Body and Self-awareness: Functional and Dysfunctional Mechanisms

  • Michela Balconi
  • Adriana Bortolotti


Some features of human experience contribute to a person’s self-consciousness as the “ability to represent one’s own bodily and mental states as one’s own states” [1]. Although some aspects of this ability are phenomenologically the same, they are heterogeneous on both the functional and the representational level. Experienced phenomena involved in self-consciousness are the sum of one’s own experiences, the perspectivity of these experiences, the sense of ownership of one’s own body parts, the sense of agency of actions, the sense of authorship of thoughts, and the trans-temporal integration of all this into autobiographical knowledge [1]. These aspects highlight the psychological, physiological, and neural mechanisms involved in bodily experience and important for self-consciousness.


Body Part Insular Cortex Rubber Hand Body Schema Phantom Limb 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Italia 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michela Balconi
    • 1
  • Adriana Bortolotti
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PsychologyCatholic University of MilanMilanItaly

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