Advertisement

A Separate Debt Management Office

  • Charan Singh
Chapter
Part of the India Studies in Business and Economics book series (ISBE)

Abstract

In many countries, both advanced and emerging, during the recent global crisis, scope of fiscal policy was expanded and debt to GDP ratios increased significantly. Consequently, debt management became difficult and coordination between monetary and debt management assumed significance. The setting up of separate debt management office will help to establish transparency, and assign specific responsibility to and accountability on the debt manager. The strategy could ensure that resources are available to the government at competitive market rates of interest prompting expenditure prioritization and fiscal discipline in budget making.

Keywords

Monetary Policy Central Bank Government Debt Government Security Fiscal Deficit 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. Agell J, Persson M (1992) Does debt management matter? In: Agell J, Persson M, Friedman BM (eds) Does debt management matter? Clarendon Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  2. Alesina A, Summers LH (1993) Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: some comparative evidence. J Money, Credit, and Bank 25(2):151–162CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Alesina A, Prati A, Tabellini G (1990) Public confidence and debt management: a model and a case study of Italy. In: Dornbusch R, Draghi M (eds) Public debt management: theory and history. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  4. Bade R, Parkin M (1980) Central bank laws and monetary policy. University of Western Ontario, UnpublishedGoogle Scholar
  5. Bank of England (1995) Report of the debt management. Review available at www.dmo.uk
  6. Barro RJ, Gordon DB (1983a) A positive theory of monetary policy in a natural rate model. J Polit Econ 91(4):589–610CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Barro RJ, Gordon DB (1983b) Rules discretion and reputation in monetary policy. J Monetary Econ 12:101–121CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Bernanke BS, Gertler M (1999) Monetary policy and asset volatility, Fed Reserve Bank Kansas City Econ Rev 84(4)Google Scholar
  9. Bernanke BS, Mishkin FS (1997) Inflation targeting: a new framework for monetary policy? Working Paper No. 5893, National Bureau of Economic ResearchGoogle Scholar
  10. Blejer IM, (2013) Central bank’s outdated independence. Proj Syndicate 1–2Google Scholar
  11. Blinder AS (1997) Distinguished lecture on economics in government: what central bankers learn from academics—and vice versa. J Econ Perspect 11:3–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Blinder AS (2004) The quiet revolution: central banking goes modern. Yale University Press, New HavenCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Blommestein HJ, Thunholm EC (1997) Institutional and operational arrangements for coordinating monetary, fiscal and public debt management in OECD Countries, In: Sundararajan V, Dattels P, Blommestein HJ (eds) Coordinating public debt and monetary management, IMFGoogle Scholar
  14. Blommestein HJ, Turner P (2012) Interactions between sovereign debt management and monetary policy under fiscal dominance and financial instability, OECD working papers on sovereign borrowing and public debt management, No. 3, OECD PublishingGoogle Scholar
  15. Burdekin RCK, Laney LO (1988) Fiscal policy making and central bank institutional constraint. Kyklos 41:647–662CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Carracedo MF, Dattels P (1977) Survey of public debt management frameworks in selected countries, In: Sundararajan V, Dattels P, Blommestein HJ (eds), Coordinating public debt and monetary management, International Monetary FundGoogle Scholar
  17. Cassard M, Folkerts-Landau D, (1997) Risk management of sovereign assets and liabilities, Working Paper No. 166, IMFGoogle Scholar
  18. Committee on the Global Financial System (2011) Interaction of sovereign debt management with monetary conditions and financial stability, lessons and implications for central Banks, (Chairman: Paul Fisher), Bank of EnglandGoogle Scholar
  19. Cukierman A (1992) Central bank strategy, credibility, and independence: theory and evidence. The MIT Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  20. Currie E, Dethier J-J, Togo E (2003) Institutional arrangements for public debt management, Policy Research Working Paper 3021, World BankGoogle Scholar
  21. Demopoulos GD, Katsimbris GM, Miller SM (1987) Monetary policy and central bank financing of government budget deficits: a cross-country comparison. Eur Econ Rev 31:1023–1050CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. El-Erian AM (2013) The threat to the central—bank brand, Proj Syndicate 1Google Scholar
  23. Eschweiler B, Bordo MD (1993) Rules, discretion, and central bank independence: the german experience 1880–1989, Working Paper No. 4547, National Bureau of Economic ResearchGoogle Scholar
  24. Giovannini A (1997) Government debt management. Oxford Rev Econ Policy 13(4):43–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. GoI (2008) Report of the internal working group on debt management. Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of FinanceGoogle Scholar
  26. GoI and RBI (2009) India’s financial sector an assessment. Executive summary vol. I, Committee on Financial Sector AssessmentGoogle Scholar
  27. Goodhart CAE (1994) What should central banks do? What should be their macroeconomic objectives and operations. Econ J 104:1424–1436CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Goodhart CAE (1999) Monetary policy and debt management in the United Kingdom: some historical viewpoints, in government debt structure and monetary conditions, ed. Chrystal (Bank of England; proceedings of a conference organized by the Bank of England), 18–19Google Scholar
  29. Goodhart CAE (2010) The Changing role of central banks, BIS WP, 326Google Scholar
  30. Goodhart CAE (2012) Monetary policy and public debt. Finan Stab Rev, 16Google Scholar
  31. Grilli V, Masciandaro D, Tabellini G (1991a) Institutions and Policies, Econ Policies, 13Google Scholar
  32. Grilli V, Masciandaro D, Tabellini G (1991b) Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries. Econ Policy 6:342–392CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Hess G (1998), The maturity structure of government debt and asset substitutability in the UK, Mimeo, In: Bank of England conference on the relationship between the level and composition of government debt and monetary policyGoogle Scholar
  34. IMF (2010) Stockholm principles: guiding principles for managing sovereign risk and high levels of Public Debt, IMF ForumGoogle Scholar
  35. International Monetary Fund and World Bank (2003) Guidelines for public debt management—accompanying document and selected case studies. IMF and WB, Washington D.C.Google Scholar
  36. Kalderen L (1997) Debt management functions and their location, In: Sundararajan V, Dattels P, Blommestein HJ (eds), Coordinating public debt and monetary management, International Monetary FundGoogle Scholar
  37. Kanagasabapathy K, Singh C (2013) A separate debt management office: rationale. Scope and Structure, IIMB WPGoogle Scholar
  38. Khan H (2012) Role of state in developing debt markets, RBI Monthly BulletinGoogle Scholar
  39. Kopits G, Symansky S (1998) Fiscal policy rules, Occasional papers 162, IMFGoogle Scholar
  40. Kumar S, Kumar R (2012) Sovereign debt management and monetary policy in India: an empirical investigation of conflict of interest argument. Department of Economic Policy Research, RBIGoogle Scholar
  41. Kydland FE, Prescott EC (1977) Rules rather than discretion: the inconsistency of optimal plans. J Polit Econ 85(3):473–492CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. Mohan R (2003) Fiscal issues and central banks in emerging markets: an Indian perspective, BIS Papers No. 20Google Scholar
  43. OECD (2012) Dept management and goverment securities markets in the 21st century, OECDGoogle Scholar
  44. Paper Approach (2012) Financial sector legislative reforms commission. Ministry of Finance, GoIGoogle Scholar
  45. Reserve Bank of India (2006) Report on currency and finance. RBI, MumbaiGoogle Scholar
  46. Robinson DJ Stella P (1988) Amalgamating central bank and fiscal deficits, In: Mario IB, Chu K-Y (eds) Measurements of fiscal impact: methodological issues, IMF Occasional Paper No. 59, IMFGoogle Scholar
  47. Singh C (2005) Public debt in India: the need to separate debt from monetary management, stanford centre for international development, Working Paper No. 240Google Scholar
  48. Subbarao D (2011) Central bank governance issues some RBI perspectives. Central Bank Governance Group in BIS, BaselGoogle Scholar
  49. Sundararajan V, Dattels P (1997) Coordinating public debt and monetary management in transition economies: issues and lessons from experience In: Sundararajan V, Dattels P, Blommestein, HJ (eds) Coordinating public debt and monetary management, IMFGoogle Scholar
  50. Swinburne M, Castello-Branco M (1991) Central bank independence and central bank functions, In: Downes P, Vaez-Zadeh R (eds) The evolving role of central banks, International Monetary FundGoogle Scholar
  51. Taylor JB (1998) Monetary policy and the long boom. Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis, November/December, pp 3–11Google Scholar
  52. Thorat U, Singh C, Das T (2003) Guidelines for public debt management accompanying document and selected case studies, IMFGoogle Scholar
  53. Togo E (2007) Coordinating public debt management with fiscal and monetary policies: an analytical framework. The World Bank, Banking and Debt Management Department, pp 7–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  54. Vickers J (1999) Monetary policy and asset prices, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, NovemberGoogle Scholar
  55. Wagner H (1998) Central banking in transition countries, IMF Working Paper 98/126, IMFGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer India 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsIndian Institute of Management BangaloreBangaloreIndia

Personalised recommendations