Information and Cooperation in a Simulated Labor Market: A Computational Model for the Evolution of Workers and Firms

  • S. A. Delre
  • D. Parisi
Part of the New Economic Windows book series (NEW)


In free markets workers and firms exchange work for salaries and they have both competing and mutual interests. Workers need to work to get a salary but they are interested in getting as high a salary as possible. Firms need to hire workers but they are interested in paying them as low a salary as possible. At the same time both categories need each other.


Labor Market Labor Demand Work Agent Lower Salary Regular Network 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Italia 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • S. A. Delre
    • 1
  • D. Parisi
    • 2
  1. 1.Faculty of Management and OrganizationUniversity of GroningenThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Institute of Cognitive Sciences and TechnologiesNational Research CouncilItaly

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