xin (heart-mind), and ming (destiny) are secondary (Lu 2001: 116). In contrast, Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 is fundamentally right in pointing out that “the substance, the principle, and the function refer to heavenly creativity… and so change, dao, and divinity are all different names for the tian dao 天道 (heavenly way) itself” (Mou 1990: 2.23).
- 20.
Qian Mu 錢穆 was wrong to claim that there is only wu li 物理 (li of things), but no ren li 人理 (li of humans) in Neo-Confucian philosophy (Qian 1991: 228). In Qian’s distinction between the classical Confucianism of Confucius and Mencius and the Neo-Confucian philosophy of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi 朱熹, classical Confucians talked about dao, which includes only the dao of heaven and of human, but not the dao of things; Neo-Confucians talked about li which includes only the li of heaven and things but not a specific li for humans.
- 21.
Mou Zongsan proposed an alternative interpretation by distinguishing two different kinds of li: li as the ontological/metaphysical foundation of the universe (as expressed in such claims as “the reason ten thousand things form one body is that they all have this li ”), and li as the natural tendencies of particular things (as expressed in such claim as “ten thousand things all have their own li ”). As the former, there is only one li under heaven; but as the latter, each thing has its own unique li (Mou 1990: 2.81).
- 22.
I disagree with Hon Tze-ki’s distinction between li and qi: “While li is structured and orderly, qi is dynamic and creative. While li provides the universe with a system of operation, qi sets the universe in motion, propelled by the duality of yin and yang. To move unceasingly, the universe requires both the structure of li and the dynamism of qi” (Hon 2003: 44). Cai Fanglu 蔡方鹿 also argues that “on the relationship between li and things, Cheng believes that there first exists li and then there exist things” (Cai 1996: 69–79). In contrast, I think Pang Wanli 龐萬里 is right: Cheng Yi believes that li and qi “cannot exist independently from each other. When there is one there must be the other. Therefore, the order of li, qi, and image is made in terms of their importance and not in terms of their temporal order” (Pang 1992: 95).
- 23.
This interpretation of Cheng’s li as life-giving activity has some similarity with A.C. Graham’s interpretation of it as growth. However, Graham arrives at an interpretation of life-giving activity (sheng) that is not very far from the Christian idea of creation, despite his own claim otherwise. For example, he argues that “the Song philosophers do not conceive the origin of things as ‘creation’ by Someone standing outside the universe, but as ‘breeding’ growth’ (sheng) from Something at the root of the universe… . It is precisely because the production and growth of things is not explained by preceding physical causes that it is necessary for them to postulate an unseen source out of which things are continually manifesting themselves” (Graham 1992: 108–109). Here, Graham assumes that for Cheng, the ten thousand things originate from “Something at the root of the universe,” an “unseen source.” This “Something unseen” simply does not exist for Cheng. For them everything can be seen, what cannot be seen is the life-giving activity, li, which is not a thing.
- 24.
The interpretation I present here differs from the one advanced by Mou Zongsan, who claims that Cheng Yi, unlike his brother Cheng Hao, thinks that li is static (Mou 1990: 1.44 and 2.78). Mou’s view has not only been generally accepted by scholars in Taiwan, many of whom are Mou’s students; it has also become popular among scholars in mainland China. For example, Pang Wanli also argues that the two brothers understood li differently: whereas Cheng Hao understood it from the perspective of change and movement, Cheng Yi understood it from the perspective of the static structure of things. Pang also cites Zhang Dainian, among others, in support of this interpretation (Pang 1992: 59).
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Yong, H. (2010). Cheng Yi’s Moral Philosophy. In: Makeham, J. (eds) Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2930-0_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2930-0_4
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