Case Analysis I: Tarski’s Semantic Approach in the Metaphysical Project

Abstract

In this chapter, as a case analysis of one representative, influential and significant approach in the metaphysical project concerning truth, and to explore its due ‘perspective’ status in a complete account of truth, I give a critical examination of Tarski’s semantic approach, which is largely formally presented for the sake of meeting his substantial need of capturing our pre-theoretic understanding of truth and his formal needs to be explained below. I intend to explore to what extent, and in which aspects, Tarski’s semantic approach, as one reflective elaboration perspective of our pre-theoretic understanding of truth, is (or can be) successful for its alleged substantial purpose, i.e., to capture the core idea of our pre-theoretic understanding of truth. I thus identify and evaluate the due function and limitation of a Tarski style approach in the truth-constitutional-characterization project concerning the metaphysical dimension of the philosophical concern with truth. In so doing, I also suggest a Tarskian general account of what it is to be a truth definition. Through this case analysis, I intend to pave the way towards the suggested theory, i.e., SPT, in the last chapter, in view of a number of related sub-projects in the metaphysical project concerning truth.