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Comparative Evaluations of Innovative Fisheries Management pp 233–246Cite as

How to Compare (the Efficiency of) Fisheries Management Systems?

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Abstract

To realize the very substantial economic benefits offered by many fish resources an appropriate fisheries management system must be installed. The number of possible fisheries management systems is very large, as demonstrated in the paper. It is obviously not practical to compare the empirical outcomes of all these systems. It is therefore potentially very useful to develop a reasonably simple measure to assess the economic efficiency of the various fisheries management systems that may be proposed. Luckily, it turns out that by appealing to the basic theory of property rights and economic efficiency such measures are available. In the paper, two such measures are proposed; a simple graphical measure based on radar diagrams and a more flexible numerical measure, referred to as the Q-measure. The properties of these measures are discussed in the paper and their use illustrated by means of examples.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The number of subsets of rules from a set of n different rules is given by \(2^n - 1\).

  2. 2.

    This, of course, assumes something less than perfectly altruistic individuals.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics Oddi v. Sudurgotu, University of Iceland, IS-101, Reykjavík, Iceland

    Ragnar Arnason

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  1. Ragnar Arnason
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Correspondence to Ragnar Arnason .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Marine Research, Nordnesgaten 50, Bergen, 5817, Norway

    Kjellrun Hiis Hauge

  2. Innovative Fisheries Management (IFM), Aalborg University, Willemoesvej 2, Hirtshals, 9850, Denmark

    Douglas Clyde Wilson

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Arnason, R. (2009). How to Compare (the Efficiency of) Fisheries Management Systems?. In: Hauge, K., Wilson, D. (eds) Comparative Evaluations of Innovative Fisheries Management. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2663-7_11

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