Abstract
We show the existence of a first best incentive compatible mechanism for the queueing model that satisfies identical preferences lower bound. We call this mechanism the FB′ mechanism. We also show that for the queueing model, either with three agents or with four agents, the FB′ mechanism is the only first best incentive compatible mechanism that satisfies identical preferences lower bound.
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© 2007 Springer-Verlag Italia
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Mitra, M. (2007). Preferences Lower Bound in the Queueing Model. In: Chatterjee, A., Chakrabarti, B.K. (eds) Econophysics of Markets and Business Networks. New Economic Windows. Springer, Milano. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-0665-2_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-0665-2_17
Publisher Name: Springer, Milano
Print ISBN: 978-88-470-0664-5
Online ISBN: 978-88-470-0665-2
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