Debt-credit Economic Networks of Banks and Firms: the Italian Case

  • Giulia De Masi
  • Mauro Gallegati
Part of the New Economic Windows book series (NEW)


A first analysis of the Italian system of banks and firms was carried out using an approach based on network theory. The emerging architecture of this economic network shows peculiar behaviors. Big banks are creditors of many firms; among these, big firms are financed by several banks. On the contrary, small firms are preferentially financed by small banks, covering very often the entire credit they need.


Degree Distribution Large Bank Small Bank Bipartite Network Bank Relationship 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Italia 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Giulia De Masi
    • 1
  • Mauro Gallegati
    • 1
  1. 1.Dipartimento di EconomiaUniversità Politecnica delle MarcheAnconaItaly

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