# Complexity Theoretic Bounded Rationality and Satisficing

Conference paper

## Abstract

Formally, the orthodox rational agent’s ‘Olympian’ choices ([9], p. 19) appear to be made in a static framework. However, a formalization of consistent choice, underpinned by computability, suggests *satisficing* in a *boundedly* rational framework is not only more general than the model of ‘Olympian’ rationality; it is also consistently dynamic. This kind of naturally process-oriented approach to the formalization of consistent choice can be interpreted and encapsulated by varieties of frameworks of *theories of complexity*.

## Keywords

Rational Agent Decision Problem Rational Choice Turing Machine Bound Rationality
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