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Affordances and the Sense of Joint Agency

  • Jérôme Dokic

Abstract

All of us are aware when we are doing something. We have a sense of our own agency. We can also be aware that another agent is doing something. Thus, we have a sense of the other’s own agency. The relationship between these two types of awareness of action is the subject of intense debates in the philosophy of mind and in cognitive science. Some authors argue that our awareness that we are doing something ourselves is in fact complex. It involves the sense of agency; we are aware of a bodily action in contrast to a mere passive movement. For instance, I am aware that I am slapping my hand on the desk, and not merely that my hand is slapping the desk (perhaps as the result of a reflex, or an external manipulation). But it also involves a different sense, of being the author of the action; we are aware that we ourselves are doing something, in contrast to another agent.

Keywords

Joint Action Mirror Neuron Biological Motion Social Perception Joint Agency 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Italia 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jérôme Dokic
    • 1
  1. 1.École des Hautes Études en SciencesSociales & Institut Jean-NicodParisFrance

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