Abstract
As the recent global crisis (GFC) unfolded, a consensus was forged among a group of developed countries and EMEs, under the aegis of the G20, to tackle the associated issues on a coordinated basis. The main partners in such a coordinated response were envisaged to be: (i) national policy-making bodies, viz. central banks, national and subnational Governments (especially Finance Ministries), and Financial Regulatory & Supervisory Authorities and (ii) international bodies comprising (a) an IMF reformed so as to give EMEs and LDCs a greater say in its policies and greater participation in its governance structure, (b) influential international advisory groups such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and G20 and (c) international financial standard-setting bodies such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). This chapter is devoted to an extended discussion of how successful were the national and international bodies in facing the several challenges involved in a coordinated response to maintaining global financial systemic stability.
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Notes
- 1.
The G20 was formed in December 1999 and involves an annual meeting of the central bank governors and finance ministers of its members (the EU and 19 other countries including India) and occasional meetings of heads of member states.
- 2.
The FSB was established at the Second G20 Leaders’ Summit held in London (2 April 2009).
- 3.
As noted by Bernanke (2004, p. 2) constrained discretion allows policymakers “considerable leeway in responding to economic shocks, financial disturbances and other unforeseen developments … however this discretion of policy makers is constrained by a strong commitment to keep inflation low and stable”.
- 4.
If government expenditure is fully tax-financed, then the rise in government expenditure is directly offset by the decrease in private incomes. Even if the government expenditure is financed via bond issuance, these bonds are not viewed as additions to net wealth—fully rational consumers anticipate that future interest payments on the government debt (as well as the amortization charges) will lead to higher future taxes, in anticipation of which consumers raise their current savings. Thus, the rise in government expenditure is matched by a corresponding rise in private savings. Leaving the aggregate demand unaltered.
- 5.
Shadow banking may be taken to refer to the several financial institutions (such as securitization vehicles, money market mutual funds, investment banks, mortgage companies.) which carry out diverse traditional banking activities but do so outside the ambit of regulated banking activities. More precisely, they may not exactly be unregulated but are only loosely regulated (in any case much less so than commercial banks) (see Goodhart 2008; Posar and Singh 2011; Adrian and Ashcraft 2012, etc.).
- 6.
We are confining ourselves here to issues bearing on national policy-making. International aspects are discussed later.
- 7.
The output gap is defined as the difference between the actual output and potential output (the output level that would prevail in the absence of nominal rigidities) (see Blanchard and Galí 2010, p. 3).
- 8.
- 9.
There seems to be some confusion as to whether the use of asset prices explicitly in the Taylor rule corresponds to their use as a target or as an indicator. We feel that explicitly using it as a separate variable is tantamount to using it as a target. If it were treated as an indicator, it would not figure explicitly in the rule—only implicitly through its effect on general inflation or sometimes through some temporary ad hoc adjustments by the central bank to the rule.
- 10.
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 are from the author’s 2014 article “Flawed Cartography? A New Road Map for Monetary Policy”, available at http://xaam.org/flawed-cartography-new-road-map-for/.
- 11.
This possibility assumes particular relevance, when the domestic economy business cycles are not aligned with international cycles.
- 12.
Some limitations of this definition are discussed in Whelan (2009).
- 13.
- 14.
The RBI has already agreed to move to a Basel III framework on the internationally agreed timeline.
- 15.
As was pointed out by the FSAU of the IMF (2013), the current exposure limit (in India) for large loans of 55% of a banking group’s capital is far in excess of global practices of 10–25% and should be brought down in stages. The Report also observed (p. 49) that the issue of “connected exposures” was not getting enough attention in the case of the Indian financial system. More specifically, “cross-guarantees” between financial entities should be sufficiently highlighted as these result in financial interdependency and commensurate concentration of risk.
- 16.
In a typical moral hazard framework, bank management acts in the interest of shareholders that have voting power. If the shareholders of a bank are interested mainly in the dividend payout, the bank’s management may be induced to oblige them by increasing the bank’s risk profile—this is especially true in the absence of a risk-based deposit insurance system (see Flannery 1998; Park and Peristiani 2007; etc.). This tendency is counterbalanced by the fact that bank managements (as well as shareholders to some extent) are also concerned with the banks’ charter value (viz. the ratio of an organization’s market value of equity to its book value of equity) (see Keeley 1990; Demsetz et al. 1996; etc.). In the event of bank failure, bank managers lose prestige and shareholders forfeit charter value. Thus, the consideration of preservation of charter value acts as a restraint on the risk assumption of banks. Depending on which tendency dominates, supervisory ratings will tend to be positively or negatively correlated with dividend payouts. The empirical evidence cited in the above and related papers seems to bear out that risk-averse banks tend to exhibit a positive correlation between bank share earnings and supervisory ratings, while the opposite is true for banks with riskier portfolios (or lower bank capital).
- 17.
There is an increasing move towards risk-based premium systems (RBPs) across the globe, and moving towards an RBP system could be an important move in the direction of strengthening market discipline in India.
- 18.
In India, as in other South Asian countries, as of now, there is no mandatory requirement for a subordinate debt component in regulatory capital, and it is a suggestion worth careful consideration as to whether such a mandatory requirement be imposed in the interests of market discipline.
- 19.
See EU (2013).
- 20.
Introduction of numerical benchmarks for the fiscal deficit and debt targets, which take into account the stage of the business cycle, and which provide a criterion against which to assess whether the excessive deficit and debt ratio are sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace.
- 21.
The PCA system in India is in force since 2002.
- 22.
The EIP applies only for all Eurozone member states.
- 23.
An exposure is past due when any amount due under the contract (interest, principal, fee or other amount) has not been paid in full at the date when it was due.
- 24.
Illustratively, the European Bank Authority (EBA) has fixed (i) the absolute component at €100 for retail exposures, and €500 for all other exposures and (ii) the relative component at 1%, which in certain cases could be raised to 2.5%. (see EBA 2016).
- 25.
- 26.
Among suggested TWs, we may prominently mention (i) ratio of official reserves to total short-term external obligations (foreign portfolio investment and total—i.e. private plus public—short-term hard-currency denominated foreign debt), (ii) ratio of foreign currency denominated debt to domestic currency denominated debt (appropriately weighted by maturity), (iii) ratio of short-term debt to long-term debt and (iv) ratio of total cumulative foreign portfolio investment to gross equity market capitalization.
- 27.
SBs could take several forms including (i) requirements on borrowers to unwind positions involving locational/maturity mismatches, (ii) curbs on foreign borrowings, (iii) restrictions on certain types of FPI (foreign portfolio investment) and (iv) import curbs (in exceptional circumstances).
- 28.
“2010 governance and quota reform is an absolute must. It has to be implemented and everybody knows that it is currently stuck before the U.S. Congress. We very much hope that the different branches of the U.S. authorities … will understand the relevance of having an IMF that is representative of the global economy.” Christine Lagarde quoted in The Financial Times (9 October 2014).
- 29.
India is an active member of the FSB having three seats in its Plenary represented by Secretary (EA), Deputy Governor—RBI and Chairman-SEBI.
- 30.
A malus system is an arrangement whereby parties enter into a contract, where payment is related to certain key performance indicators. By contrast, under a clawback provision, part of the contract money already paid is required to be returned in the event of non-fulfilment of certain conditions.
- 31.
Currently 60 countries (including India) are members of the BIS.
- 32.
However, BIS, unlike a central bank, is prohibited from printing currency; loaning or opening accounts to governments; acquiring a significant interest in any business transaction; or engaging in real estate transactions.
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Nachane, D.M. (2018). Revisiting Domestic and Global Macroeconomic Policy in the Aftermath of the Global Crisis. In: Critique of the New Consensus Macroeconomics and Implications for India. India Studies in Business and Economics. Springer, New Delhi. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-3920-8_14
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