Agency and Inter-agency, Action and Joint Action: Theoretical and Neuropsychological Evidence

  • Davide Crivelli
  • Michela Balconi


Agency deals with action, self-consciousness, and causality dimensions as a constitutive and pervasive aspect of human experience. The self is not a static entity but most of the time is an acting-self. To be an agent means to be in action and to encounter objects or subjects to interact with.


Parietal Cortex Joint Action Causal Power Mirror Neuron Collective Intention 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Italia 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Davide Crivelli
    • 1
  • Michela Balconi
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PsychologyCatholic University of MilanMilanItaly

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