Abstract
A PS game is a TU game where the sum of a player’s marginal contribution to any coalition and its complement coalition is a player specific constant. For PS games the prenucleolus coincides with the Shapley Value. In this short paper we show that if ℒ is an anonymous linear subspace of TU games such that it has a basis which is a subset of the class of unanimity games, then the prenucleolus coincides with the Shapley value on ℒ if and only if ℒ is a subset of the class of all PS games.
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Kar, A., Mitra, M., Mutuswami, S. (2010). A Characterization Result on the Coincidence of the Prenucleolus and the Shapley Value. In: Basu, B., Chakravarty, S.R., Chakrabarti, B.K., Gangopadhyay, K. (eds) Econophysics and Economics of Games, Social Choices and Quantitative Techniques. New Economic Windows. Springer, Milano. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-1501-2_34
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-1501-2_34
Publisher Name: Springer, Milano
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