Abstrct
The phenomenological study of consciousness is the study of consciousness from the inside. The simplicity of this definition is, however, merely apparent. The idea of studying consciousness from the inside is amenable to two distinct interpretations. One of these interpretations is almost universally presupposed in recent influential scientific and philosophical treatments of consciousness outside of the phenomenological tradition. The other interpretation forms the conceptual core of the phenomenological approach but has, for the most part, been curiously overlooked in those recent scientific and philosophical treatments.
When recent influential scientific and philosophical treatments of consciousness talk of studying consciousness from the inside, they do so through the prism of what Husserl called the natural attitude. From the phenomenological perspective, on the other hand, the idea of studying consciousness from the inside is constituted precisely by the rejection of the natural attitude. The two interpretations are, therefore, irreducibly distinct. They are not, necessarily, incompatible: arguably, both may be required for a complete understanding of consciousness. However, the distinctness of the interpretations does mean that recent scientific and philosophical treatments of consciousness have overlooked something crucial to consciousness. Indeed, I shall argue that they have overlooked what is most important about consciousness.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Husserl E (1970) Logical investigations (trans: Findlay J). Routledge, London
Husserl E. (1983) Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy (trans: Kersten F). Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague
Jackson F (1982) Epiphenomenal qualia. Philos Q 32:127-132
Jackson F (1986) What Mary didn’t know. J Philos 83:291-295
Kaplan D (1989) Demonstratives. In: Almog I, Perry J, Wettstein H (eds) Themes from Kaplan. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Kripke S (1980) Naming and necessity. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
McGinn C (1989) Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind 98:349-366
McGinn C (1991) The Problem of consciousness. Basil Blackwell, Oxford
McGinn C (2004) Consciousness and its objects. Oxford University Press, New York
Merleau-Ponty M (1962) The phenomenology of perception (trans: Smith C). Routledge, London
Nagel T (1974) ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ Philos Rev 83:435-450. (Reprinted in Nagel (1979) Mortal questions. Cambridge University Press, New York. All page references are to the latter).
Nagel T (1986) The view from nowhere. Oxford University Press, New York
Noë A (2004) Action in perception, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
O’Regan K, Noë A (2001) A sensorimotor theory of vision and visual consciousness. Brain Behav Sci 24: 939-1031
Polanyi M (1962) Personal knowledge. Routledge, London
Rowlands M (1999) The body in mind: understanding cognitive processes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/England
Rowlands M (2001) The nature of consciousness. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Rowlands M (2002) Two dogmas of consciousness. J Conscious Stud 5-6. Special edition, Noë A (ed) Is the visual world a grand illusion?
Rowlands M (2003) Consciousness: the transcendentalist manifesto. Phenomenol Cogn Sci 2(3):205-221
Rowlands M (2006) Body language: representation in action. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Yarbus A (1967) Eye movements and vision. Plenum, New York
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Rowlands, M. (2010). Consciousness. In: Schmicking, D., Gallagher, S. (eds) Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2646-0_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2646-0_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-2645-3
Online ISBN: 978-90-481-2646-0
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)