Abstract
Moral disagreement is to be expected in modern, pluralistic societies. Rational and reasonable persons can and do disagree about the appropriate solutions to various moral problems. Though each party to a moral disagreement may derive moral answers to moral problems in a morally justifiable fashion, different persons will not necessarily arrive at similar moral conclusions. This results from the combination of the under-determination of morality by reason and the related fact of rational moral pluralism . So, when persons who disagree encounter one another in a situation in which they must determine the right thing to do, they may not agree upon the appropriate solution, even when all parties actually desire to reach a solution.
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Notes
- 1.
Engelhardt , H. Tristram, Jr. (1986). The Foundations of Bioethics, 1st ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- 2.
While it is true that Engelhardt ’s theory does allow persons to recognize that the limits of justifiable political power mean that they must allow others to perform some actions, even though their own moral views may show an action to be wrong, this is not all that Engelhardt argues. His theory argues for a secular account of morality, by which we may conclude that certain actions are morally wrong, at least insofar as moral authority can bind one in a secular and pluralistic context.
- 3.
It is not necessarily the case that this is precisely how the authors of these theories would state the goals of their theories. I believe that it is a fair interpretation of their goals; but even if it is not, this is the way in which these theories are often used. It is still relevant that they are not capable of accomplishing this particular goal. In Chapter 5 it is argued that they can achieve a similar goal in more limited settings.
- 4.
See Loewy , Erich. (1997). Moral Strangers, Moral Acquaintance, and Moral Friends. New York: State University of New York Press, and Wildes , Kevin Wm., S.J. (2000). Moral Acquaintances: Methodology in Bioethics. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Their views, which differ importantly, are discussed in depth in Chapter 5. Though Engelhardtians might be willing to agree with some or all of the conclusions derived by an appeal to moral acquaintances , I believe it does represent a departure from Engelhardtian theory. This is also discussed in Chapter 5.
- 5.
Supreme Court of New Jersey, “In the Matter of Karen Quinlan, An Alleged Incompetent”, in Ethical Issues in Death and Dying (1977). 1st ed., Robert F. Weir, ed. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 274–277.
- 6.
“A Demand to Die” (1998), in Cases in Bioethics: Selections from the Hastings Center Report, 3rd ed. Bette-Jane Crigger, ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 110–111.
- 7.
Information about this case derived from: Perry JE, Churchill LR, Kirshner HS. (2005). “The Terri Schiavo Case: Legal, Ethical, and Medical Perspectives.” Annals of Internal Medicine 143(10):744–748; Wolfson, J. (2005). “Erring on the Side of Theresa Schiavo : Reflections of the Special Guardian ad Litem.” The Hastings Center Report, 35(3):16–19; Koch, T. (2005). “The Challenge of Terri Schiavo : Lessons for Bioethics.” Journal of Medical Ethics 31(7): 376–378; Dresser, Rebecca. (2005). "Schiavo 's Legacy: The Need for an Objective Standard." The Hastings Center Report 35(3):20–22; “Schiavo Case Tests Priorities of GOP” Shailagh Murray and Mike Allen. The Washington Post; March 26, 2005; A.01.
- 8.
Or, at least, no recognized self-contradiction, given that it is likely that many large sets of beliefs contain conflicting claims that have not been considered contemporaneously, and so the contradiction has gone unnoticed. Reason, as understood herein, will require that such contradictions, once noted, be addressed in a fashion adequate to resolve the contradiction.
- 9.
H. Tristram Engelhardt , Jr. (1996). The Foundations of Bioethics, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 7.
- 10.
The term “contentful” means “having a significant amount of moral content,” similar to Engelhardt ’s usage of the term “content-full.” See, e.g., H. Tristram Engelhardt , Jr. (1996). The Foundations of Bioethics, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 7, where he contrasts content-full morality with procedural morality. I avoid that term here, as it may be misinterpreted to imply that the moral view being described must be “full” or “complete,” which can suggest that all possible moral issues have been addressed by the view. A contentful moral view may not address all possible moral issues, but must address a significant amount.
- 11.
Defined as, “those who share enough of a content-full morality so that they can resolve moral controversies by sound moral argument or by an appeal to a jointly recognized moral authority whose jurisdiction they acknowledge as derived from a source other than common agreement.” Ibid. The latter portion of the definition is best understood as a specification of the former, as the source for accepting the legitimacy of such a recognized moral authority can only be an appeal to their shared content-full morality. This is shown in Chapter 5, esp. in The Separation of the Moral and the Social.
- 12.
H. Tristram Engelhardt , Jr. (1996). The Foundations of Bioethics, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 253–258.
- 13.
Ibid., pp. 67 and 123. Engelhardt also enjoins moral strangers to abide by a principle of beneficence , but this principle is so limited as to be a non-factor in nearly all debate amongst moral strangers. See Chapter 2, “Content-Free” Ethics.
- 14.
This important phrase, as employed by Beauchamp and Childress , is not defined here and not easy to clearly define. See Chapter 3, especially Two Versions of the Common Morality, for significant discussion of this. A “morally serious person” is, roughly, a “reasonable” person (as defined above) who seeks moral resolutions to moral problems.
- 15.
See, e.g., Jonsen, Albert R. and Stephen Toulmin. (1988). The Abuse of Casuistry . Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 16–20.
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Hanson, S.S. (2009). Justifying Moral Claims in a Pluralistic Society. In: Moral Acquaintances and Moral Decisions. Philosophy and Medicine, vol 103. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2508-1_1
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