Abstract
It is sometimes said that while we have an obligation to cure disease and prevent or ameliorate disability, we do not have an obligation to enhance or improve upon a normal healthy life. Indeed it is often said that not only do we have no obligation to enhance, we have a positive duty not to do any such thing. Enhancements are often, perhaps most usually considered anathema In this paper we argue against this assertion and maintain that not only does such an obligation exist, but also where it is possible to confer upon one’s child certain health advantages or enhancements, then to fail to enhance is in fact to disable them.
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Quigley, M., Harris, J. (2009). To Fail to Enhance is to Disable. In: Ralston, D., Ho, J. (eds) Philosophical Reflections on Disability. Philosophy and Medicine, vol 104. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2477-0_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2477-0_7
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