Abstract
Dai Zhen 戴震 (1724–1777) was a prominent philosopher in the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) and a highly influential critic of orthodox Neo-Confucian philosophy. The heart of his philosophical project was to restore feelings and sophisticated faculties of judgment to their proper place in moral cultivation and action. He argued for a more robust form of moral deliberation, one which gives greater deference to both cognitive and affective capacities, and which requires us to examine and often reconsider our spontaneous moral intuitions. He also aimed to broaden the scope of desires that could play a legitimate role in a good and virtuous life. Dai used his considerable philological skills to demonstrate (convincingly, for many) that his Neo-Confucian predecessors had read the Confucian classics through Daoist and Buddhist lenses, which he faulted for many of the errors he found in their moral thought.
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Notes
- 1.
Especially those influenced by Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107), Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529), and above all Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200).
- 2.
Evidential scholars in Dai’s era tended to see such philosophical speculation as lacking in rigor and overly susceptible to political and personal prejudice. For these and other reasons, many of Dai’s acquaintances in evidential studies regarded his fascination with philosophy as unfortunate (Elman 2001: 20–21; Yu 1996: 112–150).
- 3.
For On the Good and Evidential Analysis see Hu (1996: 201–337). For Remnants of Words, see Dai (1991: 64–116). The one complete English translation of On the Good is Cheng (1971). Two regularly cited translations of Dai’s Evidential Analysis are Chin and Freeman (1990), and Ewell (1990). Hereafter specific passages in Dai’s Evidential Analysis will be cited as “Dai 1996a” and followed by the passage’s chapter number, page number in Hu’s edition, and page number in Ewell’s translation. For example, a passage that appears in Chapter 10, page 253 in Hu, and page 146 in Ewell will be cited as “Dai 1996a: 10.253/146.” Unless otherwise indicated, all translations of Dai’s works that appear in this chapter are my own.
- 4.
These three texts were largely (but not entirely) consistent with one another, but as Dai’s views developed he demonstrated increased levels of sophistication regarding the role of the feelings (qing 情) in moral evaluation. For a persuasive argument to this effect see Qian (1972: 334–355, esp. 350).
- 5.
For a more thorough explication of Zhu’s “recovery model” of moral cultivation see Ivanhoe (2000: 43–58).
- 6.
Translation by Gardner (1990: 128). Dai uses the same language of inner and outer but inverts the point, saying instead that learning “takes what exists within and nurtures it from without” (Dai 1996a: 26.292/274). Hereafter, all references to Zhu Xi’s Topically Arranged Conversations of Master Zhu (Zhuzi yulei 朱子語類) will refer to the volume and page number of the 1986 Zhonghua shuju edition. For example, the above passage from volume one, page 161 would be cited as Zhu 1986: 1.161. If the passage also appears in Gardner’s translation (1990), the page number from that work will also be cited in the standard format.
- 7.
Dai’s classification of models of moral cultivation closely resembles P.J. Ivanhoe’s (see Ivanhoe 2000). I borrow Ivanhoe’s language to describe the “developmental” and “acquisitionist” models here.
- 8.
I offer a fuller account of this process in Chapter 3 of Tiwald (2006).
- 9.
A more thorough explication of Dai’s argument for the goodness of human nature appears in Shun (2002).
- 10.
To mention just two pieces of evidence, Dai thinks shu makes it possible to have a personal or embodied (ti 體) understanding of the feelings of others and to share in their sorrows and joys. These tasks presumably require simulation of sorts (Dai 1996a: 10. 255/151; 15.270/199; 43.336/423).
- 11.
Much of the psychological work that Dai attributes to shu suggests that the element of care or concern plays a crucial part. For example, Dai holds that shu is essential to the operations of the great Confucian virtue of benevolence of humaneness (ren 仁), which consists in the ability to attach our own sense of fulfillment or satisfaction to the interests of others (Dai 1996a: 15. 270/199). Presumably simulation or perspective-taking alone is insufficient to achieve so lofty a goal.
- 12.
Note that the question here is not whether a person should have higher order thoughts or reflect on relative moral value at all, but whether they should “become considerations” in one’s decision-making.
- 13.
The Evidential Analysis is not entirely clear about the role of higher order thinking in our moral delight. Some passages imply that our heart/minds take joy in knowing why our morally good conduct is in fact good. Others, however, liken the heart/mind’s delight in morality to the pleasure one gets from good food or other objects of the senses, implying that our heart/mind takes joy in good behavior independently of its underlying grounds or justifications (Dai 1996a: 8). Nivison thinks that Dai misses the subtle difference between these two forms of moral delight (Nivison 1996: 277). Ivanhoe offers the compelling and more charitable interpretation that Dai simply sees higher order reasoning as enhancing or enriching the joy we already derive from good conduct itself (Ivanhoe 2000: 94–95).
- 14.
Zhu is suspicious of weighing for a number of reasons, chief among them that it gives a foothold to rationalization of various (selfish) kinds. When reliable intuitions are tapped, Zhu thinks, little if any thought of one’s own interest takes hold. When we weigh competing alternatives, however, we tend to revise our initial views in ways that better serve our own needs and desires. Zhu makes some exceptions for particularly complex or momentous decisions—such as those where life and death hang in the balance. But on the whole he thinks weighing lends itself to rationalization far more often not, and appears to hold that even the less cultivated among us should guard against it (Zhu 1986: 1.237; Gardner 1990: 188).
- 15.
To this extent Zhu’s model of moral agency lies closer to Daoist ideal of non-action (wuwei 無為), which stresses spontaneity in both thought and action.
- 16.
I have not found a translation of this chapter that does justice to this point about the uncoupling of ease in execution and ease in deliberation. Ewell has perhaps the most accurate rendering of the chapter, but he makes the mistake of translating zide 自得 as “apprehend spontaneously” when in context it almost certainly means “understand for oneself” (Ewell 1990: 396).
- 17.
For example, Dai (1996a: 12) takes up the Doctrine of the Mean’s (Zhongyong 中庸) discussion of reverential attention (jing 敬).
- 18.
- 19.
The Five Relationships are between ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife, older and younger brothers, and mutual friends (see Mengzi 3A.4 and Doctrine of the Mean Chapter 20).
- 20.
Part of this confusion has to do with the economy of language prized by Confucian scholars, and part with the unspecified scope of the character “desire” (yu 欲) as Neo-Confucians use it. When Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017–1073) asserts that moral agents achieve the right state of mind by being without desires (wu yu 無欲), does he mean that we should be without all of them, or merely certain kinds of them? Would he distinguish between desires as dispositions and desires as occurrent states? (The Neo-Confucians tended to use yu in the latter sense, but there are instances of both.) The terseness of Zhou’s writings makes it difficult to answer these questions, but given the sophistication of his moral psychology it is hard to imagine that he did not have a well-considered view. See Zhou (1975: Chapter 20).
- 21.
As an aspirant to the civil service, Dai must have studied Zhu’s commentaries in preparation for his several attempts at passing the imperial examination, and Dai’s early mentor, Jiang Yong 江永(1681–1762), was an admirer of Zhu. See Yu (1996: 210–229).
- 22.
- 23.
Zhu, by contrast, suggests that the desire for delicacies often oversteps the more acceptable want of basic sustenance: “Hunger and thirst are matters of Heavenly Principle, but the want of fine flavors is a human desire” (Zhu: 1986 1.223).
- 24.
See Dai (1996a: 21.282–283/240–241).
- 25.
See Zhu’s remarks on Analects 4.16 in his Collected Commentary on the Four Books.
- 26.
This point assumes that being self-consciously self-interested promotes one’s own life-fulfillment or prudential good. A stronger claim would be that this sort of self-interest is itself a moral good. What could justify such a claim? Some virtue theorists assume that virtues must contribute to the moral agent’s own flourishing; many see human flourishing as involving some combination of the agent’s own well-being and the exercise of sophisticated cognitive and emotional capacities. A desire for one’s own life-fulfillment (as envisioned by Dai) performs both functions: it contributes to the agent’s well-being and it exercises some of our most sophisticated capacities, for it asks us to see how things could fit into an overall good life and then strive for them. Such a desire would thus be a plausible candidate for a virtue. If this is Dai’s view, then he would appear to follow closely an argument Eirik Harris makes for a virtue of self-love, which, as Harris shows, likely has roots in the thought of Kongzi and Mengzi (Harris 2010).
- 27.
“There is no [arrangement of] feelings (qing 情) such that one could need to fulfill the lives of others without also [wanting to] fulfill one’s own life” (Dai 1996a: 10.253/147).
- 28.
A case in point is Cheng Yi’s notorious remark that widows should not be permitted to remarry even if they lack the resources to eat. Cheng suggests that they should regard starvation as extremely small and insignificant (ji xiao 極小) when compared with the preservation of their integrity or chastity. See Zhu and Lü (1992: Book 6, Chapter 13); for an English translation see Chan (1967: 177). Thanks to P.J. Ivanhoe for this apt example.
Bibliography
Although there is a great deal of contemporary literature on Dai Zhen, to date only a sliver of it focuses primarily on his philosophical arguments and views, and even less addresses in detail his views on moral deliberation and moral cultivation. Readers interested in further study of Dai’s moral thought are encouraged to examine some of the books and articles highlighted below.
Chan, Wing-tsit. 1967. Reflections on Things at Hand: The Neo-Confucian Anthology Compiled by Chu Hsi and Lü Tsu-Ch’ien. New York: Columbia University Press.
Chan, Wing-tsit. 1989. Chu Hsi: New Studies. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Chen, Rongjie 陳榮捷. 1992. Discussions of the Collected Detailed Commentaries on Reflections of Things at Hand 近思錄詳註集評. Taibei 臺北: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局.
Cheng, Chung-ying. 1971. Tai Chên’s Inquiry into Goodness. Honolulu: East-West Center Press. (The only complete translation of Dai Zhen’s “On the Good.”)
Chin, Ann-ping, and Freeman, Mansfield. 1990. Tai Chen on Mencius: Explorations in Words and Meanings. New Haven: Yale University Press. (Of the two English translations of the Evidential Analysis listed in this bibliography [the other being by John Ewell], this is the more readable. However, significant portions are inaccurate [Van Norden 1993] and should used in consultation with the original text or Ewell’s translation.)
Dai, Zhen 戴震. 1968. Collected Works of D ai Dongyuan 戴東原集. Taibei 臺北: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan 臺灣商務印書館.
Dai, Zhen 戴震. 1974. The Collected Writings of D ai Zhen 戴震文集. Beijing 北京: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局.
Dai, Zhen 戴震. 1991. Remnants of Words 緒言. In The Dai Zhen Research Group 戴震研究會 (ed.), Complete Collection of D ai Zhen 戴震全集, vol. 1. Beijing 北京: Qinghua daxue chubanshe 清華大學出版社. (One of Dai’s lesser-known philosophical treatises, which addresses topics in Confucian metaphysics, human nature, and self-cultivation. More than half of this text was eventually integrated into his “Evidential Analysis”; it is therefore regarded by some as a transitional work.)
Dai, Zhen 戴震. 1994. “Supplemental Commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean 中庸補注.” In Zhang Dainian 張岱年 (ed.), The Complete Writings of D ai Zhen 戴震全書, vol. 2.. Hefei 合肥: Huangshan shushe 黃山書社. (Dai never finished this commentary, but it reveals much about his understanding of the Doctrine of the Mean, a Confucian classic that had a marked influence on Dai’s views about moral cultivation.)
Dai, Zhen 戴震. 1996a. “Evidential Analysis of the Meaning of Terms of the Mencius 孟子字義疏證.” In Hu Shi (1996). (Dai’s philosophical masterpiece, which addresses most directly his views on moral deliberation and cultivation.)
Dai, Zhen 戴震. 1996b. “Letter to Duan Yucai (II) 與段玉裁書(二).” In Hu Shi (1996).
Dai, Zhen 戴震. 1996c. “On the Good 原善.” In The Philosophy of Dai Dongyuan 戴東原的哲學. In Hu Shi (1996). (Dai’s first major philosophical work, presented as a series of interpretations of contested passages in the Confucian canon.)
de Bary, Wm Theodore and Richard Lufrano (eds.). 2000. Sources of Chinese Tradition: From 1600 through the Twentieth Century, second edition. New York: Columbia University Press.
Doctrine of the Mean 中庸. 1990. In The Four Books and the Five Classics 四書五經. Beijing 北京: Zhongguo shudian 中國書店.
Duan, Yucai 段玉裁. 1974. “Chronological Biography of Dai Dongyuan” 戴東原先生年譜. In The Collected Writings of D ai Zhen 戴震文集. Beijing 北景: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局.
Elman, Benjamin. 2001. From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China. Los Angeles: UCLA Asian Pacific Monograph Series.
Ewell, John W. 1990. Reinventing the Way: Dai Zhen’s Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in Mencius (1777). PhD dissertation, Berkeley. (Probably the most accurate [but perhaps not the most readable] of the available translations of Dai’s Evidential Analysis.)
Fingarette, Herbert. 1979. “Following the ‘One Thread’ of the Analects.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Thematic Issue 47s: 373–405.
Gardner, Daniel. 1990. Learning to Be a Sage: Selections from the Conversations of Master Chu, Arranged Topically. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Harris, Eirik L. 2010. “The Nature of the Virtues in Light of the Early Confucian Tradition.” In Kam-por Yu, Julia Tao, and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Taking Confucian Ethics Seriously: Contemporary Theories and Applications. Albany: SUNY Press.
Hu, Shi 胡適. 1996. The Philosophy of D ai Dongyuan 戴東原的哲學. Taibei 臺北: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan 臺灣商務印書館. (An influential work of intellectual history that focuses on Dai’s philosophical thought, written by one of his most prominent advocates.)
Ivanhoe, Philip J. 2000. Confucian Moral Self Cultivation, Second Edition. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. (This book includes a chapter on Dai Zhen that is incisive, accessible, and deals in depth with his account of moral education and development.)
Ivanhoe, Philip J. 2005. “The ‘Golden Rule’ in the Analects.” In David Jones (ed.), Contemporary Encounters with Confucius. LaSalle, IL: Open Court Press.
Lao, Siguang 勞思光. 1981. History of Chinese Philosophy, New Edition 新編中國哲學史. Taibei 臺北: Sanmin shuju 三民書局. (Includes a philosophically substantive overview of Dai’s thought, written by one of his strongest critics.)
Liang, Qichao. 1959. Intellectual Trends in the Ch’ing Period, translated by Immanuel Hsü. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Liu, Youming 劉又銘. 2000. Li Inheres in Qi: A Study of the Qi-based Ontologies of L uo Qinshun, W ang Tingxiang, G u Yanwu, and D ai Zhen 理在氣中: 羅欽順、王廷相、顧炎武、戴震氣本論研究. Taibei 臺北: Wunan 五南.
Makeham, John. 2003. Transmitters and Creators: Chinese Commentators and Commentaries on the Analects. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asian Center.
Mengzi 孟子譯注. 1990. Translated and annotated by Yang Bojun 楊伯峻. Beijing 北京: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局.
Nivison, David S. 1996. The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese Philosophy. Edited by Bryan Van Norden. Chicago: Open Court. (Nivison’s seventeenth chapter, “Two Kinds of ‘Naturalism,” draws interesting comparisons between what we might call the “metaethics” of Dai Zhen and Zhang Xuecheng.)
Nussbaum, Martha. 2001. Upheavals of Thought. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Qian, Mu 錢穆. 1972. An Intellectual History of China’s Last 300 Years 中國近三百年學術史, vol. 1. Taibei 臺北: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan 臺灣商務印書館. (A very solid account of the evolution of Dai Zhen’s philosophical thought, combined with historical background.)
Shun, Kwong-loi. 2002. “Mencius, Xunzi, and Dai Zhen.” In K.L. Chan Alan (ed.), Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. (This essay argues that Dai Zhen shared common cause with Xunzi, in spite of Dai’s claims to the contrary. It also offers a careful explication of Dai’s Evidential Analysis.)
Tiwald, Justin. 2006. Acquiring “Feelings that Do Not Err”: Moral Deliberation and the Sympathetic Point of View in the Ethics of Dai Zhen. University of Chicago: PhD dissertation. (An examination of Dai’s ethics, focusing in particular on his account of moral deliberation.)
Van Norden, Bryan W. 1993. Review of Ann-ping Chin and Mansfield Freeman, Tai Chen on Mencius. Journal of Chinese Religions 21: 148–150.
Van Norden, Bryan W. 2007. Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Yu, Yingshi 余英時. 1996. On D ai Zhen and Z hang Xuecheng: A Study of the History of Academic Thought in the Middle Qing Period 論戴震與章學誠: 清代中期學術思想史研究. Taibei 臺北: Dongda 東大. (Perhaps the most widely read work of intellectual history on Dai Zhen, with special attention paid to Dai’s unfashionable love of philosophy and his influence on the philosopher-historian Zhang Xuecheng.)
Zheng, Zongyi 鄭宗義. 2005. “On the Formation of the Confucian Line of Thought Which Holds that Nature is Qì 論儒學中氣性一路之建立.” In Yang Rubin 楊儒賓 (ed.), Confucian Theories of Qì and Gongfu 儒學的氣論與工夫論. Taibei 臺北: Taida chuban zhongxin 台大出版中心.
Zhou, Dunyi 周敦頤. 1975. “Penetrating the Book of Change” 通書. In The Complete Works of Master Zhou 周子全書. Taibei 臺北: Guangxueshe yinshuguan 廣學社印書館.
Zhu, Xi 朱熹. 1986. Topically Arranged Conversations of Master Zhu 朱子語類. Edited by Li Jingde 黎靖德. Beijing 北京: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局.
Zhu, Xi 朱熹 and Lü, Zuqian 呂祖謙. 1992. Reflections on Things at Hand 近思錄. See Chen (1992).
Acknowledgements
My thanks to Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden for their comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
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Tiwald, J. (2010). Dai Zhen on Human Nature and Moral Cultivation. In: Makeham, J. (eds) Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2930-0_19
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