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Empirical Evidence that the World Is Not a Computer

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Imagine Math 2
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Abstract

In this chapter, I assess the hypothesis that the world is a computing device. According to this hypothesis, programs or algorithms running on this device generate the numerical values of physical parameters, including the empirical data sets that we collect in the course of observations and measurements in science. I shall argue that this hypothesis entails a testable prediction, namely that empirical data sets form algorithmically compressible strings. The discovery of empirical data sets that are algorithmically incompressible would therefore refute the hypothesis. I shall argue that we already have good evidence that some empirical data sets are algorithmically incompressible, from which I conclude that we can rule out that the world is a computing device.

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McAllister, J.W. (2013). Empirical Evidence that the World Is Not a Computer. In: Emmer, M. (eds) Imagine Math 2. Springer, Milano. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-2889-0_15

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