Abstract
All of us are aware when we are doing something. We have a sense of our own agency. We can also be aware that another agent is doing something. Thus, we have a sense of the other’s own agency. The relationship between these two types of awareness of action is the subject of intense debates in the philosophy of mind and in cognitive science. Some authors argue that our awareness that we are doing something ourselves is in fact complex. It involves the sense of agency; we are aware of a bodily action in contrast to a mere passive movement. For instance, I am aware that I am slapping my hand on the desk, and not merely that my hand is slapping the desk (perhaps as the result of a reflex, or an external manipulation). But it also involves a different sense, of being the author of the action; we are aware that we ourselves are doing something, in contrast to another agent.
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Dokic, J. (2010). Affordances and the Sense of Joint Agency. In: Michela, B. (eds) Neuropsychology of the Sense of Agency. Springer, Milano. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-1587-6_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-1587-6_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Milano
Print ISBN: 978-88-470-1586-9
Online ISBN: 978-88-470-1587-6
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