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Mechanisms Supporting Cooperation for the Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma Games

  • György Szabó
  • Attila Szolnoki
  • Jeromos Vukov
Part of the New Economic Windows book series (NEW)

Abstract

We survey the evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma games where players are located on the sites of a graph, their income comes from games with the neighbors, and the players try to maximize their income by adopting one of the successful neighboring strategies with a probability dependent on the payoff difference. We discuss briefly the mechanisms supporting the maintenance of cooperation if the players are located on a lattice or on the so-called scale-free network. In the knowledge of these mechanisms we can introduce additional personal features yielding relevant improvement in the maintenance of cooperative behavior even for a spatial connectivity structure. Discussing several examples we show that the efficiency of these mechanisms can be improved by considering co-evolutionary games where players are allowed to modify not only their strategy but also the connectivity structure and their capability to transfer their strategy.

Keywords

Monte Carlo Cooperative Behavior Evolutionary Game Connectivity Structure Payoff Matrix 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Italia 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • György Szabó
    • 1
  • Attila Szolnoki
    • 1
  • Jeromos Vukov
    • 1
  1. 1.Research Institute for Technical Physics and Materials ScienceBudapestHungary

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