The Neuropsychology of Senses of Agency: Theoretical and Empirical Contributions

  • Michela Balconi


This chapter considers the two different levels of agency: one comprising lower-level, pre-reflective, and sensorimotor processes (feelings) and the other higher-order, reflective, or belief-like processes (judgments). Here, different theoretical and methodological perspectives are adopted in order to represent a compound view of the sense of agency. In addition, the concepts of “minimal” and “narrative” self are analyzed, both of which contribute to the individual’s identity. As suggested by recent models, short-term and long-term representations of agency are needed to explain the contribution of experiences and actions to the construction of the subjective sense of continuity along one’s personal story. In this perspective, agency is represented as the present sense of self in action, as well as the continuous sense of self in existence.


Autobiographical Memory Motor Command Sensory Feedback Tactile Stimulus Rubber Hand 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Italia 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michela Balconi
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PsychologyCatholic University of MilanMilanItaly

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