We propose to model the consistency-preserving aspect of preference change after the fashion of belief revision. First, we discuss the formal properties of the preference notion. Second, we discuss the various consistency requirements imposed on preference sets. Third, we discuss representations of consistency-driven preference change and compare them to models of belief change. Last, we discuss the specific needs of introducing a priority index in models of preference change. We conclude that while the general input-assimilating framework from belief change can be transferred to preference change, several modifications are necessary. In particular, the input model has to be complicated with the introduction of a distinction between primary (non-linguistic) and secondary (linguistic) inputs. Sentential representation has to be used with somewhat more caution for preferences than for beliefs. The priority-setting mechanism has to be adjusted, and priority-related information must be included in the inputs.
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Grüne-Yanoff, T., Hansson, S.O. (2009). From Belief Revision to Preference Change. In: Grüne-Yanoff, T., Hansson, S.O. (eds) Preference Change. Theory and Decision Library, vol 42. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2593-7_8
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