If the (un)trustworthy are rare, people will talk about them, making their detection more reliable and/or less costly. When, however, both types appear in large numbers, detecting (un)trustworthiness will become considerably more difficult and possibly too costly to provide a positive feedback supporting preferences underlying trustworthy behavior. We analyze how the composition of a population of trustworthy, respectively, untrustworthy individuals evolves if the cost and reliability of type detection depend on the population composition.
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Güth, W., Kliemt, H., Napel, S. (2009). Population-Dependent Costs of Detecting Trustworthiness: An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis. In: Grüne-Yanoff, T., Hansson, S.O. (eds) Preference Change. Theory and Decision Library, vol 42. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2593-7_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2593-7_12
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