Memory and Action: The Conscience of Time in Personal Becoming in Bergson and Blondel

Abstract

The aim of the article is to highlight the role of memory in subjective practical human becoming, in its particular relation given by action. Bergson and Blondel have both paid particular attention to action, conceived as a sphere of emerging of the conscience of the passing of time. Nonetheless, their analyses differ in the meaning attributed to action: while Bergson considers it as a limited part of human life, requiring a homogeneous and “spatial” approach to reality, Blondel enlarges the meaning of the term “action” to reach what, even in cosmic becoming, represents the radical spring of ontological novelty and tendency to fulfilment. According to a different evaluation of action in the context of human life, their works also offer a different conceptualisation of becoming and of the role of memory, as a deeper concept than a simple collection of memories.