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Two Agent Allocation Problems and the First Best

  • Manipushpak Mitra
Part of the New Economic Windows book series (NEW)

Abstract

We consider a general class of two agent allocation problems and identify the complete class of first best rules. By first best rules we mean allocation rules for which we can find efficient, strategyproof and budget balanced mechanisms. We show that the only first best rules are the fixed share allocation rules.

Keywords

Allocation Rule Transfer Rule Complete Class Indivisible Good House Allocation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Italia 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Manipushpak Mitra
    • 1
  1. 1.ERU — Indian Statistical InstituteKolkataIndia

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